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Over-burdened by history and religious significance, hijab - the Islamic head cover for 
women — exemplifies one of the most controversial female attire of our time, with 
government ban imposed and lifted, triggering heated debate among intellectuals of 
different persuasions and exacerbating the so-called "clash of civilizations." The recent 
return of this practice with implications of tradition and identity among Muslim women 
in the Islamic world at large, even beyond the borders in Europe and the American 
continents, is a conspicuous phenomenon in itself, thus providing a site for critical 
examination as well as theoretical challenge. The current project is an interview-based 
research on the return of hijab among college students in Tunisia, a country often 
regarded as the most advanced Arab nation in terms of women's legal status and civil 
rights. 
The focus is on the perceivable attitudes adopted and voiced by the Tunisian young 
people facing a contemporary moral dilemma under critical circumstances. The most 
influential factors are taken into consideration, including the persistent Orientalist 
representation of Islam, the force of new media in spreading and enforcing religion, and 
the relative absence of critical encouragement in the existing educational system. Based 
on empirical observations, I intend to reconsider the concept of ‘personal choice' with the 
notion of 'practical reason' as a shared human capacity, and then suggest an ontological 
inquiry into the phenomenon of veiling as an activity with everyday implication for those 
concerned. 
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"My idea in Orientalism is to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, 
to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of 
polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate 
whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and 
intellectual exchange." 
Edward Said, Orientalism(1978)' 
"Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus 
Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand." 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) 
According to an earlier report on France 2, the prominent French public TV channel, 
one eye-catching phenomenon has been spotted in Tunisia, one of its numerous 
ex-colonies in North Africa: the madams in the country, especially the young among 
them, are found returning enthusiastically to 'hijab'^, the headscarf for Muslim 
‘Edward Said, preface to Orientalismi^QyM York: Vintage, 1994): xxii. 
-Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM 
Press LTD, 1962): 90. 
3 The word 'hijab' in this thesis is used to refer to the modest head cover worn by Muslim women 
leaving only the face and hands uncovered. Two more popular English words 'veil’ and 'headscarf 
have been used interchangeably for convenience. Considering the complexity of situation regarding the 
’ dress and its naming the following clarification is necessary: first of all, the English word 'veil' can not 
at all contain the multiplicity of its usage in Arabic, which is based on detailed reading of religious 
cannon and concrete local custom of specific regions. According to some of my informants, proper 
dress code in Islam is associated with purity during prayer, which for men is the covering of the part 
from navel to knee, and for women is the whole body except the face and hands. This special 
requirement is associated with the concept of 'awrah, literally meaning genitals, referring to areas of 
the body which must remain covered to maintain modesty. Different interpretation on 'awrah can lead 
to different religious judgment on covering, and a strict interpretation can lead to requirement of full 
covering by dresses like niqab in Saudi Arabia and burqa in Afagnistan. See Gordon Newby, A Concise 
Encyclopedia of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002): 35. Second, for the current case, the 'veil' is better 
considered as referring to a broad way of dress rather than any particular piece of dress, for it is the 
particular religious rules concerning the 'veil' that people are actually trying to follow in practice. In 
the case of Tunisia the color and material of the veils can change from one individual to another so long 
as the basic principle normally regarded as 'not tight, not transparent, not decorative' is observed. 
Whereas within such a definition of 'veil' women are gaining more freedom in dressing differently, a 
stricter definition (specifying requirements in color and form, as the case in Saudi Arabia) will reduce 
the room for fashion concerns, so to speak. Third, nomenclature for the covering can be quite confusing 
in an Islamic country due to influence from local custom and historical transformation. In Tunisia for 
instance, the hijab in the current study can also be called khmar and foulard (the French term for 
headscarf), differentiating itself from safsari (one type of traditional attire that covers the whole body, 
white in color, usually worn by elder women for convenience in daily activity outside, its male 
counterpart is called 'shashiyah', a red hat resembling fez) and the 'Tunisian headscarf (yet another 
fashion slightly different from the 'hijab' by a knot under the chin). Since the government strictly bans 
'hijab' to reinforce its secular policy while granting freedom for what it defines as 'traditional dress', 
the 'Tunisian headscarf is usually adopted by the young women as strategy to enter public facilities 
and avoiding trouble from police on the streets. Finally, the naming is also associated with a person's 
general stance toward religion. Thus the practice of veiling can be commended as turning 
'mutadayyanah'(meaning the faithful and pious in Tunisian dialect), 'muhtashimah' 'muhtaramah' 
‘mutawadu‘h’(meaning in Arabic 'humility' 'respect' and 'modesty'), or be dismissively regarded as 
'muta'assibah' (meaning religious fanatic) and 'hunjiya'(another name for the 'fanatic', with 
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women. Under the faithful filming of the French camera, what appears novel is a 
conspicuous new way of dressing that floods the main streets and crowded markets, 
adding a colorful yet uncertain tone to the secular dress code that has been dominating 
the country since its independence. This fashionable new outfit usually consists of a 
down-to-chest scarf covering the head, and myriad ways of matching it: ranging from 
long sleeved blouse, jilbab (a full-length robe wrapping the body loosely), to skinny 
jeans and up-to-toe long skirt, just to describe a few possible styles visible in public 
places. It seems that hijab, the controversial attire once strictly banned by the local 
government to reinforce its secular policy, is finally gaining a secure footing in the 
country. This change has been responded by passionate celebration among young 
followers of the new trend, as one of them expresses in the report: "thanks to God, 
things are getting better now that women are no longer prevented from exercising 
their personal choice." Yet for another young lady majoring in religious studies who ‘ 
happened to be the only one without scarf in her class, the growing hijab fad does not 
seem to be overwhelmingly positive, given its dubious correlation to one's genuine 
�religiosity. As she puts it curtly during the interview: "whether to wear hijab or not is 
merely an issue between oneself and God". 
The fashionable hijab embraced by young Tunisians is by no means a local vogue and 
,, its popularity is pan-Arab as well as international. Another recent documentary which 
appeared on "Al-jazeera", one of the most widely-watched TV channels in the 
Arabic-speaking Middle East, can serve as a handy illustration for the far-reaching 
influence of the new fad, raising perplexing questions as well. The documentary 
appeared as an insertion for a special religious lecture on hijab given by Yusuf 
Qaradawi, a renowned Egyptian Islamic scholar who is followed by a wide audience 
around the region. Presented as the authoritative response to the arising confusion • 
about the correct way of wearing hijab and its religious implication, the talk of Imam 
Qaradawi is a detailed exposition on the necessity of wearing hijab. According to him, 
the wearing of hijab not only constitutes an indispensible religious obligation for 
Muslim women, but also embodies a crucial emblem by virtue of which the modesty 
cherished by Muslim women is clearly distinguished from the the pitiful status as 
sheer visual objects suffered.by their western counterparts. Setting himself up as a 
moderate voice in the contemporary Islamic world, Qaradawi cautiously leaves niqab 
(a full covering of the whole body except the eyes, usually in black and worn together 
with a pair of gloves) for personal option, yet requires the wearing of hijab as a 
disparaging suggestion for 'narrow-mindedness' 'conservative in religious matters' or 'difficult to deal 
with'. Its masculine form is found more frequent in common usage, often alluding to people who grow 
beard in order to imitate the popular image of Prophet Mohammed and sticking firmly to religious 
cannon). 
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non-negotiable religious obligation clearly stipulated by the Qu'ran and Hadith. 
Nevertheless, even a quick glance at the following interview on the streets of Cairo 
can reveal the insurmountable difficulty of the eloquent Imam to put forward his 
admonition in reality. Unlike the ubiquitous niqab in Saudi Arabia or burqa in Iran, 
hijab on the streets from Cairo to Tunis today with infinite individual preferences for 
color, material and style can bewilder the observer, all rendering the Imam's attempt 
to regulate a "modest" dress code implausible. Given this increasingly stylish feature 
and highly idiosyncratic personal preference in the new hijab trend, the confusion 
around it appears inevitable, as the reporter puts it at the beginning of the interview: 
"the colorful hijab, the brown hijab, and the black loose hijab, all of them are hijabs 
provoking furious debate among various sides within Islamic society." To complicate 
the situation even further, according to the short interview, no two women on the 
street of Cairo are found in agreement with each other on the meaning of hijab. While 
some women are criticizing the current trend with indignation as running contrary to 
the modesty required by Islam, others are downplaying the importance of covering by 
comparing it with the true value of one's inner virtue; whereas some are convinced 
that 'hijab' is required by Islam with definite principles regarding how and why it is to 
be worn, some simply consider it as a mere way of dressing having dubious origin in 
religion. Given the flamboyant appearance of the new hijab and disparate opinions 
� . arising with it, it is not surprising that the reporter arrives at the conclusion, that 
"every woman now is wearing the hijab in a way she deems as suitable." 
The new phenomenon reported by the documentary appears to be no more than an 
ordinary fashion among the young Arabs. Since all faddish objects come and go 
rapidly, it seems reasonable to conclude that no serious attention should be paid to it. 
However we will discover in our inquiry that the return of hijab is by no means 
merely a commonplace fad picked up by the young Muslims, for it has aroused heated 
debate among those concerned within the Islamic world and outside it. Further, 
current controversy around the dress has added new questions to the existing research 
of the garb of Muslim women, challenging the previous definition of personal choice 
and the early way of interpreting the veiling phenomenon. 
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Chapter One Background of the Research and Its Main Theoretical Questions 
To begin our inquiry, in this chapter I will first introduce the political background of 
Tunisia relevant to the debate on hijab. After that, I am going to lay out briefly 
different opinions held by Tunisians today toward the return of hijab. Further, I will 
offer a critical review on some of the existing literature discussing the return of the 
veil inside both the Islamic and western countries. At the end of the chapter, I am 
going to propose two main theoretical questions I am going to deal with in this thesis. 
1. New Features of the Hijab Trend and the Debate over it in Tunisia 
The hijab worn by young Tunisians today is distinctively different from its historical 
predecessors in terms of its appearance. Further, the return of hijab among young ‘ 
Muslims is not a local trend confined to Tunisia but rather a global phenomenon. 
In terms of appearance of the attire, it is relatively easy to distinguish the hijab on 
Tunisian street today from its historical predecessors, such as the white full-length 
safsari and the monochromatic hijab emerged in the 80s during the revival of Islamist 
movement in Tunisia. The hijab today looks not only more colorful but also more 
idiosyncratic for the observer, illustrating a variety of personal tastes and preferences. 
Unlike the hijab in the 80s, the followers of which demanded radical Islamilization of 
the country, the association, if any, between the hijab in Tunisia today and political 
Islam is quite loose. For some of my interviewees, politics hardly play any role in 
their choice of veiling, and they are concerned more with personal expression and 
standards of beauty rather than religious implications of the attire. Further, as we will 
see in my analysis of the interviews, that individual difference is found not only in the 
way of wearing the hijab, but also the interpretations developed by the informants for 
the attire. Since a collective political identity is not as clearly indicated in the current 
hijab as in the early one, there's more room for individuals now to have their own 
sayings on the meaning and reason of veiling. 
This individualized hijab trend, as a recent phenomenon found on the rise among the 
young of the country, also has impact beyond the borders of Tunisia. Being an Arab 
country in terms of its history and language, Tunisia has a long-established political 
bond with other Arab countries, which allow news inside the country to travel fast to 
its Arab neighbors^Further, according to many recent researches on the change of 
4 For instance, the Arabic site of 'Aljazeera' published an article earlier on the hijab ban in Tunisia, 
which has generated continuous response from people all over the Arab world, and majority of them 
criticized the Tunisian government for its lack of toleration in religious matters. See 
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dress code among young Muslims, the recent return of hijab is hardly a 
Tunisian-specific phenomenon, but rather a popular trend with wide influence within 
Muslim communities on the global scale.5 
The new hijab, as shown above, is a highly individualized and globalized 
phenomenon. These new features presumably contribute to some identifiable new 
concerns for debates stirred up by the attire. For many early researches on veiling, one 
of the central issues has been women's status and their equal rights within Islam. 
Since the practice has been condemned for a long time by the West as institutional 
oppression for women, these researches find gender implication of veiling an 
unavoidable question to address. Some of them choose to defend the practice through 
exploring the unique view of Islam on gender issues, as well as complex theological 
implications for covering within Islam and other monotheist religionsv^ Even for 
those discussing the practice from a secular framework, the women's status in Islam 
remains a central issue to be clarified, if not defended.7 Although women's status is 
still touched upon by current debate of veiling, it does not constitute the central 
concern for those joining the debate right now. For these works, the point of 
contention has been shifted from the question of equality to the question of personal 
choice. As we will see in literature review, the individual right of carrying out 
,, requirements of one's religion has replaced gender equality as the basic point of 
argument today. For defenders of the veiling now, what at issue has no longer been the 
treatment of women in Islam, but rather the relation between veiling and freedom of 
conscience. Admittedly, it is inevitable for any argument for the freedom of choosing 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/483DBB42-4776-4450-B92B-B35ED3A4325A.htm 
5 In Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, Kathryn M. Robinson mentioned the dress code 
among the young Indonesians are more conservative compared with that of previous generations, as 
way of expressing their Muslim identity. See Kathryn M. Robinson, Gender, Islam and Democracy in 
Indonesia(HQv^ York: Routledge, 2009): 119. In another research on the dress code of young Muslim 
immigrants in Canada, Homa Hoodfar also identifies the rise of more strict form of veil among the 
young, possibly linked with the prevailing prejudice against Islam and Muslims after 9/11, and other 
fitting problems shared by the immigrants. For details see Sajida Alvi et al, ed, The Muslim Veil in 
North America: Issues and Debates (Toronto: Women's Press, 2003). 
6 In her influential work Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society, Fatima 
Memissi proposes a positive reading on ‘fitna’, a central concept used usually as justification for 
veiling. According to her, to require veiling out of fear for \fitm, can also be considered as admitting 
the hidden subversion of female sexuality. The similar exploration on the 'hidden empowering 
message' of veiling can also be found in the work of Alfa Youssuf,, in which she associates veiling 
with idea of invisibility in Islam. According to her, since God is the most powerful figure invisible, the 
ideology of covering can also be read as granting Muslim women the spiritual sacredness through 
making them invisible. 
7 For works in this kind, please refer to Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of 
a Modem Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). M.M. Charrad. "Cultural Diversity 
within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia," in Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity within Unity, ed. 
Herbert L.Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi( Boulder: Rienner, 1998). Zahra, Kamalkhani, Women's Islam: 
Religious Practice among Women in Today 's Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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the veil to first define what veiling is, and in some cases, whether it is a necessary 
religious obligation in Islam, and the fairness of making such a requirement if it is. 
Yet it must also be noticed that such inescapable referring to the gender implications 
of veiling is already not the same with making the gender issue a crucial point of 
debate. For the argument over whether Muslim women, as citizens with rights, should 
be allowed to pick up the veil through their free choice, neither is the concrete 
religious requirement in this regard a central concern, nor the direct relation between 
treatment of women and veiling, if any. In our later analysis of the question of choice 
and its accompanied moral dilemma, we will develop this point further. 
Before reviewing on the recent discussion on the hijab, I will first briefly outline the 
debate over this new fashion inside Tunisia, so that it can be used as a reference point 
for comparing cases mentioned later in other studies. Besides, such a general 
introduction of the current public debate in Tunisia is also helpful to locate specific 
cases I am going to use later in chapter two during further development of my main 
arguments. In order to facilitate the reading, I have classified the existing points of 
view into three groups according to the political affiliation of the people concerned 
and differences in their opinions held. However, given the complexity of debate and 
nuanced differences in individual stances, the division is by no means exhaustive, and 
, overlaps should be expected to be found between groups. 
• The Tunisian government: 
Ever since its independence, Tunisia has devoted to the modernization process: it 
succeeded in achieving steady economic growth on an annual basis, providing 
first-rate, public-funded education till college level for its citizens, and curbing 
efficiently the religious extremism within the country. When it comes to women's 
position, Tunisia is arguably one of the most advanced Arab countries, where the 
female citizens are not only offered full legal rights in all aspects, but are granted 
certain privileges that are not shared yet by many of its European counterparts.^ 
Setting itself up as the firm devotee of modernization and the faithful guardian of 
women's rights, the Tunisian government always finds hijab, as a symbol loaded with 
religious connotation, vexingly unsettling, if not totally out of place within its 
8 The leading role played by Tunisia in regard of women's legal rights among its Arab counterparts is 
truly commendable, which can be illustrated by the following facts: Tunisian female is able to transmit 
their citizenship to offspring recently, a right that is granted to women in U.K. only in 1980s, and a new 
measure put into effect in 2006 allows mother to work part-time for two-third of their salary remained, 
while retaining full rights in terms of retirement and social security, see Andrew Jeffreys, ed., The 
Report: Tunisia 200P(Tunisia: Oxford Business Group: 2009): 19. 
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demarcated secular framework of development. Ever since the country's 
independence in 1956，the government has made securing the secular rights of women 
one cornerstone of the nation's development scheme. In this regard, the ex-president 
Habib Bourguiba first laid down Code of Personal Status, a special amendment to the 
family laws of shari ’a, as the bedrock for enhancing women's social status, whereby 
women are protected against polygamy, unilateral divorce and male guardianship. 
This pro-feminist legislative tradition has been furthered by his successor, the current 
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Among his recent political achievements, Ben Ali 
has introduced reforms regarding mother's rights of passing the citizenship to the 
offspring, improved the working condition for the female workers, and provided the 
divorced women with more working privileges. 
Given such pro-secular political agenda of Tunisia, it is predictable that the 
government casted an unfavorable eye on women's covering throughout the country's 
I 
national history.^ The full-length covering popular in the pre-independence era was 
discouraged by Bourguiba soon after the country's won of its autonomy from the hand 
of French, signifying his resolution toward modernizing the na t ion .� The hijab in our 
9 This comment is drawn based on the overall political attitude held by the government in this regard. 
However, a further investigation will reveal that, women's covering in Tunisia has a twisted fate 
" through the modern era due to political manipulations imposed on it. Back to the country's colonial era, 
covering of women \yas first condemned by the French colonizers as suggesting a 'lamentable 
backwardness of culture', and consequently defended by Bourguiba, the national leader then, as the 
unbreakable icon for Tunisian identity. See Nadia Nadja Mamelouk, "Anxiety in the Border Zone: 
Transgressing Boudaries in Leila: revue illustr^e de la femme (Tunis, 1936-1940) and in Leila: 
Hebdomadaire Tunisien Independant (Tunis, 1940-194 l)"(PhD diss.，unpublished): 164. The debate 
between colonizers and nationalists at this period is the presumably the earliest contention stirred by 
women's covering inside the country. At the same time, another nationalist named Tahar Hadad 
published a controversial book，arguing against the veiling on the grounds of its imposed huge 
inconvenience on the modern way of living, and its basic incompatibility with the modern spirit as he 
defines it. According to Hadad, being modern is synonymous with pursuing the life-style of 
petite-bourgeoisie, which was popular among European countries he deeply admired. For English 
translation of Hadad's book, see Ronak Husni and Daniel L.Newman, tran.，Muslim Women in Law 
and Society: Annotated translation of al-Tahir al-Haddad's Imra 'tuna f i 'l-shari 'a wa ‘l-myjtama'’ with 
an introductioni New York: Routledge, 2007). Because of his overt support for the French opposition 
against veiling, Hadad was condemned by the nationalists at his time as sympathizer of the colonial 
bureau, and died with his radical arguments largely unheard by the general public. Nevertheless, the 
basic ideas expressed by Hadad have ironically influenced one of his contemporary opponents, Habib 
Bourguiba, who later launched a nation-wide reform against covering during his presidency. Largely 
inspired by Qasim Amin(an Egyptian nationalist who initiated the very first debate on veiling in the 
modern age) and his earlier attack on veiling Hadad uncritically followed Amin's misleading 
associating veiling with comparison of cultural superiority. Although the social effects of veiling are 
disputable, it is another issue to compare the superiority of culture through referring to the practice. For 
a powerful critique for such cultural comparison in debates on veiling, see Leila Ahmed, Women and 
Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate '(New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992):144-188. 
Inspired by Ataturk's reform in Turkey, Bourguiba has adopted a pro-secular stance in his planned 
national reform. Compared with the moderate policy of his successor, president Bourguiba's reform is 
way more rigid in terms of its treatment of religion. Historical records suggest Bourguiba not only kept 
secularization his guiding principle of reform, but also got intimately involved in observing his held 
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discussion first appeared in Tunisia at the beginning of 1980s, which witnessed a short 
revival of Islamist movement within the country. The hijab back to then symbolized 
political solidarity with the Islamist faction during the political upheaval. Alarmed by 
such close relation between veiling and the political Islamism，the Tunisian 
government subsequently promulgated a regulative act prohibiting hijab in all public 
places. " Although recent development seems to suggest loosening of the 
governmental ban over headscarf, sporadic censorships experienced by some veiled 
women reveals a somehow ambivalent attitude of Tunisian government in this regard. 
12 
For our current case, the stance of Tunisian government on hijab has a direct influence 
on those concerned. This is so especially with some of the veiled who claim to rebel 
against what they consider as 'unfair treatment of religion' and ‘loss of faith' in the 
country's ban of hijab. In this regard we can raise the following question around the 
stance of Tunisian government mentioned above: considering the country's effort in 
making laws in favor of women's rights, the government seems to have reinforced 
human rights within the secular framework. Yet, if it is so, how should we conceive 
accusation from the veiled that the government has infringed their right of practicing 
the religion? Indeed, if the right of a citizen is adequately conceived and fully granted, 
� is it supposed to include the right of observing the requirements of one's religion, so 
long as the required practice does not interfere with more crucial interests of the 
public? Surely the government may justify the ban on the account of curbing the 
beliefs himself: he was the one who symbolically lifted the hijab of Tunisian women after the country's 
establishment, and also the one who breaks the rule of fasting in Ramadan in a high-profile gesture. See 
Fred Halliday, "The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the challenge to the secular 
state", in Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, ed. Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan(New 
York: Routledge, 2004): 102-109. 
“ T h e hijab ban has been constantly criticized by NGOs inside the country as violation of democracy 
and infringement on human rights, see Khedija Sharif, A Setback to Women 's Rights in Tunisia, 
http://www.humanritihts-geneva.inFo/spip.php?article3002. 
12 The following two reports indicate a nuanced change in the Tunisian government's recent stance 
toward the earlier hijab ban: back to 2006, in its response to outside criticism for its hijab ban, the 
Tunisian government called the headscarf the 'sectarian dress imported from the gulf，thus alien to the 
Tunisian tradition as it defines it. See Daniel Lav,, The War Over the Veil in Tunisia, 
http://www.nawaat.org/portail/2006/ll/23/the-war-over-the-veil-in-tunisia/. Yet in last year's annual 
report, the government complicated the situation by on the one hand, ruling out the niqab as usual, and 
on the other, claiming to support all kinds of 'Tunisian scarves'. See Andrew Jeffreys, ed., The Report: 
Tunisia 200P(Tunisia: Oxford Business Group: 2009): 10. Since the ‘Tunisian scarf thus defined 
makes no detailed distinction between existing kinds of covering, the government can therefore justify 
its sporadic censorship on the headscarf. Although none of my veiled informants has reported having 
trouble with the their scarves, some reports on 'al-mauqif' (a local weekly newspaper, famous for its 
sharp political critique) suggest otherwise: in one case, a female teacher was under the headmaster's 
special summon presumably due to her headscarf, and in several other cases one veiled student was 
denied by the registration office, one deprived the opportunity of receiving her won prize in a public 
occasion, and another expelled from her school. See 'al-mauqif' on Jul 11, 2008，Oct. 10, 2008, Dec 19, 
2008. 
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religious extremism, yet in that case we can still question how the veiling is 
ideologically associated with the religious extremism as it defines it. These 
considerations are crucial because they lead to a central theme of the current debate 
on veiling, personal choice and its complex implications for the matter of veiling. As 
we will see in the later analysis, that both for the defenders and opponents of the 
practice, the definition of personal choice is subject to constant dispute. 
• Feminists: 
Given that a large amount of existing literature on the Muslim veiling has touched the 
gender implication of the practice, I will therefore make the opinions of Tunisian 
feminists I have interviewed into an independent section, so that these opinions can be 
read in parallel with arguments made by other Muslim feminists in the literature 
review. 
Before entering into detailed cases of these feminists, it is helpful to have a quick look 
at the historical development of feminism in Tunisia, so that the stories told by my 
informants can be better understood within the current circumstance of discussion. 
The beginning of feminism in Tunisia, like the case with many postcolonial countries, 
was closely connected with the agenda of the nationalist movement to cast a modern 
， image for the newly-independent nation. Consequently although the Tunisian 
nationalist leaders promoted feminist agenda in law and social practice soon after the 
independence, there has never been any bottom-up feminist movement in the country. 
Back to the 50s, the first generation of feminists in the country were subject to direct 
dictation from the one-party government, having little chance of addressing women's 
issues outside the framework demarcated by the male nationalists. '^It is only a 
matter of recent years that individual feminists find themselves more space for having 
independent voice in controversial matters like veiling. As the following cases will 
suggest, the stance taken by individuals from different era, with different persuasion 
can vary significantly from one case to another, although in general all of them agree 
on the worth of pursuing gender justice and commit themselves sincerely to the 
betterment of women's conditions within the country. 
Prof. Khedija Arfaoui is a typical first generation feminist who believes that the 
veiling is overwhelmingly an oppressive institution, thus incompatible with the 
pursuit of gender equality. "^^ Now in her seventies, Khedija still finds herself at total 
For a general introduction of the feminist movement in Tunisia, please refer to Khedija Arfaoui, 
"The Development of the Feminist Movement in Tunisia 1920s-2000s," International Journal of the 
Humanities vol. 4, no. 8(2007): 53-59. 
14 Interview taken in Aug 2009 at Tunis, Tunisia. 
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ease with the secular dress code laid down by the government back in her youth, 
seeing it as a hard-won privilege achieved by efforts of her generation of social 
activists. The way Khedija dressed up during our first meeting was telling: 
sleeveless white skirt with a pair of crimson high wheels; she looked assertive and 
high-spirited despite an unfortunate involvement earlier in a controversial political 
scandal.'^When it comes to the recent soaring of fashionable hijab on the street, 
Khedija briefly commented it as the new fad among the young, which is superficial 
and transient, or as she put it: "let's wait for another 30 years and see if it is going to 
last." According to her personal observation, the zeal of the young today for the new 
hijab is somehow understandable given the popularity of the dress among young 
Muslims global-wide, presumably resulted from critical circumstances facing the 
Muslim community right now. Yet, having witnessed herself the pitiful confinement 
women like her grandmother suffering under full-veiling before the country's 
independence, Khedija is completely convinced that the religious requirement of 
covering, be it by hijab or niqab, is always suspicious of curtailing women's gained 
rights in a country like Tunisia. 
Unlike Khedija who considers the question of equality from the framework of 
secularism, Amel, another prominent feminist scholar in the country, considers it 
important to derive the gender justice from teachings of Islam.'^Amel belongs to 
another generation of younger feminists, for whom the revival of Islamic movement 
in the country during the 80s played a mind-shaping impact. In Amel's own words: 
"the Islamic perspective on women's issues could no longer be overlooked if one 
wanted to defend the established gender order from accusations of Islamists back to 
then." As a university professor in Comparative Religion Amel revealed to me her 
growing worry about the lethargy her students showed toward joining critical 
discussions on religious matters. For her the current hijab fad is resulted from the 
overwhelming religious preaching on the new media, and most of these religious 
sermons are preying on the emotional attachment that many young people have 
toward religion. According to Amel, the public education in Tunisia offers little in 
critical thinking and liberal religious education. This makes her worry that the 
students, when poorly prepared for discerning the bad arguments from the good ones 
in matters of religion, are more likely to be susceptible to the misleading preaching on 
the mass media today. As she recalled in one case, some of her graduate students 
refused to answer questions concerning Nawal Saadawi(an Egyptian activist famous 
15 For report on her case, please refer to http://www.ifex.orti/tunisia/2009/07/10/arfaoui sentenced/. 




for her radical criticism on the misogynist practices inside Islam) during the exam for 
the reason that 'Nawal is a treacherous infidel，，and on their answer sheets these 
students further condemned the feminist movement as being the "enemy of Islam". "I 
call them the generation of hearsay. They do not read, and the only way they get their 
views on Islam is through listening to the Imams on media or chatting with their 
peers", commented Amel during our interview, showing a great concern for the 
deterioration of humanistic literacy among the young Tunisians today. For those fresh 
graduates the job market inside the country is direly saturated, and one main 
alternative for many used to be immigrating to Europe. 口 Yet according to Amel, 
since recently most European countries have made the immigration process harder 
than before，many young students have lost their hope of 'finding the way out'; the 
resort to religion becomes the natural option remained for those in despair of 
unemployment. It is Amel's deep worry that such unoptimistic situation.has further ‘ 
hindered the rational debate among students on religious matters, since those taking 
refuge in religion are likely to hold an unquestioning attitude toward preaching 
received. Without adequate grasp of the religious texts and critical reading of verses 
concerning the practice, most of the veiled college students, as Amel considers it, are 
not really practicing Islam through putting up the veil; discrepancy between one's 
alleged religiosity and actual conducts exist widely among these ardent followers of 
, the new fashion. 
Similar to Amel, professor Labidi is another prominent feminist in Tunisia cares 
1 n 
greatly about women's issue, especially the legal protection for the gender equality. 
Being a productive author for books on feminist history and women's conditions 
inside the country, Labidi considers herself a devoted activist opposing all sorts of 
infringement on women's rights in the name of r e l i g i o n � 9 Yet, quite different from 
her college Amel who finds the return of hijab disconcerting, Labidi seems to hold a 
more understanding stance toward the veiling of her students. Like Amel, as a teacher 
Labidi noticed the rising hypocrisy of some veiled and disconcerted by it profoundly. 
Yet she also believes that many of her students choose to veil out of sincerity of their 
spiritual quest, which is worthy of sympathy and respect. For Labidi the policy carried 
17 The remarkable achievement in public education aside, Tunisia is burdened by a high unemployment 
rate among its young population. According to a recent report the overall unemployment rate inside the 
country was one out of ten, and for the college graduates the figure rises up to 42.5%, which is much 
higher than that of its neighbors like Morocco and Algeria. See Andrew Jeffreys, ed.，The Report: 
Tunisia 2{？卯(Tunisia: Oxford Business Group: 2009):200. ‘ 
18 Interview taken in Aug, 2009 at Tunis, Tunisia. 
For publication of prof. Labidi, see Lilia Labidi, "Islamic Law: Feminism and Family: the 
Reformation of Hudud in Egypt and Tunisia," in From patriarchy to empowerment : women's 
participation, movements, and rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, ed. Valentine M. 
Moghadam(New York. : Syracuse University Press, 2007). 
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out by the Tunisian government regarding veiling is both whimsical and draconian, 
making no distinction between the few religious extremists and the large number of 
law-abiding believers. Hence she is willing to help some of her students getting into 
trouble because of the veil, out of respect and understanding for their just need to 
observe the religion. However, considering the government's unfavorable policy in 
this regard, she sees little point in getting into unnecessary troubles with the veil. 
Personally Labidi believes that it is understandable that one wants to express the 
sincerity of faith in God through veiling, yet for her the sticking to veil is unworthy of 
costing one the opportunity of taking crucial exams, or in some cases, the right to 
enter the college. In one case one of her dear students started veiling a while ago, 
refusing to take off the scarf even during the exam (according to regulations of most 
Tunisian universities, the veil is not allowed inside the exam room), and Labidi 
attempted at times to dissuade the student from her stubbornness, worrying that it 
might lead to undesirable results like failing the exam and repeating one whole year. 
Difference in personal evaluation of the phenomenon aside, the three Tunisian 
feminists have in common the overriding concern for women's social status and rights. 
It is their shared common ground that the actual political rights of women should not 
be reduced nor tramped by the religious requirement of veiling, nor the government's 
、， control over it. Starting with this basic point, we can then arrive at some questions 
under heated debate, such as whether it is possible to reconcile between the Islamic 
requirement of covering with the secular understanding of human rights, and whether 
it is possible to reach middle ground between the individual liberty of practicing the 
religion, and the national interest of controlling religious extremism. In our current 
case, there is another more interesting problem as pointed out by the previous 
comments on veiling, namely, what can be counted as the real practicing of veiling, 
and how it is going to be differentiated from the superficial, or even blind following 
of the fashion, as Amel seems to worry about. All these are crucial points deserving 
further scrutiny if we are aiming at a thorough examination of the hijab trend in 
Tunisia and its theoretical implications. As we will soon discover from other existing 
discussion on the phenomenon inside Tunisia, many non-feminist scholars are also 
complaining about the dissembling behaviors of the veiled, identifying it as a vexing 
social problem plaguing the young population today. Now let's move to more details 
on how the question is raised in other discussions. 
Others: 
First of all, it is necessary for me to make some remarks on the general religious 
background of the country, so that the stances held by interviewees in this section can 
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be understood against this larger background. From our previous introduction on the 
Tunisian government's firm stance against the veiling, we can infer that the political 
influence of Islam in Tunisia is largely limited, compared with the situation in other 
Arab countries in the region such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where the Islamic law 
bear more direct influence on the life of the citizens. Yet insofar as the country's 
major religion and customs are considered, Tunisia is undoubtedly an Islamic country 
where up to 98 percent of its population identifying themselves as Muslim. Islamic 
rituals such as five times pray, annual fasting and traditional Islamic festivals are 
observable for visitors to the country. Besides，located on the south coast of 
Mediterranean Sea, the country has experienced intimate cultural exchange with its 
European and Arab neighbors along its long history, which has definitely contributed 
to the tolerance and open-mindedness of many Tunisians today toward religious 
matters. Historically this peaceful tiny land lying behind the Carthage beach has been 
ruled by Berbers, Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, and Ottomans; co-existence with other 
civilizations and religions therefore constitutes a historical necessity to be handled 
skillfully by residents of this land. As one of my Tunisian friends once commented, 
that one will immediately fall into great puzzle once start to ask what is to be a 
Tunisian，given that this very identity has been subject to countless mixture and fusion 
between different peoples and cultures drawn to this land. 
My contact with ordinary Tunisians during the field trip suggests that the viewpoints 
people held toward the return of hijab is different from one case to another, showing 
tremendous diversity depending on the religious upbringing and political inclination 
of individual. Here 'others' is used as a handy label that covers a wide range of 
opinions from the people I encountered: from liberal intellectuals holding secular 
stance against the ‘interference，of religion to those sticking to more rigid reading of 
religious scripture，from those espousing the liberal religious reform to adherents to 
the rule of religion in all spheres of life. Their expressed opinions can neither be 
subsumed under the official stance held by the Tunisian government, nor the 
relatively distinctive position held by the feminist group, offering a complicated set of 
data conducive to our further philosophical investigation. 
On one end of this spectrum we encounter university professors like Mohammad who 
considers veiling as the new way the young developed among themselves toward 
mutual attraction, and to veil is aimed at alluring the marriageable male through 
advertising one's piety?®Although privately he scoffs at the wide spread of hypocrisy 
of the veiled and disproves the correlation between the outfit and one，inner virtue, he 
20 Interview taken in Aug, 2009 at Tunis, Tunisia. 
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is willing to be more tolerant with his veiled students in the class so long as they do 
not divert the attention of other audience from his lecture. A similar view is shared by 
Ahmed, one of Mohammad's colleagues, who not only denies any moral content 
expressed by veiling, but considers the practice as the misinterpretation of Qu'ran?' 
For him, Qu'ran only uses the word ‘hijab’ to signify the spiritual barrier between 
God Muslims, between prophet Mohammed and the reminder of believers, which has 
• 2 2 • • 
been wrongly understood by some as precepts for the way of dressing. In addition, 
he further argues for the overriding importance of niyah{mQ2inmg the 'good will'), 
which alone defines the real virtue. The young Tunisians' sticking to hijab is mocked 
by Ahmed as superficial and dogmatic，and for him there is noting external that can be 
compared with the good will behind one's behavior. 
Contrary to the sharp criticism aforementioned, the wearing of hijab is considered as 
clearly dictated by Islam, thus obligatory for all Muslim women with another group of 
teachers. For Amad，a professor in social science, the veiling of Muslim women frees 
women from the lustful look of male in the public places. As he sees it, Islam makes 
indisputable requirement regarding women's proper way of dressing, and whoever 
chooses to pick up the veil should discipline herself in the daily life to represent the 
21 Interview taken in Aug, 2009 at Tunis, Tunisia. 
� ‘ 22 In Quran, the word 'hijab', as the most common word used (both by Islamic jurists and average 
Arab-Muslim) for headscarf, is actually never mentioned jointly with the covering of women. 'Hijab' in 
Arabic stems from the verb 'hajaba', the original meaning of which is 'to set a barrier between two 
things', or to 'block something from the sight'. Its use in Quran seems to suggest the spiritual distinction 
between the believer and the unbeliever(in surah/chapter 17 verse 45 by saying 'when thou dost recite 
the Quran, we put, between thee and those who believe not in the thereafter, a veil invisible), and the 
essential difference in terms of the relation to God between prophet Mohammad and other 
Muslims(indicated in surah 41 verse 5，that 'between us and thee is a hijab, so do you go your way and 
we shall go ours'). The word is also to remind the theological inequality between God and human, as it 
is put in surah 42 verse 51，that 'it is not fitting for a man that Allah should speak to him except by 
inspiration, or from behind a hijab.' Insofar as women's covering is concerned, the controversy is 
actually over two places in Quran. The first one is surah 14 verse 31, which requires the believing 
women to 'lower their gaze and guard their modesty, that they should not display their beauty and 
ornaments except what must ordinarily appear, and to draw their veils (the word here mentioned is 
'khmar', as certain kind of modest dress for women) over their bosoms and not display their beauty 
except for the unmarriageable male relatives. The second is the surah 33 verse 59，where the God 
mentions that 'prophet, tell your wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they should cast 
their 'jilbab'(a loose wrapping cloth for women) over their persons for convenience.' The contending 
point here is mainly about, in the first case, how does the word 'khmar', as the suggested modest dress, 
actually look like. The scripture is obscure on this matter since it did not mention exactly what body 
parts to be covered except the bosoms, and therefore different Islamic schools resulted in making 
different requirements of women's covering (for instance, the Malik school, which is the dominant 
Islamic school in Tunisia and Egypt requires women to leave the face and hands uncovered; whereas in 
Salafi school of Saudi, the rule of covering is interpreted more rigidly to include the whole body of 
women.) The second point of contention is whether the requirement to veil is made to the wives of 
Mohammad only or all Muslim women in general. While some Islamic scholars like Yusuf Qaradawi 
considers the veilingt as obligatory for all Muslim women, Muslim feminists like Fatima Memissi 
renders it as referring exclusively to the wives of prophet, and therefore can not be imitated by the 
remainder of believers. See Fatima Memissi, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological 
Enquiry{Oxfox&. Blackwell, 1991):85-101. 
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ideal of Islamic morality. Being asked about the potential disadvantage facing the 
veiled under the country's current policy, Amad shows adamant support for the veiled 
by quoting verses from Hadith, suggesting that those sticking to their faith under the 
hardship will be rewarded thereof. The Tunisian society is seen by Amad as falling 
astray from the ideal Islamic society governed by sha 'ria, or the Islamic law, and the 
current return to hijab is viewed by him as foreshadowing the recovery of faith, which 
has been subject to severe suppression over the years. 
As for the university students, my target group in the inquiry, the opinions they held 
about veiling are less polarized compared to that of the teachers, and a sympathetic 
siding with religion is found common in nearly all cases. Before going into the more 
detailed account of interviews with the students, a general introduction for their 
profiles is needed. The students I have contacted during the field trip were all ‘ 
studying in the Tunis city, the country's capital, where a number of prestigious 
colleges are gathered. With their age ranging from 18 to 30，these students came from 
different majors and included both graduates and undergraduates. Although we met 
each other in the capital city, these students were natives to different provinces of the 
country, and some even came from regions in the far south for better employment 
opportunities in Tunis. In terms of methodology I have included opinions from men 
,, and the unveiled. This arrangement turns out to be quite fruitful through challenging 
one ‘commonsensical assumption' I had before the field trip, namely, the veiled would 
have unique insight into the practice and its implication due to their first-hand 
experience. Yet the result of my interviews suggests otherwise: the stance of the 
veiled is not only undistinguishable from that of the rest (men and unveiled), but it is 
almost incomprehensible without perspectives of men and the unveiled serving as 
complements. For instance, the wearing of hijab is considered by the veiled and 
unveiled alike as a religious duty, and the constant worry about being called 
hypocrites among some veiled can not be understood if it is not read alongside with 
the bitter complaint from some men about the dissembling behavior of their veiled 
girlfriends. Considering this interlocking relation between discourses of different 
groups I am not going to make specific distinction of the interviewee's status, and will 
use data from the veiled, unveiled and the men jointly to illustrate the points of 
discussion. Further, given my main interest in the philosophical reflection on 
questions brought by the current debate, rather than the pure sociological survey of 
existing opinions or ethnographic study of the dress per se, I will exempt myself from 
some irrelevant elaboration on details for individual cases, which appear to serve 
better for anecdotal entertainment rather than rigid analysis. Finally, as for the 
objectivity of the collected data，my way of choosing the interviewees (mainly 
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through the snow-ball effect, starting from friends I have already known before the 
trip), degrees of acquaintance with them, and their respective personal background 
such as place of birth, majors in college and economic status admittedly have their 
respective influence on my observation, and to some extent, my reports on it. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see later, inasmuch as the debate on veiling is concerned the 
discourse people are able to develop is much more decided by factors like the general 
political environment, the religious interpretations they find available and most 
importantly, adequacy of critical thinking, rather than the variant personal status and 
conditions. 
Since analysis of cases of the college students will comprise a major part of our 
investigation, for the time being I shall give a sketchy review for their main 
arguments, so that they can be viewed in a joint light with the earlier stances of the ‘ 
government, the feminists, and the university professors. First of all, for all the 
J 
students I have interviewed the wearing of hijab is considered as an incontestable 
religious obligation, with clear theological reference in Quran. The most frequent 
reason given to support this point is the infallibility and absolute benevolence of God, 
who, as believed by many, offers both the ultimate reason for being modest and the 
final punishment for those who fail to observe it. Although the understanding of how 
, God interacts with the believers is exhibited as different between individuals, it is held 
in common that God should always remain the final judge in matters concerning 
veiling, and no person or Muslim is offered the equivocal right to coerce another 
person or Muslim into this practice. Similarly, for many nor can any Muslim's 
intentional disobedience of the divine order through her unveiling reduce the absolute 
truthfulness in God's requirement for covering and modesty. Second, when it comes 
to the moral hypocrisy many see the necessity of making distinction between those 
veiling out of religious learning and conviction, and those using the headscarf for 
sheer pragmatic ends, in terms of the different retribution they will receive from God. 
Third, all agreed that veiling is a choice to be made by women themselves, and for the 
veiled the individual consent is of specific importance, for it serves the best proof 
against later apostasy. Finally, for these young students to veil is not a mere action 
defined by one's putting on a headscarf. Rather, the practice suggests a whole set of 
rules that every veiled woman must follow, and a cluster of socially-valued behaviors 
that one is expected to observe. The gender-related regulations make up a large 
promotion of these regulations and they are defined with different degree of rigidness: 
for some it is acceptable to mix with men in public so long as the code of modesty is 
observed, and for some it is not real Islamic unless the Saudi-like gender segregation 
is performed in all public facilities. 
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For the first two points, the preceding arguments seem intuitively appealing, and can 
be easily taken as the ordinary vindication given by believers for veiling from a 
religious standpoint, or even a mere theological representation of the practice. This is 
likely to be the case if the reader shares with me a secular upbringing in the case of 
which transcendent arguments like this may sound distant and cryptic. Yet the key 
information revealed by 'the believer's saying' is of fundamental significance for our 
inquiry into the real implications of veiling. Notwithstanding its cliche-like outlook, 
the defense of veiling through a transcendent being is not to be overlooked, since it 
offers the clue for a new way of interpreting the practice, whereby it is treated not as a 
mere presentation but rather a phenomenon with ontological significance for those 
concerned. When defending the veiling, these students are referring to God and Quran 
constantly. Yet it will be too simplistic if we conceive such reference merely as 
embodiment of Islamic teaching or indication of individual piety. Surely an Islamic 
environment is pre-requisite for the basic acquaintance with Islamic canons, and the 
personal devotion to religion might serve a strong motivation for veiling in some 
cases. However to therefore attribute the practice to the existing religious influence 
and personal religiosity will prevent us from seeing the more fundamental 
significance of veiling, which can only be disclosed when we approach the question 
,� of religious background in the right manner. In the later part of the thesis I will further 
explain how the religious background as lived by the veiled can be interpreted in the 
right manner, and why it is important to prioritize such interpretation over any 
isolated reading of the veiling. As I shall argue later, the inquiry into the ontological 
significance of veiling is needed if the religious influence is to be understood rightly 
as reality. By the same token, insofar as personal piety is concerned the ontological 
interpretation of one's final ‘for-the-sake-of-which，(a term to be analyzed in later 
discussion) is needed if it is not to be passed as the common kind of loyalty or 
fanaticism. 
Whereas for the latter two points, the main question concerned is more thematically 
associated with the existing discussion on Muslim women's veiling, as well as our 
proposal to offer a critical examination on the discussion. Whether women are 
allowed to have a choice over the covering and whether veiling implies prejudice 
against the female body are heated questions addressed repeatedly in debates over the 
attire. The question concerning personal choice constitutes the central theme for 
arguments from different persuasions: when it comes to the current debate over the 
attire it is unavoidable to touch questions such as whether women are free in choosing 
the veil and what standard is adopted in judging a choice as truly free. In this regard 
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many of us intuitively agree that personal consent is pre-requisite for any choice, and 
for many Taliban's draconian demand on veiling is unacceptable since it allows little 
room for any personal consent of women involved, at least from the view of observers. 
Since personal consent is related to some valued human rights such as individual 
dignity and self-determination, it is comparatively easy to reach common ground in 
this regard. As we have already seen all my interviewees agreed that a woman should 
be allowed to make the final decision no matter how good the behavior is conceived 
inside Islam. The issue becomes more complicated when it comes to the appropriate 
role of government in the matter of veil: whether it is justifiable for a government to 
ban veiling if the practice is defined as incompatible with the prevailing protocols of a 
society. This raises another consideration over the question of choice, namely, isn't 
the ban of veil infringing the same right of consent of those convinced of the religious 
necessity of covering? This is a crucial question deserving due discussion and I will 
come back to it later when discussing the French ban over headscarf and face-veil. At 
this point I will move on to the personal justification given by the individual for the 
practice and its position in defining a real choice, for this is more closely connected 
with my current research interest. As we shall soon see, for some people the choice is 
free so long as it is absent from external coercion (both physical and mental) and the 
person concerned can somehow justify what she chooses. Accordingly veiling is 
. judged as free so long as woman concerned are not forced into it and capable of 
making certain justification for the practice at the same time. This is so with the 
majority of discussions on this matter, for which the individual reasons for veiling is 
secondary in defining the choice. Choice thus defined is more about the institutional 
arrangement rather than individual feeling or reasoning. This is so both with those 
arguing for the neutral stance of government when it comes to the liberty of 
conscience, thus leaving the issue to be decided by citizens themselves, as well as 
those opposing veiling on the account of its implied oppression for women, which, 
according to these opponents, is systematic to the religious ideology behind. To 
consider the question at the macro level is undoubted necessary for defining the 
proper political policy regarding veiling, and the answer to this question is crucial to 
any political community since it decides the basic rights and liberty citizens inside the 
community are actually entitled to when it comes to religious practice. After all, it will 
be pointless to expect the rational justification from the individuals for their chosen 
practice if the liberty of conscience is absent under the governmental ban denying any 
room for choice in the first place. It is equally unreasonable to expect a fair 
performance of critical thinking in individual cases when the freedom of speech is not 
institutionally protected within one's community, and in that case a daring criticism 
may incur real danger for the outspoken speaker. Therefore, the grand debate on the 
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proper treatment of religion is rightly emphasized by preceding research as the central 
point of contention. 
In the current paper I am going to launch an inquiry on the individual justifications for 
veiling, especially, if it is reasonable to expect a more rational justification for one's 
veiling and consider it as necessary for defining the choice as truly free for the person 
concerned. According to the preceding analysis, surely it is desirable to be free from 
cohesion when it comes to a practice as sensitive as veiling, and for defenders of the 
right of veiling, the governmental protection for the liberty of conscience is 
considered more appropriate than interventional measures like banning, perhaps 
rightly so. Yet when it comes to individual cases, is there any more to be said about 
personal reasoning and its influence on one's actual carrying out of a free choice? In 
earlier researches, the personal reasons for veiling are either treated as secondary due 
to its triviality, or merely used as evidence for the grander analysis of the social 
function of veiling. These individual accounts are seldom examined independently in 
terms of their rigidness of reasoning and consistency with other existing argument，yet 
this does not at all render these self-accounts unproblematic or unworthy of careful 
examination. A closer look shall reveal that taken as a whole the personal discourses 
on veiling are, like many other unexamined daily talks, subject to varying and 
sometimes conflicting influence in one's concrete environment; as a result, the logical 
inconsistency and flaws in reasoning abound. As we shall see in my later analysis for 
individual cases from my conducted interview, when being asked to give an account 
of the reasons of veiling, the discourse one develops freely is far from coherent in 
general arguments and well-examined in terms of the assumptions made. For instance, 
one may on the one hand aspire to a universal understanding of humanity in terms of 
its incomparable dignity and shared natural rights, and on the other hand adopt 
essentialist argument when it comes to women's nature, thus undermining the earlier 
understanding of humanity. It is understandable that inconsistency as such exist 
widely in our daily talking, and to some extent this is better to be attributed to the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of our existential condition as human being, rather than the 
inexactitude of argument or the imperfection of rationality. Yet the natural occurrence 
of such inconsistency does not in any sense make it innocuous or in some cases, 
unavoidable. Although it might be unrealistically pedant to aspire for an ultra-rational 
life pure from any ambiguity, it is equally unreasonable to treat all ambiguity as 
worthy of living with. As I will argue through the case analysis, the fallacy in one's 
� reasoning over veiling can be spotted through deliberation governed by some norms 
of reason, which are not cultural-specific. Further, in the case of Tunisia, leaving the 
ambiguity as it is has increased unnecessary mental burden for those concerned and 
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brought disturbing confusion to their thoughts, which are both removable given 
further critical examination of one's reasoning. Before entering into details of my 
arguments, I will first give a preliminary review of existing discussion on veiling in 
Islam，so that my later critique for points from the debate can be read against a more 
comprehensive background. 
2. Literature review: attack on veiling and the corresponding defense 
After the preparative introduction on the debate inside Tunisia in this section I will 
examine how the debate on hijab has been carried out on a broader stage between its 
supporters and opponents. Although the phenomenon spotted in Tunisia only emerged 
recently, the debate on veiling has a much longer history, drawing attention and 
concern from scholars and communities worldwide on a continuous basis. To make a 
clear sketch of this admittedly lengthy story I shall examine the debate from the cons 
and pros respectively. 
• Attack on veiling 
Opposition against veiling has been found with different groups of people throughout 
history, both within the Islamic world and outside it. Here I will concentrate on one 
, kind of criticism that is most pertinent to our current study. The reasons given by the 
French government in its earlier proposal for niqab ban can serve as a good example 
for how the arguments of this kind of criticism generally go. France has ruled out 
Islamic headscarves in public places since 2004，and this year the government 
attempts to get a bill through, proposing a ban on full-length veil in public. To support 
the ban the French president Nicolas Sarkozy defined the niqab as 'the sign of 
subservience and debasement of women' which is 'not well-come in France', where 
secular human rights are cherished as bedrock for the country's tradition. The view 
has been further supported by Fadela Amara, the French minister in his calling the 
dress as a ‘prison’，and Jean-Francois Cope, another parliamentary leader by stating 
Another typical type of opposition against veiling can be found with some secular feminists, for 
whom veiling is an oppressive institution, which is incompatible with women's rights. Although similar 
to the Orientalist reading in terms of condemnation on covering, viewpoints expressed by these 
feminists are to be distinguished from the former in terms of its genuine commitment for well being of 
those concerned, as well as more comprehensive grasp of exiting cultural diversity within the Islamic 
community. For feminists who arguing from this stance, see Nawal El Saadiwi, To Veil is a Political 
Symbol, http://www.greenleft.org.au/2004/574/32877. On main problem with this kind of argument is 
its neglect for the spiritual needs that considered by many believers as one pivotal aspect of a good life. 
For a comprehensive critique for this point, see Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 174-187. Besides, as I shall 
argue in the chapter four that to view the practice as a total institutional imposition is to overlook the 
onto logical significance of the practice for those concerned. The argument for equality can not take for 
granted the existential reality of people in an Islamic community, for whom veiling constitutes an 
indispensible element of their everyday life. 
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that ‘nobody，in places open to public or on streets, may wear an outfit or accessory 
whose effect is to hide the face'.^'^Similar remarks can also be found with other 
western leaders: for instance, back in 2001，the first lady of U.S. then Laura Bush 
justifies the war in Afghanistan by calling it the liberation of women from their 
imprisonment under the veiling. On other occasions, Tony Blair, the ex-prime minister 
of Britain equals the covering of Muslim women to a 'mark of separation making 
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non-Muslims uncomfortable'. 
At first glance, these arguments seem to suggest an intrinsic incompatibility between 
veiling and modern life on the grounds of practical inconvenience the practice brings 
to modern communication and public security. 'Practical concerns' as such are 
sometimes justified by more sophisticated reference to the necessity of protecting the 
secular public order, which is defined as free from religious interference. ^^  ’ 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the issue reveals some problematic aspects of this line 
of reasoning. For instance, to call veiling as a sign of subservience and debasement of 
women is misleadingly suggesting a connection between the practice and unfair 
treatment of women. Yet in reality little evidence has been given substantially to 
prove that ill treatment of women, say, domestic violence is systematically associated 
with the wife's veiling. Further, nor it is justifiable to ban the practice for the reason 
� of protecting public security, considering its implicit discrimination against a large 
number of peace-loving Muslims. The law's exclusive reference to Islamic veil 
unfairly implies that Muslims are more likely to become the source of threat to public 
security; whereas the security problem can be solved by making specific requirements 
of dress for certain circumstances without referring to the religious implication of the 
dress. For instance, if under some critical situations the covering is considered as 
potentially dangerous for facilitating the bomb-carrying on the public transportation, 
it might be reasonable for the institution concerned to propose a ban for all kinds of 
24 "丁he war of French dressing: France's bar on Burqa", The Economist Jan 16，2010,43-44. 
“ A l i s o n Donnell, "Visibility, Violence and Voice? Attitudes to Veiling Post-11 Setember", in Veil: 
Veiling, Representation and Contemporary Art, ed. David A. Bailey and Gilane 
Tawadros(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003): 126. "Blair's Concern over Face Veils", 
hUp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6058672.stm. 
26 One common defense on the French ban of the hijab refers to the country's cherished laicite tradition. 
For a detailed account for the historical background of secularism in France, see Jocelyne Cesari, 
"Islam and French Secularism: The Roots of the Conflict," 
http://www.pbs.orgAvnet/wideanide/episodes/young-muslim-and-fi.ench/islam-and-french-secularism-t 
he-roots-of-the-conFlict/2524/. Yet it is always contestable whether hardcore secularism as such is the 
best way to solve the assumed conflict between religion and secular state. For a sharp critique for the 
implicit 'secular fundamentalism' underlying the French government's handling with veil, please refer 
to Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America ’s Tradition of Religions 
Equality(HQ^N York: Basic Books,2008): 346-353. According to Nussbaum, this rigid requirement made 
by the European countries for Muslim immigrants is violating the liberty of conscience of those 
involved and making assimilation a unilateral duty from the side of citizens. 
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dress at certain length. This does not have to be done through specifically referring to 
the Islamic veil. 
In the wording of French president, the purity of French culture is defended by the 
leaders against alien elements introduced by the covering. Further, the secular social 
institution is defended against the intervention of religion. However, even 
metaphysically the Frenchness could be distinctively separated from the foreign 
influences, and the secular institution could be decisively differentiated from the 
religious establishment, how can such division work when it comes to real life cases? 
Does the protection of national purity necessitate the actual separation between people 
of different ethnicity and religion? By the same token, can secularism thus defined be 
fully carried out in reality when the fire in the mosque is expected to be put out by the 
government, and the religious establishments are sharing the same sewer system with 
other public facilities? 
One meaningful question to be asked about the French officials' comment on the 
niqab is whether such kind of comments indicates a more implicit cultural prejudice 
against Islam. When it comes to this point we must look at the influence of works of 
Edward Said. Prejudice against Islam and Muslims within the western culture is a 
. basic theme of Said's Orientalism and his many other critiques, and the colonial 
history and continuing imperialist reality have been identified as providing 
systematical support for prejudice as such. Surely it is one thing to point out that the 
narrative of literature plays an important role in constructing the collective identity, 
and therefore should be kept under constant critical check to make sure such an 
identity is inclusive enough for outsiders. After all, effective communication and 
mutual understanding wouldn't be possible if national identities were inflexibly 
defined to permanently exclude any alien and foreign element. For this point I am 
with Said in his good intention in asking for more tolerance for the Islamic world, so 
that an unbiased understanding of people of this part of the world and their religion 
can be achieved. Further, Said might be correct in suggesting that his proposed 
tolerance of the Islamic culture has been postponed historically due to the western 
colonization of the Muslim lands in the past several centuries; at least I am not in the 
position to judge that the numerous works and reports he cited are as he believes, 
implicitly biased against Islam. Yet what concerns me here is the possibility of 
rational discourse that is not circumstance-relative. If this possibility can be 
successfully argued, it helps to reduce effectively the chance of having any prejudice 
as colossal in scale as Said seems to have depicted. 
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The research methodology adopted by Said is of great influence to our current debate 
on veiling. On the one hand, Orientalism and the thriving of post-colonial study make 
hypersensitive any discussion regarding Islam and Muslim, and this is so especially 
with critical voices about the weakness of the Islamic world in terms of social 
democracy and basic human rights, of which the women's position remains a 
sub-issue. Surely it won't be acceptable if the Islam is attributed as source to all 
existing problems and cultural diversity within the Muslim community is denied in a 
demagogic report; yet it is equally unacceptable when tolerance of religion and 
foreign cultures becomes the categorical law that overrides the sensible understanding 
of the matter at issue. When it comes to veiling, it is more common for us to hear 
today about the discrimination against Muslim women's rights as expressed by the 
'anti-veiling' incidents here and there, rather than actual details concerning these 
incidents. During an international conference in Tehran earlier this year, I was worried 
by a kind of misleading 'sympathy' that the western academics feel obligated to 
harbor toward Islam: when a British scholar sentimentally condemned the western 
ignorance of the cultural diversity of veiling through citing anti-veiling cases all over 
Europe, she received enthusiastic applause from the audience, western and Iranian 
alike. Under the contagious passion for 'diversified human community', only one 
Romanian human rights worker expressed disagreement with the far-reaching 
�� conclusion that this British scholars drew from disparate cases. According to this 
Romanian lady distinction should be made between the national ban of veiling and 
more subtle situations like exam, illegal driving and security check, where removing 
the face veil is necessary: whereas the national legislation of hijab ban within a 
democratic society, as the French case, is subject to dispute in terms of its 
appropriateness. It is entirely a different case to ask for individual identification under 
certain social situations, provided that the rule is not applied exclusively to Muslims. 
Yet it is more often that the prevailing passion for fighting against the Islam-phobia 
today allows little room for these subtle distinctions. 
In the current case of Tunisia is considered, the notion that Islam is misrepresented 
and Muslims are unfairly treated is prevailing among the people I knew. The belief 
that the western world won't say anything fair about Islam has almost become 
self-evident for the students I have interviewed. For many，one usual reason for 
wearing the hijab is to represent the good side of Islam, or to defend the image of 
Islam which is believed to have been wronged by the West. Such strong sentiment 
seemed appealing at first glance, yet it becomes increasingly disconcerting to me 
during my completion of the thesis. The western prejudice and U.S. hegemony have 
been constantly mentioned by my Muslim friends in their charged comments on 
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Middle East politics, and to support their beliefs they often resort to sporadic incidents 
such as the Denmark Cartoon controversy, the murder of an Egyptian woman (who 
happened to be veiled) in Germany last year, and the recent ban of minarets in 
Switzerland. For them it is without doubt that all these are unanimously 
manifestations of a deep-seated bias against Islam. As we will see in later chapters, 
the reasoning process of such a line of thinking is likely to be flawed upon further 
reflection, and it is difficult for a person adopts such a view to justify oneself 
coherently. 
Back to the question I raised in my reference to Said's Orientalism: is it possible for 
the rational discourse to achieve a fair degree of objectivity, independent of the 
general political background of the society from which it derives? My answer for this 
question is yes. After all, it makes no sense to argue against any prejudice or bias if 
one does not believe the possibility of objective reasoning in the first place, and one 
crucial feature of this reasoning is to distinguish facts and emotional distortion of the 
facts. It is a basic theme of Orientalism that the colonizer's ambition to dominate and 
rule results in their degrading the custom and under-evaluating the culture of the 
colonized. If we agree with the basic premise of this argument, namely, strong 
emotions can impair the soundness of judgment when kept out of control, then it 
、， follows that the eagerness to defend one's cherished idea/identity/custom or whatever 
can as well lead to distortion of facts, as illustrated by the case of Tunisia. In this 
paper I am using the term 'Orientalism' is used under a critical light, and it refers 
mainly to the misleading belief held by many of my informants, i.e., Islam and 
Muslims are wronged by an amorphous entity named the 'West', and now it is the 
critical time to defend Islam against such unfair treatment. Further, I am going to 
examine the impact of such a belief on individual reasoning over the veiling. A basic 
assumption regarding this point is: it is possible that the anger for the 'unjust West' 
correlates with one's unwillingness to evaluate the matter from the standpoint of the 
westerners when it comes to the debate on hijabl If so, what consequence will this 
unwillingness bring? These questions will be answered in my later exposition of 
universal reasoning and defense of it. Now we will first continue our literature review 
to look at another side of story from the defenders of the veil. 
• Defenses on veiling 
Historically, the defense on veiling has been developed in parallel with the attacks on 
practice. The focal point and general theoretical framework of scholars defending the 
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veiling vary from one case to another. Given my concern with Tunisia, here I shall 
only mention the most recent research in the time line, while leaving the discussion on 
some earlier works later when it is necessary. The following researches are different in 
terms of countries focused and research method adopted, yet they can be read in 
conjunction under their basic stance of talking back to the West, which is obviously 
expressed in their line of arguing. 
In her "From Her Royal Body the Robe Was Removed: The Blessings of the Veil and 
the Trauma of Forced Unveiling in the Middle East", Mohja Kahf passionately shows 
how the massive return to hijab across the Arab societies turns out to empower 
women concerned. 2? According to Kahf, women are not merely satisfying their 
spiritual needs through picking up the veil, but also using it to escape the male 
guardianship at home, or to organize political protest against the government. Kahf 
celebrates the multiple practical functions served by veiling, defining it as posing a 
powerful challenge to the 'ubiquitous assumption' in the West. According to this 
assumption, Muslim women are made to veil by their husbands and the head covering 
of woman is a sign of subjugation. Besides, Kahf expresses sympathetic support for 
those who pick up the hijab out of their personal conviction, and condemns the 
enforced unveiling as carried out by the Shah in Iran, the government in Tunisia, and 
� . recently the leftist in Egypt as repressive, on the grounds of their violation of 
women's free will.. 
In another study carried out by Soroya Duval on the return of hijab among female 
Islamists in Egypt, the hijab has been praised as granting women the entrance ticket to 
the traditionally male-controlled public places such as streets and mosques. 
Furthermore, she argues that veiling in Islam emphasizes on qualities such as 
thriftiness and moderation in needs, whereby differentiating Muslims from their 
western counterparts who are used to extravagant living and endless consumerism. 
Based on such distinction Duval proposes to understand veiling as voicing an Islamic 
feminism, for which concepts such as freedom and autonomy are rendered in different 
terms from those in Western parlance. 
Echoing the previous paper in its defense of Muslim women's agency, Arlene Elowe 
Macleco has examined the return of hijab among working women from lower middle 
27 Mohja Kahf, "From Her Royal Body the Robe Was Removed: The Blessings of the Veil and the 
Trauma of Forced Unveilings in the Middle East," in The Veil: Women Writers on its History, Lore, and 
Politics, ed. Jennifer Heath(Califomia: University of California Press, 2008). 
Soroya Duyal, "New Veils and New Voices: Islamist Women's Groups in Egypt," in Women and 
Islamization: Contemporary Dimensions of Discourses on Gender Relations, ed. Karin Ask and Marit 
Tjomsland(NewYork; Berg, 1998). 
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class in Cairo back to the mid-1980s. ^^According to Macleco，these women, being 
driven into professional work in the public sphere during the economic boom in Egypt, 
picked up the veil to protest against the widely existing sexual harassment in their 
working places. However, unlike Duval who views the return to hijab as overall 
positive, Macleco has spotted another side of the story. Aside from the positive role 
veiling plays in protesting against harassment, it has also revealed the deep-rooted 
guilt vexing those concerned: these women saw themselves as having betrayed their 
traditionally assigned role inside the household as mothers and wives when working 
outside. Consequently, they took up the veil to reassure their lost femininity. 
Perplexed by this discovery, Duval terms the protest voiced by this self-initiated 
veiling movement as ambivalent and compromising. 
Finally, in another recent research focusing on the wearing of hijab among Young 
Muslim immigrants in Canada, Homa Hoodfar argues that the self-led return to hijab 
among second generation Muslims brings them relative freedom from their family. 
^^Besides, the phenomenon is also closely associated with the rampant discrimination 
these youngsters face in a major western society, where the veiling is taken by these 
women as the symbol of Islamic identity. In picking up the veil they are also 
protesting against the cultural chauvinism which they perceive to exist in their 
. community. 
The main points of the preceding researches can be rendered as follow: first of all, 
through delivering a more self-conscious and assertive profile of the veiled, these 
scholars aim at challenging the misrepresentation dominating the Western world as 
they believe it, in which veiling is treated as an intrinsic oppressive institution, the 
veiled women a silenced and passive lump. Second, all of them consider the veiling as 
liberating and empowering, this is based on women's conscious choosing of the attire 
as well as the manifold utilities the attire serves in practice. Third, the moral 
implications conveyed by the hijab such as 'modesty' has been defended in one way 
or another in terms of the uniqueness of Islam, and more vexing problems arising 
from these implications have been left unexamined(or in Macleco's case, rendered 
unsettled through her use of the term 'accommodating protest'). 
Ill the current paper, through investigating the self-accounts of young Tunisians on the 
29 Arlene Elowe Macleco, "Hegemonic Relations and Gender Resistence: The New Veiling as 
Accommodating Protest in Cairo," in Theorizing Feminism: Parallel Trends in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences, ed. Anne C. Herrmann and Abigail J. Stewart(Oxford: Westview Press, 2001). 
Homa Hoodfar, "The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling Practices and Muslim 
Women," in Women, Gender and Religion: A Reader, ed. Elizabeth A. CastelI(New York: Palgrave, 
2001). 
• 26 
matter of veiling, I am going to start with a problem left unaddressed in these 
preceding researches, namely, the impact of the moral implications of veiling and the 
individual reasoning on these implications. As I shall show through case analysis later, 
the feelings developed by the veiled toward the socially-expected behaviors attached 
to the veil are not unanimously positive, or at least they can not be simplified under 
words as pale as 'empowering' or 'liberating'. Rather, at times there is hesitation, 
confusion, or even fear when we read closely the individual's account of her choice of 
the veil. For instance, one of my informants is a devoted practitioner of Islam, who 
observes the religious teaching closely, and for this she is greatly admired by her 
friends. Yet in her self-account she is not happy all the time about taking such high 
ground in morality. Rather, she is constantly worried about how people will perceive 
her if she behaves otherwise. The great concern for breaking the social protocol 
relevant to veiling overweighs, and as a consequence she is burdened with 
self-censorship. Rendering her case in this way, my suggestion is not to disprove the 
point of earlier Muslim feminists mentioned by saying that veiling can be confining as 
well. The general evaluation of the actual benefits or downsides of the practice per se 
is not at stake here, neither do I consider very promising a consequence-based 
evaluation as such, given the fact that the social determination yields a particular 
consequence is not subject to the choice of individual. Not to mention that the 
� . consequences are not justified in their own terms. For instance, if one tries to say that 
veiling brings the consequence such as supporting the presence of women in public 
places, and this consequence cannot justify itself as desirable without referring to 
further justification like the importance of having gender equality in society or 
whatever. In this way an infinite regress of justification is triggered by this line of 
thinking. On the other side, unlike the communitarian argument claims, I do not think 
that the cultural or social conditions that an action like veiling is subject to is 
infinitely complex to make any sense of human agency impossible. Rather, to act 
upon some sense of autonomy should be assumed as possible on the social and 
personal level alike, so that it makes sense to discuss questions concerning fair 
treatment or free choices. For the former, the positive social changes are proved as 
possible by the admirable achievements of the feminist movement in the last century 
in different countries has already demonstrated. In the case of Tunisia, women's 
conditions are admittedly improved through years of legislative endeavor, and 
Tunisian women today do not have to suffer from unilateral divorce initiated by the 
husbands or the deprivation of heritage rights, which still bother some of their Arab 
sisters. To see this we do not have to agree on deeper concerns of the government to 
promote such a legal change, be it wooing the western onlookers or strengthening the 
autocratic regime inside the country, still less do we have to justify the Tunisian 
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political structure, which is still far from democratic in terms of other basic human 
rights such as freedom of speech and voting rights. In any case it is not my intention 
to downplay the humanistic ideal expressed by earlier Muslim feminists in their works 
through their insistence on the importance of self-determination, as well as the 
possibility of justice. What I am concerned here is about the definition of choice that 
perplexes the earlier discussions. Further, how we should consider the question of 
choice, so that the liberation on the individual level can be genuinely achieved rather 
than optimistically assumed by the researchers. As the earlier discussion suggest, the 
choice of veiling should be considered as free so long as women are not forced into 
the practice by external forces, presumably the husbands and the national law, and 
being able to develop some thoughts on the practice while using them in defending 
one's choice. The absence of external cohesion and right of self-determination are 
surely essential for our conception of choice; there won't be any choice at all if one is 
made into a practice against his/her personal will, even if the imposed behavior is 
beneficial to the individual. Insofar as veiling is concerned I agree that at the social 
institutional the government should better leave the issue to be decided by people 
themselves. The reason for my belief is mainly the respect for individual's liberty of 
conscience, which might be violated if the government promulgates any specific law 
favoring or disfavoring such behavior. For this point I am with the argument of some 
. Muslim feminists that governmental banning the headscarf (not the face-veil or niqab 
which I consider as a different case) through constitution is repressive insofar as its 
disrespect for self-determination in religious practice is considered, provided that the 
practice does not violate more basic rights of others. Yet when it comes to individual 
lives my observation is that the absence of external cohesion is far from sufficient in 
defining the consequence of veiling as liberating, as all previous Muslim feminists 
have believed. The voluntariness of making the choice in the first place does not 
automatically put at bay the ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion that a person might 
feel afterwards. In all earlier discussion, no separate attention has been given to the 
free choice and its connotation in terms of individual cases, and the discourses of the 
veiled have instead been summed up through its grand political implications, be it 
protesting against sexual harassment or entering the public space. The deeper 
philosophical implications of this kind of reading of veiling will be left to my analysis 
in the final section of the paper. Here what is at issue is whether the uncertainty and 
confusion existing in individual reasoning on a controversial matter as veiling can be 
subsumed under the definition of free choice as free from external cohesion, as 
implicitly suggested by the previous research. If not,'what should we add to qualify a 
choice as liberating for the person concerned? 
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This leads to the problem of practical reason and its position in defining a free choice. 
My discussion of practical reason does not concern the legislative issue in the public 
sphere, although practical reason plays a crucial role in constituting actual laws for all 
citizens. In this paper I shall focus on the individual use of practical reason to sort out 
the underlying contradiction of accepted beliefs and more sensible maxims of action. 
The external condition such as a felicitous political environment is not sufficient to 
define an action as a free choice, given the fact that individuals are likely to be 
inconsistent in beliefs and incoherent in actions without the effective application of 
practical reason to examine one's thoughts and actions. To be sure, this situation is 
pretty natural and obvious in our everyday life, and for most of the time the source of 
confusion or incoherence does not have to be something as controversial as the 
veiling. For instance, although attending college is definitely up to individual choice, 
and generally considered as good, when it comes to individual cases, one might 
reasonably be confused over the purpose of higher education: is it worthwhile to 
engage in years of book-learning, which might be of little practical use? Students are 
often torn between the intellectual needs and practical concerns. And in other cases 
conceptual confusions are almost unavoidable, especially in matters of great personal 
significance. For instance, we can be confused over the actual worthiness of attending 
a test-preparation class for an important exam if the final results fail to leave up to the 
� expectation, or feel uncertain about how to make an overall judgment of a close friend 
who turns out to be dishonest occasionally. In both cases the initial will in making the 
choice, namely, take the class and befriend a person, can not predict the further 
development afterwards, yet such results have decisive influence over our 
understanding of the chosen entity, and confusion will arise if the development 
contains contradictory information to our earlier belief or assumption. Therefore when 
it comes to a heated issue as veiling, it is understandable that one is easily lost in 
different contending points around it, feeling conceptually confused over the original 
choice. Yet the naturalness of the occurrence does not at all make the confusions 
innocuous, or even unavoidable. For instance, if I adopt the argument that to veil is to 
protect the female body which is more fragile by nature, then it is very likely that I 
will find it is justified for a society to assign different jobs for men and women 
according to their different natural strength. If at the same time I am a supporter for 
equal opportunity for both genders in the employment policy, then I will be at 
contradiction with myself over the definition of female fragility and its relation with 
employment fairness. Take another example: if I adopt the argument that to veil is to 
combat consumerism, which is ideologically western in nature, then it is likely that I 
will be confused when noticing that it can be a pursuit of fashion as well with some 
people, and some Muslim countries today are developing capitalism with no less zeal 
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than its western counterparts. In both cases, a critical reflection on the assumptions I 
adopted might reveal the problematic nature of points such as 'women are weak by 
nature', or 'veiling is the effective way against consumerism', and my earlier 
confusion in practice will be cleared, or at least partly solved. Therefore I am arguing 
here for the practical reasoning, defined broadly as the capacity to examine one's held 
belief over a choice critically, should be considered as a necessary condition for any 
choice to be defined as free. 
When it comes to practical reason more conceptual clarification is needed before we 
move to the next point. In general what I mean by reason refers to a basic fact that can 
be identified in all human beings, namely, we are capable of having self-awareness of 
out thoughts and actions. In this paper my basic premise is that the capacity of reason 
is available in all in virtue of one's being human, and it is a transcendental fact 
non-relative to the concrete cultural or social backgrounds dividing one another 
further apart. (Further argument for this point cannot be pursued given the main 
subject of this paper on an empirical case and its implication rather than pure 
philosophical discussion.) Moreover, the term 'practical' refers to a Kantian 
distinction of reason in terms of its use in different spheres. Broadly speaking 
according to Kant, theoretical reason regulates our inquiry of nature in general and is 
. limited by the natural determinations as proved by our possible experiences in its use. 
In contrast the practical reason presumes free will of our actions and can be put into 
constitutive use in legislating moral laws for all humans, insofar as one bears the tile 
of human.^'Our discussion on veiling and its implication for the matter of choice in 
general concern practical reason rather than theoretical reason in the sense that it is 
not the empirical opinions/views that people have on this matter per se at issue here. 
Nor it is my interest to conduct a pure sociological analysis on, say, the 
over-determination of veiling, or an anthropological report on the nuanced meanings 
that the practice bears under a particular cultural context. The question that I am 
concerned with is more general than that: first, the universality of reason in all 
humans granted (a point I take as the starting point without further vindication), what 
are the most important factors we have to consider when defining an action as free? 
Second, is there a way to adequately understand the nature of cultural practices in 
general, where the cultural meanings are not treated as a bunch of isolable and 
free-standing properties pertaining to an entity named 'culture'? I am going to talk 
about this a little more in the following section. 
31 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar(Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1996)，A647/B675; A802/B830; "Critique of Practical Reason," in Practical 
Philosophy, trans, and ed. Mary J. Gregor(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996^ 5:16. 
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3. Main questions and chapter outline 
• Main Questions 
To further spell out my main points sketched above, it will be helpful for me to 
explicate them through two stories from my field trip. Despite their triviality, these 
experiences turned out to help my constructing of main questions for the current 
thesis. 
The first story happened with a Tunisian taxi driver during my stay at the country. As 
part of the research routine I asked about the meaning of 'hijab' and its implications 
every time I got on a taxi. Like all other friendly taxi drivers, Ahmed was willing to 
educate me on the subject through patiently explaining to me that the modest dress in 
Islam is required of men and women alike. Meanwhile he bitterly complained how 
life had been demanding for him recently after his wife's sudden quitting of job and 
becoming 'muttadayiinah'(the Tunisian way of calling the veiled). Knowing that I 
was going to write on the return of hijab in my master thesis, before my jumping off 
the taxi, he almost begged me: "please say something good about Islam in your 
writing and leave the negative side with you". Impressed by the sincerity of his tone, I 
responded with a reassuring 'certainly, no problem' with my head nodding 
. understandingly. 
The second case is with Zanouba, a vivacious veiled student pursuing her bachelor 
degree in Mathematics. Getting a little bit confused by my constant asking for the 
meaning of hijab in Tunisia today, she emphasized with a smile: "like I told you, it 
does not symbolize anything, and it is merely a religious obligation like the five-time 
daily prayer, fasting and pilgrimage." Her point has been further supported by Saida, 
who start wearing hijab from her adolescence. Being an experienced high-school 
teacher in human rights, Saida sees the current return of hijab in Tunisia as a positive 
phenomenon. Like Zanouba, she showed the same incomprehension with my research 
interest focusing on the piece of cloth on her head. She constantly attempted to 
re-contextualize the veiling within Islam, which for her resembles a holistic way of 
living that defies any isolated reading or fragmentary explanation. As she puts it: 
"hijab is only a small part of being a devoted Muslim. This is to say that no distinction 
should be made between faith and life, and when it comes to faith it has be practiced 
rather than kept to oneself (namely, to veil is an essential part of being faithful)." 
Despite the triviality of these stories, they are closely connected with two main 
theoretical questions I am going to address in the paper: first, how can the return of 
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hijab and people's reasoning on this issue be read under the light of the critical 
political situation of the region, and second, when it comes to the question of choice, 
what theoretical implications can be offered by an investigation into the ontological 
significance of veiling. 
For the first question, what concerns me is a popular feeling that Islam and Muslim 
have been treated unfairly by the world, mainly the West. For an average Tunisian 
such a belief is strengthened on the daily basis through the news reports on new 
miseries in Gaza and Iraq, and for the intellectuals more systematic documentary on 
the western crime toward Islam can be found with works from prominent dissidents 
like Said and Chomsky. My point here is not that humanistic disaster did not actually 
happen in places like Gaza and Iraq. No matter how sensational reports of Aljazeera 
appear, my basic common sense and conscience do not allow me to pretend that the 
photos of wounded Palestinian children and self-accounts of the unemployed youth in 
Gaza are mere forgery of the media. For this much I find the quest of Said and 
Chomsky admirable in terms of their touching sensitivity to human suffering and 
willingness to empathize with cultures different from theirs. However, it is one thing 
to accept basic realities as they are in each case, and another to believe that all these 
cases indicating the general stereotype against Islam and Muslim exist widely in the 
� . western society. Therefore, it is one thing to notice that one Egyptian woman was 
killed in Germany last year by her employer, and one of the many motivations causing 
the murder could be the personal stereotype against Islam; it is however entirely 
another thing to conclude that the incident indicates the rise of Islam-phobia inside 
Germany, or even Europe in general. Since the later kind of assumption includes a 
large group of people (all Germans, Europeans or Westerners), and selectively 
overlooks other alternative explanations for one event which are not religious-specific, 
it could be invalid in terms of its reasoning process. Yet what disconcerts me is the 
pervasiveness of this kind of over-generalization in the popular opinion on issues 
concerning Islam, and no complex background information is needed for convincing a 
general Tunisian student I knew into believing that the international environment is 
hostile for the Muslim population as a whole. If the sophisticated arguments 
developed by Said in Orientalism can be summed up as the decisive influence of 
politics over cultural matters, namely, the continuing warfare between the ex-colonial 
countries and the Islamic world results in systematic prejudice in the West against 
Islam, then this point can be considered as well understood among the average 
Tunisian regardless of the educational level. Too often people lament the Palestinians 
and condemn the U.S. and Israel for the war crimes in Iraq, there is too little talk 
about the political corruption inside Palestine, let alone the brutal crimes committed 
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by the Saddam regime. One might be furious about the denial of a veiled teacher in 
France entering school, yet feels indifferent to the recent trial of a Tunisian professor 
for transmitting a message on facebook. Double standards abound when it comes to 
the questions of rights, and the deep-seated conviction of a wronged Islam holds sway 
in a majority of comments I came across. Therefore, when it comes to the case of 
veiling, my first question is about how does this tendency of response emotionally to 
what happened influence the individual reasoning over the veiling debate. Will strong 
belief in an unfair relation between the West and Islam bring specific difficulty to 
thinking about arguments overloaded with ideological trap? This question will be 
further examined in Chapter three, in which we will see how my interviewees found 
difficulty in spotting weak points in popular preaching for veiling on TV and internet. 
For the abovementioned stance not to be misunderstood it is better for me to recount 
my personal experience and its impact on my conceiving of the current research. 
Personally I share a strong emotional bond with my Tunisian friends because of my 
studying of Arabic, which facilitates my acquaintance with the Arab side of story 
when it comes to heated debates in the Middle East in general. Yet I am convinced 
that personal feelings have little to do with a fair judgment of one issue, which 
depends more on disinterested reasoning. It is based on this principle I am arguing 
against the cultural-relativist assumption held by some Muslim feminists, with the 
hope to defend the practical reasoning capacity, which seems to me universal for all 
human beings. Although terms like 'reason' and 'universal value' are rendered more 
often in Western parlance, the central idea expressed by them as the fair treatment for 
all human fellows in moral legislation is by no means exclusively western. The same 
quest for justice is expressed in different languages in non-western cultures as well, 
including the Confucian teaching I am familiar with, and the Islamic culture I am 
drawn into.^^ On the other hand, the cultural chauvinism and provincialism are by no 
means exclusive to the western parlance. During my field trip it is not uncommon for 
me to encounter compulsive preaching here and there, sometimes even regardless of 
my refusal, and for some of my Arab friends my cherished belief in Confucianism 
was jeered as an atheistic doctrine. Insofar as disrespect for other people's liberty of 
conscience is concerned I see no difference between these cases and prejudices 
suffered by some Muslims in the western world. Precisely because as human beings 
we are all naturally inclined to favor the familiar over the alien, it is important to 
search for common ground through reasoning when cross-cultural comparison is 
made. 
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For the second question, what I am pointing at is epistemological assumption behind a 
researcher's asking for the meaning of veiling. Interpretation of the meaning of 
veiling is an essential part for any research on this practice, and epistemological 
stance held by the researcher has a decisive influence on how the practice is 
represented in the research work. As we have seen in the preceding discussion, the 
question of choice and its implications for the veiling are central to the existing debate 
over the practice. One basic theoretical assumption of the discussion on choice is 
arguably of the subject-object kind, namely, viewing human beings as agents capable 
of knowing good from bad and acting based on judgment made out of such 
knowledge accordingly. The free will in terms of making independent moral judgment 
is presumed so that it is sensible to talk about choice, and in my concern for the 
current case, the practical reasoning over one's choice. Yet a crucial question remains 
to be whether it is the most appropriate way of viewing what is going on with the 
veiled through the emphasis on subject-object kind of choice alone. Surely holding on 
to the discourse of choice and reasoning has their position insofar as the institutional 
justice regarding religious practice is concerned, yet such rather broad consideration is 
not at stake when it comes to the concrete existential condition of those living around 
this practice. To illustrate my point here I shall list some small accidents from my stay 
., in Tunisia. Throughout my field trip, when being asked about the meaning of the attire, 
people frequently responded by saying 'why ask, this is religion.' (In one case, I was 
even challenged by a young male driver for 'flying across half a planet to study 
something as trivial as the hijab). For some, even to think about the topic raised great 
difficulty, and the reference to God instantly comes to occupy the answer. Nearly in 
every case, a more sophisticated answer only came much later, usually after much 
thinking and accompanied with contrivance. These details might be considered as 
irrelevant if our general task is to inquire into the question of choice and people's 
actual reasoning over it, for they are merely the empirical data lack information 
through which we obtain opinions. They might even be taken as the natural process of 
ice breaking, which is common for all interview-dependent research. According to 
this belief these people were simply unwilling to give crucial information to a stranger 
at the first encounter. Yet what catches my attention here is not how trivial the veiling 
is to these people, but rather how existentially invisible the practice is for those 
concerned; not how cliche the reference to God sounds but rather how frequent people 
are unaware of doing so. For the Tunisians I knew veiling or not was not a question in 
the first place. This is not to say that the practice can not be further thought as a 
thematised question by my informants, for sure they can otherwise they would not 
take up the interview. What I am saying here is that veiling does not invite any special 
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notice from the Tunisians, and this has nothing to do with whether one has research 
interest or not over the matter. Following Heidegger in his work on the ontological 
analysis, I will briefly attribute such 'not feeling strange' over veiling to the 
overwhelming familiarity average Tunisian has toward the attire as part of his/her 
Being-in-the-world. My main question regarding this point is whether we can be 
conceived as free-floating subject capable of independent moral reasoning when it 
comes to choice, if not, what implications can familiarity have over the choice and our 
reasoning of it. Back to the cases mentioned earlier, what does it mean to be 
inquisitively attracted by veiling，which has nothing to do with personal research 
interest? Further, how should we understand the familiarity which is not the 
quantitative description of experience we have, but the indispensible structure of our 
being human? These are questions which can not be answered easily without a 
preliminary background introduction to Heidegger's vision of our Being-in-the-world 
as Daseins. As the most difficult task to tackle I will leave this exposition in the last 
part of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Liberating or Burdensome? Case Study of the Veiled 
"The wearing of hijab is new in Tunisia, and most importantly, the way of wearing it 
now is pure modern." ^^Nadia, the 27-year-old was pursuing her master degree in 
marketing in a prominent local university, and as she considers it, the scarf on her 
head is an attempt to reconcile between the modern way of living and dictates of 
Islam: “Hijab in Islam has prescribed some general guidelines for the way women 
dress themselves, most importantly, not in something transparent, tight and showy. I 
am always trying to keep myself within boundaries set up by these principles without 
loing the basic awareness of beauty. While covering by hijab is obligatory, the 
full-length covering by niqab is not required by Islam." For Nadia, although the 
religion prefers more stringent regulation in this regard, she always finds it justifiable 
to loosen the rigidness of such regulation to make room for personal expression: "I am 
ok with wearing colorful hijab and sometimes I take light-scented perfume, so that I 
look great and appear modest at the same time." According to her, what underlies her 
emphasis on the awareness of beauty is the fact that for her generation, the veil，its 
intricate religious implications aside, is a new phenomenon which has to find its place 
in the modern way of living. "Just like the requirement for ‘modesty，，being 
incontestably a social convention, should be found as varying through time and 
., understood differently under disparate cultures, the wearing of hijab today necessarily 
carries a new message, namely, the personal expression of one's spirituality can go 
hand in hand with a modern way of life where the person is guaranteed the full right 
of public participation", Nadia explained to me with a proud smile on her face, feeling 
grateful for the liberty that young people like her can enjoy in a hybrid culture like 
Tunisia. In our conversation, she constantly referred to the a-political implication of 
hijab on Tunisian street today through equating it with other individualized outfit such 
as T-shirt and jeans，and for Nadia, who was the first one in her family to adopt the 
veil, this choice does not hinder her at all from becoming the kind of person she is 
aspires to become, namely, the global citizen with open-mindedness toward the world 
and cutting competence in the professional field. When being asked about the possible 
inconvenience the hijab might bring to her in job-hunting (given that some companies 
in the country are holding reservation toward the dress), she passionately defended 
her cherished personal choice by pleading a fair judgment from such companies. 
According to her, the standard of selection should be based on the professional 
competence of the individual rather than the dress s/he chooses to wear. 
To begin our investigation with Nadia's case is revealing, for she does not only serve 
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an excellent example for the new generation of young Tunisian who find themselves 
inevitably overwhelmed by what Nadia terms as 'globalization', in terms of which 
traditions as the veiling should be redefined, but also a telling illustration for how 
wearing of hijab in Tunisia is entangled with central questions concerning the practice 
of religion and personal choice. In expressing her reservations toward full covering 
and support for hijab as the new fashion of the young, Nadia seemed eager to 
exculpate the veiled from the imposed negative stigma and substitute it with a new 
profile that is open-minded, competent and intellectual. To her the practice of one's 
religion with civic order within a modern community should be free，and wearing the 
hijab should also be left for personal decision. This is also the crucial assumption for 
the hijab-fashion analogy Nadia developed in her defense for hijab, namely, similar to 
the case of fashion which can be tolerated for being idiosyncratic, to practice one's 
religion through wearing hijab should also be granted as individual choice.. For N a d i a , ‘ 
to adopt a modern way of living comes before the personal practice of religion, and it 
is based on this reason she rejects niqab due to its incurred inconvenience in 
identifying the identity of the wearer, thus hindering the effective communication 
between individuals. Since hijab is perfectly fitting for all kinds of activities an 
individual is likely to undertake today, she sees no reason to deprive women the rights 
of wearing it. 
Taking the veiling as a personal choice of fashion is common ground shared by other 
students such as Zounuba, for whom being beautiful is an undeniable right for 
whoever chooses the dress.^'^In explaining to me the reason that she never wears 
jilbab(a full-length robe wrapping the whole body loosely, usually single colored and 
worn with the headscarf), she mentioned: "God loves beauty and that's the reason he 
created different colors. Although putting on the hijab is to prevent fitna, it should not 
make you look miserable or hideous. On the contrary, we should take advantage of 
different colors to look good on our part, while still living up to the modest 
requirement." Like Nadia, Zounuba was also the first one in her family to put up the 
veil, after a painstaking effort to convince other family members who were either 
worried about the stringent governmental ban on the attire or scared by its rampant 
misuse by religious demagogues in subversive activities. Now in her twenties, 
Zounuba still recalls how stressful the situation had been for the veiled when she first 
started it seven years ago, back to when the trend had much fewer followers than now 
and could lead to expulsion from school as punishment. Yet, lucky for Zounuba, who 
is the daughter of a teaching staff in the school, the draconian punishment was never 
exercised. To her pride, she even succeeded in challenging the prevailing stereotype 
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against the veiled by getting first honors in her class and receiving the prize with the 
hijab. "For me back to that time, the forbidden is desirable, and more the government 
controls the veil, the more I find it tempting to challenge the rule." Again, the case of 
Zounuba seems to suggest that veiling is not only compatible with living a modern 
life to the full, but is conducive to innovative interpretation of the religious 
implications of the attire, in the case of which the rigid standard set up by the male 
clergy is constantly loosened to make room for personal expression. Besides, it can be 
further inferred that strict control on the attire does not always work to keep its 
adamant followers at bay, and in some cases the control can turn out to be 
counterproductive and generates rebellion from the young. 
Like Nadia and Zounuba, Salwa，the undergraduate student in her final year, also 
finds herself in agreement with the point that the main characteristic of the current 
hijab trend is its idiosyncrasy, which partly motivates the imitation between peers due 
to the young's fondness of fashion. ^ ^ According to her, the veiling used to be 
infrequent in the country, but now it seems to spread rapidly among young college 
students like her. Unlike Nadia and Zounuba, who searched online for religious 
implications of veiling before picking up the practice, Salwa started veiling for more 
expedient reasons. As a student from southern Tunisia, living and studying in the 
, capital constantly made Salwa feel homesick and insecure. "Back home I used to 
dress like you, and only recently I have decided to become more respectable (meaning 
to veil)，，，Salwa explained while referring to my casual wear of T-shirt and jeans. 
"When you find yourself alone in a city far away from home, knowing that no one is 
anywhere near for help when you are in trouble, the only one you can resort to is God. 
He knows what is going on with me and listens to my prayers, and I want to be closer 
to him through this", she recounted, pointing to the tightly wrapped scarf on her head. 
Besides, for Salwa there is another background story for to her changing outfit, 
namely, the need to show sympathy for the injured image of Islam and solidarity with 
wronged Muslims around the globe. Like many of the students I have encountered, 
Salwa holds sharp criticism of the unfair treatment suffered by Muslims after 9/11. 
“Israel and U.S. are the ones who started the war by occupying the land of Palestine 
and killing innocent civilians from Iraq to Kabul, and how dare they call us 'terrorists' 
when the news from Gaza shows that people are deprived of nearly all the essentials 
of life," Salwa reasoned with indignation, condemning the U.S. as the leading 
infringer of human rights and democracy. However, personally Salwa does not want 
to stay veiled out of practical concern and is willing to give it up if any real trouble 
occurs. For her the strict control imposed by the Tunisian government on this matter is 
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unpleasant but justifiable: "the government is reasoning like the French, i.e., religion 
should be confined to the private sphere in order for people to be judged equally in 
public regardless of their personal religion, and I will comply if one day I am told to 
take off the scarf in public places." Unlike Nadia and Zounuba who emphasize the 
right to practice one's religion openly, Salwa finds her increasing religiosity, to some 
extent, ramshackle in the face of her deeper convictions in the secular nature of the 
public sphere. 
Despite the nuanced difference in personal stories, the above three cases can be read 
in conjuction to provide us some general characteristics of the hijab trend in Tunisia, 
as well as valuable clues for problems arising with it. Back in the first chapter I have 
made brief arguments against the veiling, mainly on the grounds of the institutional 
oppression the dress imposes on women and its political allusion .to religious ‘ 
extremism. The secular feminism opposes veiling usually for the former reason, and 
some European leaders are more concerned with the latter in proposing the ban of veil. 
Regarding these considerations, the examples of Nadia, Zounuba and Salwa can 
povide implications as follow: first of all, these cases indicate that it is hasty to 
conclude the practice as overall oppressive, be it in the physical or ideological sense. 
There are no reports that these cheerful students were subject to physical abuse from 
their family members, nor was it the case that they had given up basic principles 
concerning gender equality once the hijab was picked up. On the contrary, to both 
Nadia and Salwa personal rights can override the need of religious expression under 
certain circumstances. Therefore it should not be assumed that the practice of veiling 
is bonded with a higher rate of domestic violence, or will necessarily result in 
weakening one's demand for equal opportunities. Furthermore, if the oppression 
assumption were right in its judgment of the practice, namely, the religion prescribes 
strict law of covering for women shows systematic bias against women, then it would 
be reasonable to either ditch the religion that prescribed the practice altogether, or to 
put strict control on its influence in the public sphere, so that the established secular 
rights for women would be preserved. Both the French and Tunisian government 
might defend their ban of veil by this line of reasoning. However, for students such as 
Nadia and Zounuba who believe in the religious necessity of veiling, religion is 
neither a dispensable option that one can do without, nor a private matter that is 
preferably to be taken up at home only. Rather, trying hard to prove the possibility of 
reconciliation between being a citizen endowed with full rights and a believer obliged 
by religious obligation, both Nadia and Zounuba value the spirituality suggested by 
hijab as an inalienable aspect of their life and ask for the right to realize such 
spirituality in public. Further, in their defense of the attire by words and action, the 
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veiling does not only seem to be non-oppressive and non-confining, but liberating and 
increasing their control over life, through inspiring the argument for religious freedom, 
expressing protest for governmental ban, and offering solace for the loneliness of 
studying away from home. Without doubt these utilities provided by the veiling 
benefit the practitioners in each case, at least as the individuals concerned seem to 
have suggested. Back to the literature review in the previous chapter, this kind of 
practical benefits brought by the veil has been constantly used as evidence for the 
liberating nature of the attire, and this point does have an intuitive appeal if we are 
preoccupied with the aim to correct a prevailing prejudice against the veiled. Yet to 
define the nature of veiling based on the actual function served by the attire falls short 
in being consequentialist in the judgment; thus it is easily to be opposed based on 
other cases in which veiling brings inconvenience to those concerned. More 
importantly, to hastily label the practice as liberating will hide the complexity of what ‘ 
happened to these women, as I will show as follow. 
Riyad is a young researcher fellow at a U.S. funded research center in the capital, 
whom I interviewed during my stay in the center as a visiting scholar.^^ To him, the 
veiling in general is influenced by the political relation between the West and the 
Islamic world, and when it comes to the case of Tunisia the people seem to care more 
. � about the fashionable look of the dress rather than its broad political implications. 
Being a secular scholar, Riyad disagrees with the popular idea that veiling can prevent 
the female fitna, and for him to define the female body as sexually appealing seems 
incompatible with the modern view of gender. Further, witnessing dissembling 
behaviors of the veiled around him, Riyad expressed serious doubt over the 
connection between one's moral integrity and the choice of veiling, as he put it: "For 
some to veil is simply to fake the appearance of being pious so that one can be 
married off more easily, and the Tunisian men today have been warned of the great 
danger of finding the ugly truth for their veiled wives-to-be. In my experience some 
girls from my neighborhood had lived a casual and libertine life until the age of 
marriage. They used to go to night clubs and hang around with guys casually, but once 
with the scarf on they can now pretend to be religious for those who don't know them. 
As for me these girls are untrustworthy no matter how well they pretend to behave 
right now." This bitter observation echoes comments of Mohammad, a university 
professor teaching economics in the country's best business school, as he puts it: "The 
hijab is a sign, a signal. Women are sending a symbolic message to people around 
them that they are not the messing around type, which might help to attract the 
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attention of a potential husband. But it is also well known that most women are faking 
by doing so." Amel，one colleague of Mohammad, surely knows what is really going 
on with some of her veiled students who appear to be morally impeachable, for she 
has witnessed frequently her veiled students flirting with their boyfriends in public, as 
well as cheating in exams. According to her these are acceptable for a veiled woman. 
The above remarks seem to suggest that the veiling can not be examined from 
perspective the veiled alone，for there are social expectations attached to the attire 
regulating what is morally desirable for the veiled, and what is not. These 
expectations can not be overlooked for they have a clear bearing on how the veiled 
reason over their choice, as the following cases will show. 
Salsabi is a student majoring in Chinese who started veiling not long before our first ‘ 
e n c o u n t e r . 37 She at first felt blessed by the choice of veiling for the practice is 
considered as symbolizing the spiritual transformation of a person inside an Islamic 
culture, as she reports it: "It feels so great when people around bless me for my 
conversion and wish they could be like me. I never feel closer to God than now, as if 
he were omnipresent in my life as a whole!" Salsabi cherished this unique experience 
so much that she swears repeatedly throughout the interview that she is never going to 
， take off the scarf whatsoever. Yet the joy on her face fades away when recalling the 
reason leading to her conversion: “I was not a religious person and led a common life 
as other non-observing Tunisians. Yet recently I start to watch the religion channels on 
TV, which talk abundantly about the severe consequence of ignoring the calling of 
God. According to these programs the unveiled are unable to get to heaven and will be 
tormented in hell after death, and this scares me. Since we never know when we are 
going to die, we had better start to prepare for it now." As she siad earlier, it is a 
popular belief that veiling marks the making of a spiritual contract with God, and 
consequently to take off the veil afterwards will incur negative comments from people. 
“I do not want to be doubted for my sincerity", Salsabi said at the end of our 
conversation, worrying about the public censor she might suffer when being spotted 
as lapsing in her changed dress code. 
In another case, Sausa, a master student in abnormal psychology is also haunted by 
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the dreadful warning given by Imams on TV for the unveiled. Like Salsabi, Sausa 
sticks to veiling all the time when she is outside, and according to one of her teacher 
her persistence on veiling has once cost her the opportunity of passing an exam, when 
I , 
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the invigilator required her to take the hijab off. Since Sausa started veiling during 
one congregational prayer in her school, her 'conversion' is thus witnessed by the 
presence of her classmates. It worries her how the casual taking of the veil will 
endanger her reputation among her friends on campus. She reveals to me once that 
being called as a hypocrite will severely damage one's personal life in a society like 
Tunisia, where the honor of an individual is highly valued. Therefore she sees the 
definite necessity of keeping self-discipline so that no breach of faith will occur. On 
the other hand, exercising self-censorship is by no means an easy task for Sausa. 
Rather, for most of the time, to observe all the social protocols attached to veiling 
amounts to a grueling drudgery. Being familiar with the theory of Freud as a 
psychology student Sausa holds an interesting theory for what is actually going on 
with the veiled: "Although to veil means to represent the best side of Islam and one 
should never complain about that, it is also true that one will sacrifice a lot from 
picking up the short clothes in summer to wearing the make-up in public. Further, no 
pre-marital sex is allowed for the veiled. These all result in repressing of one's natural 
desires, and according to Freud the mental repression has to be constantly released so 
that it won't lead to psychological problems." After that Sausa shows me pictures of 
her dressed in T-shirt and wearing make-up at home, referring to it as her personal 
way of minimizing the repression caused by the rigid self-discipline. 
If the accounts of Sausa showed that living up to the social expectations for the veiled 
brings mental stress, then such stress is not found to be tolerable in every case. For 
Leila, Sausa's classmate, it is unbearable to fulfill all the rigid code of behavior for the 
veiled, which led to her quitting of hijab two years ago.^ '^  At first she was talked into 
veiling by one of her friends during a stressful period of her college life, as she 
recalled it: “I felt anxious about what was going on with my study, and I was told that 
putting up the hijab will help miraculously, so I tried." However, veiling did not work 
magic for Sausa's study problems, as her friends had promised. On the contrary, what 
awaited her was increasing formalism in one's way of dress that appears to her as 
time-consuming, as she puts it: "The idea behind the modest dress is to make things 
easier. Yet ironically I find myself using more time to dress myself properly everyday 
and paying extra attention to how people feel about me. That is one weird part of 
actually picking up the hijab. “ Further, to her surprise her intimate personal 
relationships were also damaged due to her veiling, for people were described as 
treating her differently since her picking up the hijab. In her words, "My friends used 
to tell me everything before, yet they no longer do so after my veiling. It is commonly 
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believed that the veiled are conventional and judgmental, and people would censor 
their thoughts before talking to me." As a professional psychiatrist-to-be, Sausa finds 
such reservation held by people around her disturbing especially when it comes to her 
relations with clients during the internship. Patients are supposed to feel comfortable 
in telling her everything, yet her putting on the hijab makes such un-reserved 
conversation difficult, for most patients would choose not to talk about intimate issues 
of sex and violence. The actual difficulty the dress brought to Leila's personal and 
professional life soon disenchanted her from the popular myth around veiling. 
Although this happened two years ago, Leila could not help shedding tears when 
recalling her unhappy past with the veiling, feeling sad about some friends she lost 
after entering the practice and getting out of it. 
The above cases reveal a more complex side of veiling, which can not be understood 
separately from the beliefs one accepts when picking up the practice, as well as the 
social expectations one is supposed to fulfill. In the case of Salsabi, her decision to 
veil is influenced by the Imam's talking on the Final Judgment, and for Sausa and 
Leila whether to stick to veiling or not wouldn't make any sense if there were no 
public pressure on what is expected to be observed by the veiled in the first place. 
When it comes to the individual experience with veiling, the choice does not end with 
. � one's initial volition, nor will one's initial understanding of the practice prevent 
further confusion rising in the later development. Rather, the choice of veiling has 
revealed an on-going process of reasoning over what is the most proper thing to do, 
and the religious and practical considerations are balanced against each other all the 
way along. Therefore if our aim is to define the free choice in regard of veiling, then 
the choice should first be considered as a continuing process requiring the intellectual 
engagement of an individual, rather than a static point in time emitting permanent 
impact on later occurrences. This is one problem I see with some of the earlier 
researches on veiling, where the practice is defended as liberating insofar as women 
make the initial decision out of personal will, and being able to benefit from the 
utilities brought by the practice. Yet as suggested by cases with these Tunisian 
students, the initial decision, arguably independent, can neither dispense with existing 
beliefs of veiling in one's community, nor in any sense guarantee the utilities of the 
dress as profitable. In the case of Salsabi, one could pick up the hijab voluntarily yet 
felt coerced into veiling out of fear for hell; in the case of Leila one could be burdened 
by veiling given certain social stereotype against the veiled and the nature of one's 
chosen profession. This does not only point out the insufficiency of defining the 
matter of choice solely from an utilitarian stance, namely, considering only the actual 
benefits the practice brings, but also the inadequacy of evaluating the practice without 
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taking into account the personal reasoning over the matter. 
Brandly speaking, these veiled students can be said as, explicitly or implicitly, 
participating in different political activities, be it promoting a positive image of Islam 
or protesting the governmental banning. My point here is not to deny such broad 
meanings of veiling, as pointed out by earlier Muslim feminists. (Again, the more 
basic theoretical assumption of such a reading of veiling is to be discussed in the final 
chapter.) Yet what concerns me is that to emphasize these general implications of 
veiling can't explain all the detailed choices one faces on a daily basis, from the 
legitimacy of exhibiting a religious icon openly to the appropriateness of wearing the 
colorful outfit when veiling, from the propriety of wearing make up to the 
compatibility between veiling and some particular occupations. Compared with the 
general meaning of veiling, these are detailed yet pressing issues requiring the ’ 
subtlety in judgment and flexibility in dealing. On a more basic level, choosing veil 
means to face up to small decisions as such, which at times, requires more subtle 
reasoning and flexible dealing so that one can get around feeling generally coherent 
about the choice made. Nevertheless, the commonplaceness of these decisions does 
not make them irrelevant to more general reasoning one usually has for veiling. For 
instance, a person who believes in the necessity of keeping the religion at bay in 
.. public might be open-minded toward being fashionable in one's outfit, and another 
who sees the veiling as an effective means of protecting female weakness might agree 
that wearing make-up is not prohibited for the veiled. The reasoning process is by no 
means always consistent in itself; in some cases, the unexamined holding on to certain 
beliefs one accepts when choosing to veil will contradict one's rationale of making 
more concrete decisions on how to cope with life, resulting in conceptual confusion or 
even actual dissembling behavior for those concerned. In the preceding cases, the rise 
of moral hypocrisy among the veiled is believed to be a vexing problem plaguing the 
Tunisian society right now: some of the veiled are seen as failing the general social 
expectations for a modest Muslim. These complaints should first be understood in 
terms of beliefs the veiled are holding, so that we can determine if there are any 
conflicts between different justifications for handling different situations. For instance, 
to examine the 'hypocrisy' of one veiled hanging out in a nightclub is to first 
determine whether there is any actual contradiction between being modest and joining 
mixed-gender activities. Therefore I believe that individual reasoning must be taken 
into account when defining the choice of veiling as free, and in the following chapter I 
am going to further illustrate my point through making an exemplary examination of 
the question concerning fitna, as the central concept of one popular branch of belief 
on veiling. In this process we will see how a confused understanding of questions 
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Chapter Three Fitna and the Universal Norms of Practical Reason 
In the preceding chapter, I have already shown from individual cases that the story 
behind one's choice of veiling is more complex than earlier discussions in this regard 
assumes. Further, I have suggested practical reasoning to be a crucial element for 
deciding concrete matters in the daily life of the veiled, and argued that critical 
examination of one's held beliefs regarding veiling is indispensible for our defining 
the choice as truly free. In this chapter I will develop my proposed argument through 
examining the concept of 'fitna' in order to show how a clear reasoning over 
questions around this concept can help remove the guilt found in many of my 
informants. 
When I asked for the main purpose of veiling, frequently I would get the answer from 
my informants that it is for the protection of women. The typical arguments around 
this point can be seen in the words of Hajer, a veiled young woman working as 
administrative staff at one college: "Since men are created with stronger sexual desire 
than women, and women are endowed with fitna, the veiling can protect women from 
the lustful look of the men. As a result, whenever a man wants to have sex with a 
woman he has to marry her." For other similar arguments it is the belief of some that 
the wearing of hijab functions to facilitate women in entering the public space so that 
they can receive the same respect the men aspire for in terms of their intellect rather 
than the sexually attractive body. For those sticking to this argument, women should 
be first de-sexualized to be active in the public sphere, and the veiling is considered as 
suitable for this purpose. Another common seen way of arguing for this point is 
through making an analogy between the veiling and the hiding of precious goods, 
namely, since the precious goods must be kept hidden to prevent the theft, the female 
body, which is highly valued, should also be covered to protect it from potential harm. 
Despite of the difference in phrasing, these arguments can be considered as similar in 
their basic assumption that women are physically structured to be different from men 
in terms of the sexual-arousing character of female body and its natural vulnerability, 
and different dress code must be therefore applied to women and men respectively. 
Fitna as defined in the preceding contexts can best capture this essential physical 
difference between genders，namely, the female body when exposed improperly will 
provoke the sexual desire of men, and such provocative characteristic must be kept 
under control so that the public interaction(presumably non-sexual) between genders 
can be carried out. These ideas are intuitively appealing, for after all in the pure 
biological sense the female body is distinctive to the male body, and the sexual 
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arousing aspect is one important question to be considered when it comes to the 
discussion of proper way of dress. Yet does it then justify the veiling as the most 
proper way of dress for women insofar as the prevention of illegal sex, especially the 
sexual harassment is considered? For this question more have to be said on the 
detailed assumptions behind each of the argument laid out above. First, although it is 
probably true that certain covering of body for both genders are necessary so that the 
general interaction between people can be carried out without unnecessary 
disturbance associated with sexual fantasy; therefore no human society ever exist in 
which the men and women remain nude as beasts (neither would such possibility be 
practical considering other functions served by covering the body, such as keeping the 
body temperature and indicating the identity of the person). Yet insofar as the veiling 
is considered the point is not about the general necessity of covering, rather than a 
very specific way of covering as presumably required by the Islamic canon. Therefore 
what at stake here is not the necessity for the women to cover the breast and men to 
cover the genital, but rather more specific necessity of covering the hair, the face, the 
neck, and parts from the hands and legs. If one insists on veiling as means to prevent 
the sexual provocative characteristic of the body the contending point is about 
whether such principle should reasonably include the hair and the face, or should such 
principle be considered as adequate at all insofar as the general social function of 
these body parts are concerned. For instance, those argue for the covering of face 
based on its being sexually provocative should also consider the other social functions 
the face plays in helping our identifying of a person and communicate efficiently with 
him/her. Further, even one can prove all these body parts as predominantly 
provocative, no evidence has been given to suggest that covering will be the best 
solution for the problem of illegal sex, or sexual harassment. There has been little 
evidence that the veiling can reduce the chance of having extra-marital affair, or 
pre-marital sex. At least in the Tunisian context if this were true people wouldn't 
complain about the hypocrisy of some veiled in faking to be virgin in the first place. 
Further, according to all of my informants the chance of getting sexual harassment is 
equal for the veiled and unveiled alike, and therefore it is problematic to assume that 
the sexual harassment, as the problem vexing the public interaction between genders, 
will be adequately solved by the practice of veiling, at least as the personal experience 
of my informants reveal. Second, let's look at what has been assumed by the argument 
that only veiling will allow the women to be seen as intelligent beings rather than 
sexual beings. If it were true that only through veiling can a woman be respected for 
her intelligence rather than physical beauty, would it be reasonable to believe that one 
won't be socially recognized for her intellectual achievement unless she veils, as the 
proposition logically suggests? If that were the case, how should we consider cases of 
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many of the outstanding Tunisian women, who are widely admired yet not veiled?卯 
Further, if the society as a whole is holding prevailing bias against the female 
intelligence, assuming that the intellectual performance of the women will be 
necessarily hindered by their physical beauty, how will the picking up hijab in any 
sense challenge such a prejudice? Now we see the fundamental problem with this line 
of reasoning based on the seductive nature of female body, namely, it is wrong not 
because female body are not more sexually arousing than that of the male. Perhaps it 
is in a biological sense or under general cultural circumstance. It is wrong because it 
violates the basic principle of fair treatment, which is not to be based on the specific 
characters that persons might have to or against their advantage. If we would agree 
that it is obnoxious to treat the disabled differently because of their disability, then the 
same principle should be applied to the case of veiling as well, in which women 
should not be required to dress differently simply because they physical character of 
being more sexy. Finally, as for the analogy between female body and precious goods 
in terms of their value and need for protection, I find it both extremely implausible to 
assume that the value of human beings can be equated with the value of material 
goods, and funnily weird to assume that the sense of 'protection, offered by veiling 
can be compared with the protection for valued objects. Insofar the value is 
considered, the price we generally attaching to material goods, which is relative and 
., comparable, is of fundamental difference with the intrinsic values of human beings, 
which are arguably absolute and incomparable. For this point, it is commonly held as 
true that the value of human being resides in the dignity of some of our natural rights, 
which is not to be sold at any price. Therefore，it will be the travesty of reason to 
assume that women today will give up their right of sell-determination so long as they 
are offered with a comfortable material life. Precisely because of this essential 
difference between the value of goods and value of human being, the protection for 
human can not be confused with the protection for the precious goods; thus although 
it is reasonable to lock the precious goods in closet, it will be absurd to suggest that 
women must also be grounded at home in order to have their security protected. Some 
arguing for the analogy between the value of women and value of precious goods hold 
another essentialist assumption, namely, the physical vulnerability of women 
somehow calls for veiling as an efficient measure of protection, yet such vulnerability 
is not at all clearly defined to determine what kind of protection is necessary. For 
some of the students I knew, the vulnerability of women is compared with the 
40 The general profile of Tunisian women is generally known as being outspoken and secular rather 
than veiled and pious, and many of the unveiled women are well-established in the Tunisian society 
and respected for their personal success as well. In the following report the success of Ms. Faiza Kefi 
and Amel Bouchamaoui will support this point, see 
http://www.wrtnea.eom/backissues/1098/9810064b.html 
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vulnerability of beautiful flowers. This highly fugitive saying might be understood as 
a literature metaphor, yet when it comes to serious argument for necessity of veiling 
this is not at all a valid comparison. The factors influencing the natural growth of a 
plant are incomparable with factors affecting the nourishment of human, which are, in 
an important sense, cultural and social dependent. Even when we assume that by 
vulnerability one is referring to the chance of getting sexual harassment, it is at all 
clear that veiling can be considered as an effective solution for this social problem, as 
we have already demonstrated earlier. 
These popular arguments for veiling are not at all uncommon among the students I 
knew, and most of them reported to have got their understanding of this matter online 
or on TV. To get a general idea of what kind of information one can possible get from 
reading articles online or watching religious program on TV, I have searched online 
for Islamic website talking about veiling and followed the popular religious programs 
on Al-jazeera, and here I have chosen two articles on the necessities of veiling, as 
recommended by my Tunisian friends for further knowledge on this matter. The first 
one is taken from IslamOnline, one of the best known Islamic websites among 
Tunisian Muslims. The second article is written by Yusuf Qaradawi, who is also the 
presented by the Arabic channel of Al-jazeera as the religious authority in a program 
., named "Sheikh and Life'. Many of the students I contacted are fans of Qaradawi and 
his interpretation on Islam. 
Let's begin with the answer given by IslamOnline for the veiling first. According to 
the website, the main reasons for Muslim women to veil are two. First, like the 
precious jewelry needs to be well protected from the theft, the Muslim women are 
also subject to the moral guardianship of the male members within the family. These 
guardians are morally responsible for advising the women inside family to veil. 
Second, to veil is praised as the effective way of resisting the material" attraction 
existing widely in the modern life, so that the veiled women are no longer exploited 
by the ruthless market economy. ^^  
As for another admonition on veiling by Qaradawi, the hijab represents the 
fundamental difference between the Islamic and western philosophy in terms of 
modesty. On the one hand, Qaradawi blames the westerners for their exploitation of 
women through indulging in consumerism, where women are merely treated as cheap 





western social institution where women are forced to become materialized into cheap 
products. On the other, the ideal Islamic society is defined by him as one that 
recognizes the women's humanity in asking for modesty in dress, and requires the 
husband to take up the job of financing the women when it is possible. This 
complementary relation as described by Islam is compared by Qaradawi to the 
relation between the can and its lid. Further, this arrangement is further justified by 
him as essential to Islam, where the women and men are created with different nature 
defining the most proper social role for each. Or in his original words, the difference 
between men and women is like the difference between the positive and negative. 
Therefore it is the natural duty for women to take up all household duties, most 
importantly, taking care of the children, and it is in accordance with the men's nature 
to earn the living outside home. As a contrast, Qaradawi criticizes the western kind of 
labor arrangement as destroying the family as the basic unit of human life. 42 
Since in the previous analysis we have already examined the analogy between 
women's value and that of the jewelry, and said that the dignity of human being can 
not be compared with the market price of any valuable commodity. Here let us take a 
look at other main arguments made by the two articles cited here, namely, the veiling 
can help fighting consumerism, and it is a purely western idea that women should be 
granted with the right of working outside home. First, insofar as the western emphasis 
on material consumption is considered, is it the case that the hijab will effectively 
control one's desire of consumption? It seems intuitively true that women won't be 
able to spend on a wide range of fashionable wear once picks up the hijab, which is 
generally believed to be plain in color and unanimous in style. Yet this is not at all 
true when we look at the real cases of the veiled women today; at least under the 
Tunisian context to veil by no means equals to being more economical and less 
fashionable. Many of my veiled friends spend a great deal in buying different sets of 
hijab and small trinkets, and it is not uncommon for the more wealthy ones'to possess 
Gucci bags and L.V. purse. Further, a greater problem with this assumption lies with 
its equating the dressing sexy with inviting sex. According to the criticism of these 
articles on the western society, the women in the West are treated as mere objects 
because they have to expose their bodies lavishly in the popular media, which in turn 
indicates the over-obsession of the westerners on sex. On a symbolic level it might be 
disputable whether over-exposure of nude women in popular culture is equivalent to 
42 In another book titled The Status of Woman in Islam, Qaradawi argues in further details for the idea 
that femininity is of fundamental difference with masculinity, as prescribed by God through creation. 
According to him, the natural weakness of women makes necessary for the husbands to work outside 
home and support the wives. See Yusuf Qaradawi, The Status of Woman in Islam, 
http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_Wl/women_feminine.htm 
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objectifying women, and whether this over-exposure will necessarily result in the 
increase of public interest in sex, yet such cultural debate is not at all relevant here. 
Insofar as the dress code in the West is concerned dressing sexy is not the same with 
inviting sex or encouraging free sex. When it comes to personal choice of attire 
dressing less (which for sure, has to be basically decent), like the veiling, should be 
considered as different individual decision on what to wear, provided that the social 
institution concerned allows such choice to be made. Such choice is guaranteed 
regardless of the individual opinions on the matter; therefore it won't be allowed for 
one considers dressing sexy as objectifying women to sexually harass a women 
dressing sexy, or one opponent of the veil to actually take it off from another person's 
head. Further when it comes to the statistics, it is not at all clear that given such 
difference in the popular sex culture the western societies will actually have higher 
rate of sex-related crimes than their Islamic counterparts, provided that these crimes 
can be effectively identified by the social institution concerned in the first place. 
Second, in regard of Qaradawi's argument for essential difference between women 
and men as the theological basis for labor division, it is problematic how such nature 
can be accurately defined to be used as justification for concrete social arrangements. 
Take the femininity as an example, if under one context it is taken as the fitna, the 
natural attractiveness of women, and under another as maturity, how is an essence 
contingently defined as such going to give any substantial support for the proper 
rights of different gender? Most of these arguments for gender essentialism are 
figurative in diction, in Qaradawi's case, the "male and female are complementary in 
Islam like the can to the lid", and "the male and female are unlike as the positive to 
negative." Yet it is enigmatically confusing how the relation between the can and 
its lid can be compared with the relation between husband and wife, where a 
complicated deal of rights and duties are involved. Not to mention that is not at all 
clear how is the account for "negative and positive" (of what? subatomic particles?) 
going to support the argument that women are more suitable to stay at home, and men 
to the working outside. 
If my preceding analysis on the reasoning given by my Tunisian informants and their 
admired religious scholars on veiling is correct, then one crucial question to ask is, 
why does the fallacies in their reasoning process happen, and further, how is having 
conceptual confusions on the ideas around fitna going to influence one's actual living? 
If as we have already pointed out, the veiling can neither be sufficiently justified by 
appealing to the analogy between women and precious goods, nor the essential 
43 Yusuf Qaradawi, The Status of Woman in Islam, 
http://www.witness-pi0neer.0rg/vil/B00k:s/Q_WI/w0men_feminine.htm 
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difference between women and men in terms of their nature given its dubious 
definition in the context, then what can be said about the truth that none of my 
interviewees had ever questioned such these assumptions? It is ok for some one to 
pick up the veil without thinking clearly about the beliefs adopted during the very 
process of choosing? Putting question in this way my intention is not to suggest that 
the veiling practice per se can not be sufficiently justified in a reasonable manner, for 
sure it can, as we shall soon see in my introducing of arguments of Barazangi on this 
subject. Rather, what concerns me here is whether the practical reasoning is to be 
included in our judgment of an individual choice as truly free. To determine on this 
issue we must first turn to the question that what is so bad about practicing the veil yet 
having some conceptual confusion over the debate behind? Isn't this the case with 
majority of our human activities, which we have acquired from coping with our social 
environment without giving most of them a clear thought? Isn't it too. demanding to 
state that one must be clear and certain about the choice one is making so that the 
choice can be considered as free thereof? To be sure, the confusion that my informants 
had on the implications of veiling is merely one of the many puzzles we are facing up 
to naturally in the daily experience; although given the my current research focus we 
have examined conflicting ideas around the veiling, this does not make the case of 
veiling more special than other issues such as the same-sex marriage and women's 
spiritual status, which are also of great concern within the Tunisian context currently. 
In all these cases the students I knew were experiencing the real urge to defend their 
religion, which was perceived by them as being under severe threat from the external 
world, and for many of them the anxiety about the status as being Muslims today 
under an authoritarian regime and sincerity to present the best side of Islam wee 
heartfelt. For one grows up within an Islamic society and exposes to news on the 
unfair treatment of Islam, it is not only difficult but perhaps ontologically impossible 
to entirely distance oneself from sensitive issues concerning the honor of one's 
cherished religion, and reach a total cool-headed judgment of what is going on. 
Therefore I would agree that confusions as exhibited previously in the arguments held 
by people regarding the hijab are impossible if one does not commits oneself 
seriously to the question concerned and finds personal significance within the subject 
in the first place. Yet to admit one's ontological condition and its impact on the 
. reasoning over certain issues is not the same with acknowledging the confusions 
rising in the process as insignificant or unavoidable. In the above cases, those are 
convinced that fitna is defined as the women's being naturally seductive, and the 
veiling must be adopted in order to solve social problems brought by such natural 
attractiveness such as sexual harassment and extramarital sex, then one is saying at 
the same time that it will be natural that the unveiled would be sexually harassed, or it 
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is certain that the sex relation between people will go out of control without the 
institutional requirement of veiling; both are unlikely to be true given that coming 
from a culture where veiling is not required I do not find the sexual harassment more 
severe in any Chinese city I have lived than that in the Tunisian capital, nor the 
general interest of public in matters concerning sex. Yet believing the correlation 
between fitna and the occurrence of sex-related social problem a woman is likely to 
suffer from a constant feeling of guilt about her own body. In the case of Tunisia such 
guilt is not at all psychological abstraction; it is concretely expressed by the small 
decisions such as not wearing the made-ups in public, not walking hand in hand with 
men in public, not going to nightclubs in the evening, not swimming without a 
full-covering swim suit and etc. These are crucial components for what is considered 
as appropriate socially for the veiled to do by the general public. If one veiled woman 
requires herself to observe all these conventional norms on the account of her belief in 
fitna, then it is understandable why in earlier cases Sausa feels the stacking of 
repression for her rigid sticking to the norms for the veiled, and Leila complains about 
suffering from the stiffening formalism of veiling. This is so, because, aware or not, 
neither of them can live at ease with the idea that women's bodies are destructively 
seductive, as their belief in fitna suggests. This is why for Sausa the self-disciplining 
as required by veiling becomes the accumulation of repression of otherwise naturally 
,� existing needs, and for Leila the living up to daily particulars prescribed by veiling 
amounts to the excruciating drudgery. Even for cases like Salsabi who does not 
complain about the daily observing of the rules for the veiled as trying, she has to 
worry about being called hypocrite so long as she breaks a particular rule in daily 
behavior. To be clearly, the point here is not about the appropriateness of detailed 
decisions such as wearing the make-up or hanging out with men, nor is it about the 
regulative role that moral principle would play in reality. First of all, it is not my 
contention that wearing make up is the natural need of women and the practice of 
veiling has repressed such need. Rather, my consideration is that in any case the 
decision concerning the make-up can not be reasonably supported by referring to the 
fitna thus defined. Therefore, what at stake is not about choosing to not walk hand in 
hand with men in the streets per se; it is about choosing to do so and having a good 
reason for doing it at the same time. The problem with these Tunisian students is not 
that through veiling some of them choose to lead a Spartan life, restraining from all 
physical pleasure and material temptation; it is about having a good argument for 
reasons of making such a choice so that the actual living with such heightened 
self-discipline will be felt as positively inspiring rather than negatively repressive. 
The good argument requires thorough understanding of the questions implied by one's 
choice and rigid reasoning over the points concerned, so that one's original beliefs 
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held up to earlier can be examined in terms of their validity and carried out with more 
resoluteness and flexibility. In the case of veiling, to have a good argument means to 
be able to reason fairly over the matter so that one does not have to follow the public 
expectations for the veiled all the time if one has a good reason to deviate. For 
instance, if the dominating opinion says that the veiled should not walk hand in hand 
with men in public because of the natural fitna of women, then one may reason that 
the public exhibition of personal love is also a basic right that should not be 
overridden by the religious requirement of modesty, or one may even ask further 
whether the modesty as required by Islam should be interpreted to exclude all public 
showing of intimacy. Through questioning in this way one will be unlikely to be torn 
between the need to interact normally with the men on the one hand and the fear of 
being called hypocrite on the other，and the prevailing prescription on what is 
supposed to do will lose its grip on this particular situation for an individual. Yet as 
the case study previously mentioned has shown, because of the lack of such a 
reasoning process in most of the cases, these students were either suffering from the 
stringent prohibitions prescribed by the popular idea oi fitna, or feeling guilty of being 
'hypocrite' through breaking the law of modesty as it is commonly defined. Second 
when it comes to the nature of any moral principle for sure the regulative nature is 
what defines the principle as self-imposed, thus free. Therefore I am not arguing 
.. against the detailed requirements made by veiling because of their being prohibitive; 
it is always possible to imagines some one good at practical reasoning will actually 
choose to lead a strictly self-disciplined life. Therefore when it comes to my critique 
for Sausa and her talking about repressions that a veiled has to endure my point is not 
to say ideally any repressions should not exist, or the adopting of practical reasoning 
will necessarily remove one from self-discipline, which is by nature, prohibitive. In 
her case she believes in the fitna as women's endowed nature, and opposes the 
wearing of make-up because its increasing of the dangerous attractiveness of women 
in public. Yet she also reveals to have tried the make-up privately at home where the 
concept of fitna is no longer applicable (given that the members inside household are 
not marriageable males). If this can be sufficiently justified by the modesty principle 
as she holds up, then why would there be any repression in the first place? If one is at 
total ease with living such clearly split life in accordance with the principle of 
modesty, why should the domestic life be thought as compensating the loss in the 
public one? Shouldn't these two worlds be as harmonized as the Imam Qaradawi 
describes by the 'positive vis-a-vis negative' metaphor? Sausa reports as having the 
need to unleash her repressed needs through doing what is prohibited in public at 
home, including wearing the make-up and dressing in beautiful T-shirts. Repression as 
such is not quite the result of positive self-discipline but rather the consequence of 
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deeper uncertainty over what is the more natural thing to do. Precisely because Sausa 
can not fully agree with the implications of f i tna , that women are already attractive by 
their nature and should hide such attractiveness properly in public, she is troubled by 
feeling on the one hand, the need to look better, and on the other, the need to be 
modest as she believes it; the repression for her is resulted from the unsolvable 
conflict between these two kinds of need she is struggling with simultaneously. 
Conceptually Sausa is confused over whether the need to look good and the need to 
be modest can be combined with each other, and such confusion burdens her through 
causing the repression of one need over another. Yet this is totally avoidable if Sausa 
reflects critically on her held idea on 'fitna \ as the crucial concept underlying her 
understanding of modesty, through asking questions such as "isn't the wearing of 
T-shirts and make-up choices worthy of same consideration in terms of their 
expression of natural needs other than the need for spirituality", or further "is it the 
case that the Islamic requirement for modesty leaves no room for the individual 
J 
expression of beauty and fashion?" These are all questions Sausa encounters when 
choosing to veil; a reflective thinking over these questions can result in greater 
consistency in the decisions one makes, making one less likely to be disturbed by the 
negative repression. 
.� Since we have mentioned the practical reasoning as the crucial capacity to be included 
in making a truly free choice, some further remarks have to be given for this very 
concept and its philosophical implication. As I have shown earlier, when put under 
critical scrutiny, the ideas people generally hold about fitna, as one crucial concept 
underlying some interpretations for the veiling, is not as consistent and well-supported 
as they appear to be. Conceptual confusions and weak analogies abound when we 
examine the assumptions behind some familiar line of reasoning that my informants 
used during our conversation. Further, I have also demonstrated that the conceptual 
confusions as such are by no means innocuous and inconsequential, for they can result 
in unnecessary mental burden and actual dissembling behaviors in individual cases 
when left unsolved. Such observation leads to one of my main argument in this thesis, 
namely, being able to reason clearly over ideas assumed behind the choice one made 
and have a good argument about it should be considered as one crucial aspect for that 
choice to be considered as truly free. In this sense, the self-initiated veiling of my 
Tunisian informants in the earlier cases are not truly liberating, since insofar as the 
debate on fitna is concerned no one made an argument which is strong enough to 
sustain critical scrutiny. This point warrants further clarification. First of all, I 
consider the reasoning referred here as one crucial human capacity that is fully 
universal, namely, it is valid and applicable for people and communities across 
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culturally. Since my theoretical concerns for choosing this stance have been already 
clarified in the first chapter, here I will make a further exposition on this point through 
responding to the individual cases I mentioned earlier. Although in cases like Sausa 
and Leila they reported to be actually repressed by their sticking to the social 
expectations for the veiled, in other cases people were simply doing fine with their 
veiling experience. For Nadia, Zounuba and Salwa there is no apparent conflict 
between living as a modern citizen and a modest Muslim, as least according to their 
conversations with me. Nadia and Zounuba managed to justify their respective using 
of perfume and wearing colorful hijab through referring to the modern requirement 
for modesty, and Salwa even allies with the governmental ban for hijab despite her 
adopting of the attire in practice. Does this suggest that our proposal for practical 
reasoning is not applicable for their case? In other words, even they are sharing the 
same popular view on fitna with Sausa and Leila, since practically they are not at all' 
troubled by the inconsistence between the assumptions they held in this regard, why 
should we insist that it is necessary for them to have a critical examination on their 
beliefs? This leads back to the question I raised earlier, namely, if in reality the 
conceptual confusions over issues of great concern for us are unavoidable, and most 
of us can come up with temporary justifications for what we chose to do under one 
situation without noticing the general consistence of stances we have taken, why it is 
� . so important to insist on the use of practical reasoning in examining systematically 
what we have believed in particular cases? If it is up to individual choice when it 
comes to the thorough exploitation of the natural world and discovery of scientific 
laws, why shouldn't the cultivation of one's practical reason be an individual choice 
rather than an inescapable duty, as I have suggested? These are legitimate challenges 
to my argument of reasoning as necessary condition for a free choice, and to answer 
them we will see if the common ground can be achieved on the following points. First 
and most importantly, to define practical reason as one indispensible human capacity 
is to suggest logically that this capacity is so significant to the extent that we can not 
be considered as human being any more when being deprived of it. In its most basic 
sense, the practical reasoning asks about what is a good and desirable human life, and 
inquires on this question not only as an individual with particular interests but a 
member of a shared human community. The existence of a human society depends on 
the common capacity shared by different individuals in envisaging and acting for this 
possibility of betterment, and to legislate beyond oneself makes possible the justice of 
a fair social share of benefits gained collectively. This seek of good can be agreed 
upon cross-culturally as the common end, although the specific means toward this end 
is arguably different under different cultural contexts. In our current context practical 
reasoning stands for the capacity of examining the accepted arguments regarding the 
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veiling critically; this is contrary to passively conform to the popular sayings on this 
matter, or sympathetically accept anything said to be derived from Islamic tenets. 
Such a capacity is indispensible because as human beings the students concerned 
should naturally aspire to a well-examined life where one's considerations for crucial 
life decisions are carefully sorted out, rather than a conformist life following whatever 
is available in a close environment. Second, to name the practical reason as a capacity 
is to admit that the actual conditions in the real cases will influence the realization of 
this shared human potentiality; therefore although ideally these students should be 
able to perform the same kind of analysis I have made earlier for the popular ideas 
and religious doctrines they have received on the veiling, I am also aware that in 
reality such reasoning has to be motivated by one's willingness to empathize with 
another culture that is different from one's own, as well as externally supported by 
broader social arrangements like the liberal education within schools, and the legal 
protection for freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. Some of these 
conditions are arguably unavailable in the Tunisian context, where one will normally 
find great difficulty in sympathizing with the western culture, which is considered as 
systematically biased against Islam. Further, according to the observation of 
university professors I have talked with, the liberal education in regard of religion is 
very limited in the country due to the government's fear for religious extremism; not 
�� to mention the country's very poor record in providing its citizens with the freedom of 
speech. As I shall show later，most students tend to take a defensive stance when it 
comes to matters regarding Islam, making thinking the issue from an alternative 
perspective quite difficult. This predominant tendency of siding with Islam has 
definitely facilitated some fallacious religious indoctrination to be passed as truthful 
rendering of the religious tenets. Further, the insistence on practical reasoning in the 
individual cases is important, because it is commonly the case that the different 
beliefs we naturally have at one time will only turn out to be contradictory or 
untenable when we make efforts in pressing them critically in the reflection process. 
For instance, although Nadia, the young woman I used in the first example of last 
chapter, has lived in peace with her commitment to the equal standing of women in 
public life and her belief in fitna as one crucial reason for the veiling, these two ideas 
will contradict each other once being put under closer scrutiny: if the idea of fitna is 
true, namely, women are physically less suitable for taking up jobs outside home, then 
how should they be entitled to the equal opportunity that Nadia insists as crucial for 
the understanding of citizenship? Further, if she is consistent in arguing that the 
company should not make a person's choice of dress one aspect for the employment 
decision, how is she going to stay with the idea of fitna which insists that women 
won't be respected for her intellect unless they wear the veil? Is she now saying that it 
• 57 
is somehow understandable if the company refuses to recruit a woman for her being 
unveiled, as her personal religious belief seems to suggest? These questions can be 
argued for or against the original stance Nadia was taking, but they won't show up as 
serious questions if one does not make efforts in tracking different arguments down. 
This can explain why some are unaware of the hidden inconsistency of the popular 
sayings they took to be true at one time, and precisely because it is not the case that 
contradicting beliefs will automatically figure themselves out when reach us first as 
popular sayings, it is important to emphasize that practical reasoning is a more 
reliable device for this task. 
Insofar as the practical reasoning as universal human capacity is concerned I have to 
bring into discussion the argument for Islamic-relativism among a few Muslim 
feminists. One typical way of arguing this point is like this, namely, the.understanding' 
of rights within Islam is closely associated with the idea of modesty and 
complementary relation between genders, which is essentially different from the 
western understanding of rights which is connected with the consumerist culture and 
individualism; veiling is the concrete embodiment of such ideological dichotomy 
between the Islamic and western thinking.44 This line of reasoning is widely found in 
people I knew during the field trip, and for some of them the veiling expresses the 
� . opposition against all western corruption from liberty of sex to materialism. This 
stance is found problematic in the following aspects: first of all, modesty or 
consumerism aside, isn't there a basic commitment to justice and public debate for 
achieving this end within the Islamic society, which is not different in nature with the 
idea for liberty and equality within the western context? In this sense the veiling does 
not only have a cultural aspect, as stood for by the debate between 'modesty' and 
‘consumerism,，but as a social practice it is also connected with what a rational 
member within the community considers as good and right to do. Therefore when 
arguing that veiling is the modest way of dress for women one is not only speaking as 
a believer, with the hope to address the religious community only, but as a citizen 
within a larger civic community one is at the same time proposing a systematic 
understanding of women's status, which is to be further decided by other members of 
the community in terms of its compatibility with more general protocols of the society. 
As the earlier cases have shown, insofar as individual reasoning is concerned the 
44 For examples of this kind of argument see Soroya Duyal, "New Veils and New Voices: Islamiist 
Women's Groups in Egypt," in Women and Islamization: Contemporary Dimensions of Discourses on 
Gender Relations, ed. Karin Ask and Marit Tjomsland(New York; Berg, 1998) and Pamela K. Taylor, 
"I Just Want to Be Me: Issues in Identity for One American Muslim Woman," in The Veil: Women 
Writers on its History, Lore, and Politics, ed. Jennifer Heath(California: University of California Press, 
2008). 
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reasoning over the religious significance of the veiling can not be really distinguished 
from the reasoning over more general public arrangement regarding the religious 
practice. In many situations the public policy and its underlying principle, when well 
exposed through reflection, will directly challenge the religious reasoning one uses in 
private, and vice versa. In our earlier discussion of fitna in the context of Tunisia, such 
challenge is most vividly illustrated by one's entitlement to secular legal rights on the 
one hand and the personal attachment to the popular religious interpretation of fitna 
on the other. Leaving such conceptual contradiction unresolved will not only result in 
confusion but also a split or lethargy of public debate in the long run. Yet such a 
debate is nevertheless unavoidable if the community as a whole is going to keep its 
commitment to justice, which depends on the individual use of practical reasoning on 
a public scale. Therefore, it is my contention that to reason over the nature of the 
veiling practice, not merely as a cultural product of one's particular environment but 
as the religious practice within a broader civic community, should be found necessary 
in the western and Islamic society alike. Second, the categorical division held by the 
Islamic-relativist is also untenable when it comes to the actual function of the veiling 
and the fair evaluation of the western society. As we have already mentioned, given 
the lack of substantial evidence, it is implausible to assume that the veiling can 
provide the panacea for social problems like sexual harassment and extramarital sex; 
.. still less problems such as consumerism and materialism which are metaphysical in 
definition. Not to mention that libertine sex culture and consumerism can not provide 
a whole picture of what is happening within the major western societies. After all, the 
spread of sex culture on media won't be possible if the freedom of speech is not first 
guaranteed by law in the first place, and in principle the public mania with material 
consumption does not hinder the society concerned from committing to the general 
fairness of wealth distribution or the well-fare of the less advantaged. Again, insofar 
as the general concern for justice and good is concerned there is no distinctive 
dichotomy between an Islamic society and a western one as the relativist argument 
assumes. 
Furthermore, the idea of practical reasoning is not purely a western concept as the 
Islamic relativists would suggest. The argument developed by Nimat Hafez Barazanqi, 
a Syrian feminist scholar and educator in Qu'ran, in her book Woman 's Identity and 
the Qu 'ran: A New Reading will serve as a good example for how practical reasoning 
can be rendered under the Islamic context. The main argument of Barazanqi in her 
proposed new pedagogue of Q'uran is to practice Islam in the real sense one must first 
be able to read the relevant religious texts critically through independent reasoning. 
Bazrzanqi has addressed this point especially with Muslim women, who have been • 
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assigned a secondary status with the religious community and excluded from 
interpreting the religious canons thereof historically. This in turn further perpetuates 
women's intellectual subordination when it comes to the reading of religious texts; 
therefore Barazanqi sees the necessity of enhancing not only the literacy of women 
but as well their capacity of critical thinking regarding religious matters. '^^Therefore, 
Barazanqi has redefined the nature of human beings in the Islamic context as 
‘mutaqqi,, namely, the follower of the principle of Uaqwa\ Unlike the Islamic 
relativists, who consider the ideas of reason and rights as mere western, Barazanqi has 
developed the Islamic version of universal reason from the idea of 'taqwa\ According 
to her, 'taqwadefined as the balance between the individual choice and social action, 
represents the moral ideal that a Muslim should aspire to achieve; one's ability to 
exercise the endowed free will through reasoning openly on matters concerning the 
good of oneself and the community is a necessary means toward the end of 'taqwa' . 
Thus for Barazanqi the nature of Muslims as human beings resides in their capacity of 
practical reasoning in matters concerning the society and religion, and this holds true 
for men and women alike. When it comes to the veiling, Barazanqi reinterprets the 
Q'uranic chapters regarding hijab, arguing that the primary meaning of veiling resides 
in its emphasis for privacy and protection for lineage, as expressed by the idea of 
modesty. Yet different from the popular preaching that usually associates modesty 
,� with fitna, Barazanqi emphasizes the necessity of having moral autonomy prior to the 
observation of the social protocol of modesty. Therefore to be considered as really 
practicing Islam rather than merely conforming to the existing social norms the 
woman who decides to veil must have a good understanding of the modesty as 
mentioned by Q'uran, so that she won't feel guilty about her body or be perplexed by 
the prevailing negative stigma of female sexuality. Further, the priority of the moral 
autonomy will allow the women more flexibility in making the decision of veiling 
under different social circumstances; if one has a good reason to believe that the 
general social convention on veiling is unjust, it is reasonable for one to decide not to 
follow the practice and the code of modesty as it is defined in this concrete context. 
My understanding of this principle is, the code of modesty, however defined within 
one social context, should not override other human rights that are agreed as more 
basic according to practical reasoning. For instance, the woman can refuse the veil if 
she is coerced to do so by parents or other family members; for in that case individual 
liberty defeats the requirement of modesty. Further, if the state as a whole imposes the 
code of modesty on women on account of the fitna, then one should be able to oppose 
the practice based on its misrepresentation of what Islam actually requires. In the case 
Nimat Hafez Barazangi, Woman 's Identity and the Qu 'ran: A New Reading(Gsi\nQsvi\]e: University • 
Press of Florida: 2004): 3-8. 
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of Tunisia, since the legal rights of women regarding marriage, education and 
inheritance are all guaranteed by the civic law, and can not be violated on by any 
religious obligation, the case of veiling is more about the use of practical reasoning in 
individual cases, so that one can have a good argument about this issue before making 
the choice. Or at the very least they won't simply follow the popular idea of fitna and 
suffer from the unnecessary guilt of being sexually tempting men. 
One important background to be brought into our analysis of cases with the Tunisian 
students is the wide belief within the Muslim community that Islam has been unfairly 
treated in the world today, and it is the critical time to defend one's religion. Back to 
the first chapter I described my encounter with a taxi driver, who made a plea for my 
saying something positive about Islam. Such deep-seated worry that Muslims are 
systematically stereotyped is shared in varying degrees by all the people I have come 
to know within the country. Daily reports from Aljazeera and the local newspaper are 
the best sources if one is looking for evidence showing the misery of Muslims in 
war-ravaged places; daily headlines showcase the bloody scenario across the region: 
injured children in Palestine by the fire of Israel, and civilians killed by 
suicide-bombers in Iraq or Afghanistan. These daily covering of unfortunate incidents 
in some cases raisesw strong indignation, and I will list two cases to show this point. 
� Hasan(male) is a well-established calligrapher making his living on selling his 
amazing Islamic handwritings and designs, and I have been friends with him since my 
first visit to the country back in 2007. In his mid-thirties, Hasan is soft-spoken and 
moderate, and his knowledge regarding the Q'uran and the anecdotes of Prophet 
Mohammed never ceases to amaze me. Yet he loses his temper every time when 
discussing with me the Middle Eastern politics. For him the brutality of Israel and its 
ally U.S. has predominantly caused the interminable suffering of people in the region, 
and to destroy the occupying force is the only solution for the continuing conflict. His 
deep-seated anger for foreign interference in the region is shared by Yosr, a veiled 
student majored in mathematics. Young and talented, Yosr is among the best in class 
and very popular among her friends for her warm-heartedness and extrovert character. 
Yet one thing distinctive of Yosr is her having a clear political agenda expressed 
through the veiling, namely, according to her one important reason leading to her 
choice of the hijab is to defend Islam and protest against the Zionism. In the words of 
her friend, the hijab in this case resembles the emblem on the shoulder of a soccer 
team leader: like the team leader who has to take up the responsibility of guiding the 
whole team during the match and representing the best of the team, a veiled woman 
shoulders the responsibility of showing the best of Islam. For Yosr I am the first 
non-Muslim she came to know, and in every opening of her conversation she would . 
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add "in our Islam", worrying that as an outsider I will be easily influenced by the 
overwhelming negative reports on the extremist side of the religion. Although as a 
friend I enjoyed her company, the way Yosr showed her resistance of Zionism seems 
eccentric to me: she not only boycotts Coco-cola and other American made products 
for their sponsorship for Zionist activities, but refused to watch BBC for its 
ideological affiliation with the occupying Israeli force in Palestine. It is predictable 
that for both Hasan and Yosr the religious necessity of veil is not subject to any 
dispute, and any criticism on the practice would be condemned as western prejudice 
against Islam, or the misrepresentation for what Muslims actually believe. In private I 
do value these two friends for their sincerity and personal integrity, yet in retrospect 
what troubles me is a general assumption underlying their passionate reaction to the 
existing injustice in the region, namely, there is a systematic prejudice against 
Muslims in the western world, and such prejudice is omnipresent in. every from of 
contact between Islam and the West. In the first chapter I mentioned the Orientalism 
of Said to draw attention to the more theoretical rendering of this idea now found 
popular within the Muslim community in Tunisia. The point is not to say that that 
lamentable human loss on the Muslim side and popular ignorance over matters 
concerning Islam never happened as they believed. Rather, the main concern here is 
about a more rational way of approaching these issues so that one does not merely 
,, take sides based on emotions alone. In the case of the return of hijab in Tunisia my 
observation reveals that critical thinking of principles behind one's choice is highly 
inadequate among the students I know, and this can not be considered as irrelevant to 
the general political background where people feel their cherished religion is under 
threat. After all, if the prevailing sentiment within this situation is the need to defend 
the wronged Islam，then how can one be distanced enough to make a more lucid 
judgment of diverging beliefs around an issue as sensitive as the veiling? In my 
conversations with the young Tunisians terms like "reason" and "basic human rights' 
are disconcerting given their political association with the ‘bully West', yet in reality 
none of these students could actually do without committing to issues regarding 
practical reasoning and basic rights in one way or another. For instance, one basic 
assumption behind the protest of many against the prejudice against Islam is that one 
group of people should be treated differently because of their basic religious belief, 
and to reach this basic point we need the practical reasoning that goes beyond the 
immediate circumstances of our own. Besides, many final-year students I know were 
busy with job-hunting last summer, and only to that point would they begin to see 
how important it is for the country to insist that women should be granted equal 
opportunities in employment. Therefore for these students they would tell me that a 
secure job and an independent income are crucial constituents for a good life that they . 
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aspire to lead; although they found little reason to oppose the popular idea offitna that 
women are more suitable physically to live at home. In this case the reasoning has 
already been partly applied when one argues for the essential role of employment in 
one's own case, and the adoption of practical reasoning will allow one to reason more 
generally about the necessity of having an equal opportunity of participating in public 
life, which will then allow one to see the implausibilily of the idea of f i tna . It is based 
on these considerations I am arguing for including practical reasoning as one 
important aspect for a free choice when it comes to the veiling. In this regard I believe 
that Said is on the same track of promoting genuine understanding between Islam and 
the West, yet a more urgent question to be asked here is about the means toward this 
humanistic end. For Said the common ground can be mainly achieved through our 
shared human capacity of empathy, as he puts it in Representation of Intellectual, that 
a true intellectual should "always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an 
ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the 
unrepresented, the powerless". 46Yet the point seems to have overlooked the fact that 
empathy can be severely limited by the immediate environment we find most familiar, 
nor is the disadvantaged always on the side of truth. In the cases of Hasan and Yosr, 
their empathy with Palestinians as the weaker side in the Israeli-Arab conflict has 
been greatly influenced by the Islamic society they are living in, making it difficult 
、， for them to see the human face of the demonized West. Not to mention that the 
disadvantaged groups are not at all immune from violating other groups' basic rights, 
as the Hamas's brutal killing of Israeli civilians and Fatha's autocratic ruling over its 
own people have adequately proved. In the earlier analysis, I have already mentioned 
that the practical reasoning as an essential human capacity is situated itself within 
concrete social conditions, and general social arrangements like liberal education and 
freedom of speech can have a great bearing on how well the citizens within one 
community can actual perform in their reasoning. In the cases of the disadvantaged 
groups it is more likely that these basic social institutions are not adequately provided 
for them or fully developed in the societies they are living in, which make it more 
difficult for these people to rise above their own predicament and look at sensitive 
issues from other perspectives. Theoretically this makes the practical reasoning more 
urgent for the disadvantaged groups if the humanist goal outlined by Said can ever be 
realized. 
Giving the reason that practical reasoning should be considered as crucial for the 
choice of veiling and how it can be applied in the debate on fitna, in the next chapter I 
will attempt to discuss the ontological significance of veiling. The main reason for 
Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectuals (New York: Vintage Books, 1996): 113. 
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this inquiry turns out to be a crucial puzzle when I approach the question concerning 
the veil through the liberal stance of choice. One most important assumption 
underlying the choice argument is that human beings are capable of moral judgment 
independent of the natural determination. The free will must be presumed so that it 
makes sense to talk about the practical reasoning rising beyond one's familiar 
circumstance. Such a vision of human agency is theoretically ideal, where one can 
reasonably aspire to be under one situation; while at the same time the practical 
reasoning makes sure that the aspiration thus achieved will be inclusive enough to 
cover all the rational beings provided with the same situation. Although the capacity 
approach as delineated by Nussbaum starts with what are actually available to people 
under one circumstance, the possibility of envisaging a list of basic human capacities 
nevertheless depends on the reasoning process that goes beyond what one has been 
assigned with in his/her particular situation. Since the concept of choice concerns 
essentially with the capacity of reason, both in its public and private use, it is by 
definition free from the influences of one's concrete social and cultural conditions. It 
follows that the same group of standards should be applied for us to judge one choice 
as free, and these standards are not themselves subject to further dispute based on 
cultural differences. Therefore in my case if I have successfully argued that in order 
for a choice of veiling to be considered as free some conditions must be fulfilled, 
� , which include the protection for liberty of conscience and freedom of speech and the 
capacity of practical reasoning, then it follows that these conditions should be applied 
equally to the Tunisian, Chinese and French society alike. This implies that the choice 
of veiling in Tunisia shouldn't be considered as free if the government violates the 
liberty of conscience of the veiled through introducing the compulsive ban, and it also 
implies that the individual choice of hijab shouldn't be considered as free if one does 
not have a good argument for the choice concerned. At the same time the recent 
French ban of niqab will be judged as unjust for the same reason of liberty of 
conscience, and the state protection initiated by the Chinese government is not 
sufficient to consider the choice of veiling as free given the lack of freedom of speech 
inside the country. Such a model seems perfectly right until we ask a more basic 
question: does it make any sense at all to talk about the choice of veiling in the 
Chinese context? Here I am not saying that the veiling of some Chinese Muslim 
minorities won't be understood by mainstream Chinese culture, or their rights as 
citizens to practice their religion can not be actually denied in reality. Rather, I am 
referring to a more basic relation people in the Chinese context normally have with a 
practice such as veiling, which determines in a fundamental way whether the practice 
will be significant at all for an average Chinese. According to the choice model, this 
aspect as been left as the cultural meaning of the attire, which is not be taken into • 
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account insofar as the general rationales regarding free choice are concerned. Yet the 
story will be entirely different if we assume that Heidegger is right in pointing out the 
ontological relation we have with objects within the world is more prior to the 
present-at-hand kind of relation, as the talking on reason and rights refers to. For the 
choice story all the nuanced cultural meanings of the veil must be left out, and the 
veiling remains as abstract as a general religious practice so that agreement can be 
achieved among different groups of people, in terms of what standards should be 
adopted to judge one's choice of veiling as free. However, the choice approach will 
also agree that as peoples with different cultural background we are not at the same 
starting point when talking about the choice of veiling, which as a social custom 
exists only in some cultures rather than all. This can be further seen as one of the 
uneven conditions we are assigned with at birth, which are contingent and arbitrary; 
hence the necessity for the practical reason to overcome this contingency. Yet the 
question still remains what we mean when we are saying that a social custom or 
cultural convention exists. In the case of veiling, does the existence here refer to the 
material aspect of the practice as being a piece of cloth, which is further invested with 
specific meanings under the particular cultural context of Islam? If that is the case, it 
seems reasonable to assume that any one can practice veiling so long as she puts on 
the attire and follow the customs as required by Islam, but is this true? Here we 
.� encounter another crucial implication of the choice story, namely, if the practice were 
up to one's choice, then it shouldn't only be restricted to those born within an Islamic 
family or culture, but is open to people without such formative cultural influences. 
Again, here we are not talking about the right of conversion or quitting one's assigned 
religion; it is a pure ontological question to ask whether it is possible at all for 
non-Muslim by birth to pick up the veil? 
Through putting question in this way I am proposing a closer look at the meaning of 
having being assigned with different ontological conditions before making the choice. 
In our earlier discussion of free choice concerning the veil, the impact of one's 
assigned environment on one's making of such a decision has been left out under our 
focus on the possibility of achieving common ground through reasoning. Yet this does 
not offer us any insight into the content of the culture condition we are assigned with, 
nor our relations with it; such insight is nevertheless needed if the choice we are 
talking on the level of practical reasoning is to be considered as making sense， 
ontologically, in the first place. Therefore in the following chapter I will attempt to 
tackle this question through introducing the discussion made by Heidegger regarding 
how human beings as Dasein are related to the objects as equipments within the world. 
If the attempt is successful, then we should be able to agree that ontologically it won't • 
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make any sense for a non-Muslim by birth to actually choose the veil, although such 
choice still remains possible insofar as more abstract political rights and the individual 
capacity of practical reasoning are concerned. 
1 
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Chapter Four The Ontological Significance of Veiling 
As I have discussed at end of last chapter, the manifold cultural meanings of the veil 
has been left out by our previous attempt to figure out the question concerning free 
choice, and it is important to examine the ontological significance of the veil so that 
we can better understand what it means to be assigned a specific cultural context, and 
how such an assignment is going to influence the choice we are making. Before 
entering into the details of the ontological story it will be helpful to first look at how 
previous literature talks about the meaning of veil, then, we will try to figure out the 
philosophical assumption of such an approach toward the question of meaning. 
To illustrate how the meaning of veil has usually been discussed in previous literature, 
it is helpful to quote the introduction given by Jennifer Heath in her edited book The 
Veil, which includes one sentence as follows: "as much as the veil is fabric or an 
article of clothing, it is also a concept. It can be illusion, vanity, artifice, deception, 
liberation, imprisonment, euphemism, divination, concealment, hallucination, 
depression, eloquent silence, holiness, the ethers beyond consciousness, the hidden 
hundredth name of God, the final passage into death, even the biblical apocalypse, the 
lifting of God's veil, signaling so-called end times. When veiling is forced-then 
�� enforced-it is repression. Yet, as we see increasingly today, the veil is also a symbol of 
resistance-against ethnic and religious d i s c r im ina t i on.，，Thi s highly condensed 
summary can be seen as a standard expression of the signifier and signified formula, 
namely, as a symbol the veil can stand for a variety of meanings depending on the 
specific contexts concerned in each case. If our discussion of choice is correct, then 
these specific contexts have been assigned to every one of us as the cultural aspect of 
our birth conditions. Such a broad cultural context further multiplies different 
personal experiences in individual cases, giving rise to the complexity of meanings 
that the veil can possibly stand for. One crucial point to be noticed about this way of 
understanding the meaning is the pivotal role of an abstract subject, who can first 
receive the assigned cultural meanings of a symbol, then develop it further alongside 
the accumulation of personal experience. Both the understanding of one's assigned 
cultural context and the development of personal experience depend on this ideal 
subject as the epistemological basis in unifying the empirical data into concrete 
meanings that the veil as an object stands for. In this sense we consider this approach 
toward the question of meaning as broadly following the subject-object model; the 
presumption of the ideal subject makes possible the understanding of different 
47 Jennifer Heath, ed. The Veil: Women Writers on Its History, Lore, and Po//?/c5(Califomia: University ‘ 
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meanings of the veil, as well as its representation. 
If the subject-object model were correct, namely, the signifying relation as commonly 
understood presumes the an abstract subject that is prior to the concrete influence of 
one's culture and personal experience, and makes it epistemologically possible for the 
manifold empirical data to be grasped as a unitary whole; then how does this basic 
epistemological assumption provides us with any clue for reading the relations 
between one's assigned cultural environment and one's being influenced by it? We 
can make use of more concrete arguments from the debate on veil to figure out where 
this assumption is going to lead us. First, according to the choice story, if we state that 
veiling as a social institution is unambiguously oppressive for women, then we 
assume that it is possible for one assigned with such a practice within the culture one 
born into to abandon the practice, presumably through the execution of one's free will. 
Further, in another extreme case if we state that veiling is the most modest way of 
dress that liberates women from the tempting material world, then we simultaneous 
assume that it is possible for one outside the Islamic community to choose the veiling 
based on the same free will. This vision agrees perfectly with my earlier accounts 
considering the question of choice from the universal human capacity, which requires 
certain social arrangement as well as personal endeavor to make a choice truly free. 
.. Yet one crucial problem with this ideally based choice model is that what is legally 
guaranteed as a choice and rationally conceived as a plausible alternative may show 
up to be totally out of place within the given cultural context. For instance, as an 
average Chinese I am legally granted the right to concert to Islam and pick up the veil, 
and as a feminist scholar I may intellectually find appealing the idea of modesty and 
simplicity as expressed by the veil, yet given my common Chinese upbringing (which 
is presumably atheist and preoccupied with worldly interaction between human beings) 
to exhibit one's virtue through adopting certain a type of dress seems alien and distant. 
On the other hand the similar ideas on modesty can be expressed in ways I am more 
‘ familiar with such as being humble in evaluating one's own merits and committed to 
hard working. By the same token, although it is legally possible for a Muslim within 
an Islamic country to quit the veiling if she wills, and as a rational person she may 
have very good reasons for doing so, yet such rationalized decision does not in any 
sense make veiling or not matter less to her in a most intimate way. In both examples 
through trying to describe how differently a Chinese and an Arab would feel about the 
practice of veiling, I am not aiming at recapitulating something as thoughtless as the 
cultural diversity, namely, for certain central concepts of good the criteria people use 
different from one culture to another. Rather, I am asking about the relation between 
one and the specific culture one is assigned with in a more intimate sense, or to render • 
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it in a more rigid way, what we are concerned with here is the ontological relation one 
has with a cultural practice prescribed by the culture one is assigned with. In 
predominantly focusing on the ideal subject and its capacity of acting morally, the 
choice approach has completely left out this ontological question, making it a puzzle 
how the same reason we use in the moral decision making can be applied to connect 
us with the culture we are assigned with and further help us to handle countless 
nuanced situations within it. This is especially so in what is generally termed as 
cultural custom and convention. Consider the following examples, it is arguably 
reasonable that the makeshift fire-crackers should be abandoned due to the potential 
pollution it causes and the security hazard it imposes on the user. However, the 
Chinese government's ban of fire-crackers during the Spring Festival has raised wide 
protest within many cities in China. One crucial reason behind many people's protest 
against the governmental ban is its introducing a fundamental change to way the 
Spring Festival is supposed to be experienced as a Chinese festival. For those insist on 
this point what is at stake is not quite the statistical measurement of the chemical 
effect of the fire-crackers, nor the theoretical vindication for the lighting of 
fire-crackers and its cultural meaning; it may be vaguely referred to as the lack of 'jie 
ri fen wei’(the festival atmosphere). The vagueness of the 'festival atmosphere' thus 
referred comes from a more general hunch of 'something being not there，，which is 
.� yet too pervasive to be pinned down by definite expressions such as 'I need the 
firecrackers back' or 'the firecracker is the indispensible part of the festival'. It reveals 
itself every time one stares at the night sky at the New Year's Eve, enters shops 
decorated with paper-made firework models, or has a family dinner with a group of 
jubilant children at home. For a person has experience, the more every one else 
around seems to have adapted to a festival without the firecracker, the more the 
banned firecrackers stands out as pertinent to the festival setting in an ontological 
sense. To term this experience as ontological is to differentiate it from the talking of 
entity and its property from the subject-object stance. In this situation, what happened 
is not the same with first identifying in the mind one entity named the 'Chinese 
Festival' then coming up with all properties belonging to this item. Such pure 
conceptual thinking can never lead to the kind of getting around in a world one is 
most familiar with and finding something missing in it. Rather, to encounter the 
firecracker as something conspicuously standing out in the festival setting one has to 
first find home in a holistic of 'holiday experience' as it is under the Chinese context. 
This example leads up to the necessity for us to make a further theoretical distinction 
between the ontological investigation and the inquiry based on a broad subject-object 
model. 
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As I have already stated in the preceding paragraph, our main task here is to figure out 
how the arbitrarily assigned cultural context interacts with us, especially in terms of 
the choices we make concerning the prevailing conventions within that culture. 
Through the example of how an average Chinese could feel about the missing of 
firecrackers during the Spring Festival, I also said that the ontological relation we 
have with entities around us is different in kind from the 'subject-object' relation we 
envisage from the choice approach. This statement warrants further exposition. One 
basic assumption of the choice approach is about a knowing subject precedes the 
concrete cultural and personal experience, which makes possible to epistemologically 
talk about alternative options regarding one prevailing cultural convention. If we 
suppose that the prevailing Chinese custom regarding female modesty is the 
foot-binding and the Islamic counterpart as the veiling (since the discussion is purely 
philosophical the accuracy of the empirical cases is not a concern here), then 
according to the choice approach it is theoretically possible for a Chinese to choose 
the veiling, and a Muslim the foot-binding despite of the predominant influence their 
respective cultural contexts imposes on them. The cultural context in this case is seen 
no more than the empirical manifold which is to be gradually picked up by an 
individual. Since the possibility of being affected by the cultural context in the first 
place depends on one's being subject endowed with reason, and the reason is further 
.. assumed as unified and universal, it follows that one is expected to understand and 
judge a cultural specific practice independently of the particular cultural experience 
one possesses. The primary relation between a person and his/her particular cultural 
background is fundamentally a knowing process carried out by the reasoning power 
all the way down, wherein every thing empirical is defined against a knowing subject, 
which is by nature, a-cultural. Hence the cultural context can be grasped as the 
aggregate of different customs, norms and conventions, which can be further broken 
down into different properties. Therefore to be a Muslim is to acquire a gradual 
understanding of customs such as praying, fasting, veiling, and taking the pilgrimage, 
which can be compared in parallel with how a Chinese gets accustomed to distinctive 
Chinese practices such as eating moon-cakes during the Mid-Autumn Festival and 
lighting firecrackers during the Spring Festival. Such understanding does not only 
apply to the tangible aspect of the custom concerned, such as knowledge about which 
kind of cloth to buy and how to wrap the scarf in the case of veiling, but the intangible 
aspect as well, such as the theological meaning of covering during the prayer and 
religious interpretation of modesty. This way of approaching the question of 
background in general is characterized by its emphasis on the mental aspect of the 
issue, as represented by the subject's knowledge and judgment of one particular 
cultural custom. We may use the term 'present-at-hand' to describe how the cultural -
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entities can be understood under this approach, and this counters the ontological 
approach where the cultural entities are primarily understood as 'equipments'. The 
term 'present-at-hand' and 'equipment' is a direct borrow from Heidegger, and in his 
book Being and Time these two terms have been used to distinguish all 
pre-ontological inquiry from his proposed ontological inquiry. We have to give a 
closer look at the distinction Heidegger made between the treating entities in the 
world as 'present-at-hand' and as 'equipments'; for our current task of exploring the 
ontological significance of veiling depends on this very distinction. First of all, the 
term 'present-at-hand' is given by Heidegger in his exposition of how entities in the 
world have been understood by the pre-ontological analysis, namely, the way by 
which his predecessors deal with the question of being. The broad subject-object 
model as we mentioned earlier is one typical kind of pre-ontological analysis, wherein 
to treat a cultural entity such as a custom as 'present-at-hand' means to consider it as 
an object to be grasped by the ideal subject. Seen as the ‘present-at-hand，entity, a 
cultural practice as veiling is no different from a particle in physics, both of which can 
be determined in terms of its concrete properties and relations with other existing 
objects inside the world. Insofar as the knowing subject and the knowable objects are 
concerned, the difference between a human practice and a natural object is not a 
difference of kind but rather the difference in concrete characteristics. Hence the 
,, human practice can be regarded as including more intangible features than the natural 
objects, or be considered as essentially dependent on the intangible protocol between 
people.48 This comparison between the cultural practice and the natural object is only 
possible in the epistemological sense when we consider the nature of human being as 
mainly being the knowing subject. Hence the question of being, namely, question 
concerning what it is to be human, must be first answered before we get to understand 
different entities within the world, and it is possible that different answers to this 
question will lead to different way of understanding entities cultural and natural alike. 
Second, the answer given by Heidegger for the question of being resides in his use of 
the term Dasein, According to him, the question of being can never be adequately 
answered by the thinking subject, since entities within the world can never been 
encountered as the indifferent present-at-hand objects if they are not first understood 
as intelligible entities for our existence of Dasein in the first place. Different from the 
thinking subject reaching out to the worldly objects through mental activities such as 
perceiving, understanding and judging, Dasein is in every case indispensible for 
his/her world, and this interdependence between Dasein and his/her world is 
expressed by the Heideggerian term 'Being-in-the-world'. "^^Further, different from 
48 For Heidegger's exposition for the term 'present-at-hand', see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson(London: SCM Press LTD, 1962):67-69. ‘ 
49 For relevant exposition for the term 'Dasein' and its difference with other anthropological, 
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the thinking subject that conceives the worldly entities as mere present-at-hand 
objects, which are ontologically deprived of any meaning and intelligibility, Dasein 
and Dasein alone can disclose a meaningful world through concernfully dealing with 
entities within the world as equipments. Equipment here refers to the worldly entities 
as Dasein 'sees' it, which is different in kind from the isolable and meaningless 
present-at-hand objects grasped by the thinking subject. Equipments are not only 
wholesome by nature and thus can not be divided into isolable objects; they also for 
most of the time remain invisible if everything goes well with Dasein's dealing with 
the world.50 Here we may use the example of book as an example to illustrate the 
distinction between objects for the thinking subject and the equipment for Dasein. 
Understood as an object, namely, a present-at-hand entity, a book can be said to have 
different properties such as weight, color, size, as well as serving crucial functions 
such as recording human knowledge, transmitting intellectual ideas and systematically 
summarizing the results of a research. These characteristics a book as an object 
normally has further defines a book as a book; therefore distinguishes it from other 
entities such as documents, magazines and personal computers which share some 
overlapping characteristics with it, and are still different from a book in terms of other 
properties. Yet when seen as a piece of equipment ontologically a book does not at all 
first come to us as a bare present-at-hand object endowed with different properties. 
Rather, it strikes us as the most appropriate entity to be expected under a particular 
situation. For instance, it is what we normally expect when searching for relevant 
information on a research subject, learning the written form of a theory in class and 
studying the work of a popular writer. In every case a book may appear as the most 
appropriate entity given what we are doing at that moment, and the 'function' that a 
book serves in each case does not have to appear as clear as properties if everything is 
going fine with that particular situation. For instance, if I am a scholar who used to do 
research based on books in the library, when starting to work on a project at hand I 
may simply check the bibliography online and then get a pile of references back from 
the library without noticing the function that a book as an entity delivers. In the case 
of a student, if the most common way for my learning a new theory in class is through 
reading a book together with the lecturer, naturally I can do everything from taking 
biological and psychological understanding of human being, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson(London: SCM Press LTD, 1962):71-77. Dasein as 
Heidegger uses it in Being and Time stands both for the collective concept of human being and an 
individual case of being human; hence in this thesis 1 am also using this term in both referring to a 
group of people and a specific person. For a more detailed exposition on how is Dasein, as Heidegger's 
concept for human being, distinctive from other perspectives of human, especially the view of human 
as conscious subjects, see Hubert L. Dreyftis, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger 's 
Being and Time, Division /(Massachusetts: The MIT Press: 1992): 13-14. 
For definitive exposition for the concept of 'equipment' and its relation with Dasein see Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson(London: SCM Press LTD, 
1962): 95-102. 
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notes to raising a question without being unaware of the role that the book on my 
table plays. Even in cases when something unusual happens, like all libraries nearby 
suddenly shut down and no books are available, or in the second example the teacher 
decides to try the online teaching thus a real book is no longer needed, a person who 
is sticking to that situation will react by looking for substitutive information on the 
internet or adapting oneself to the new rules of online learning; in neither case the 
book has to be perceived as an object with distinctive properties. This is to say, if a 
person as Dasein is concerned with a more general sense of what is to be done within 
particular situations as mentioned above, for instance, getting some information in 
order to have a research paper written, or following the exposition of a teacher in 
order to comprehend a difficult theory, such concerns would never allow a book to be 
perceived as an isolated object with distinctive properties. Besides, as equipment the 
book is never understood as an object separate from other objects such as the library, 
the book shelves inside the library, the classroom, the table inside the classroom and 
etc. Rather, to define the equipment as holistic is to say that an 'equipmental whole' 
constituted by the library, the facilities inside the library, the classroom and etc have 
already been taken into account by Dasein who is coping with these different 
situations in order to get the task at hand done. Third, if the entity within the world for 
a being like Dasein can not be considered as the same with the present-at-hand kind of 
object, it follows that the meaning and significance of entity as seen by Dasein is not 
the same with the properties or attributes which we attach to the present-at-hand kind 
of object. As dicussed in the preceding point, equipments are connected by the series 
of practical manuscripts Dasein follows in a particular situation, which is termed by 
Heidegger as ‘in-order-to’ (like in the previous cases, to borrow the book from the 
library in order to finish a research project or to bring a textbook to class in order to 
follow the teacher's exposition), and the inter-connectedness between a stream of 
'in-order-to' is further termed as 'assignment' or 'reference'. Further, we also 
mentioned earlier hat equipment is defined by its being most appropriate for this 
specific task, which can not be found with a general sense of property that an object 
processes. Further, if everything goes well for Dasein's carrying out a specific task, 
equipment becomes inconspicuous or even transparent. For Heidegger our being able 
to get around in our everyday world most of the time in such a transparent manner 
indicates a more basic sense of understanding that we as Dasein 'possess'. Different 
from the understanding construed as the mental capacity, this more primary 
understanding that Dasein depends on when getting around in the world constitutes 
the inconspicuous familiarity, that is unavailable for any conceptual thematizing or 
mental representation. It is based on this more basic sense of understanding that the 
significance of entities for Dasein arises. Just like under the subject-object model it is 
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the basic mental representation of oneself, namely, the identity that grants meanings to 
more concrete deeds of individual in the practice, ontologically speaking, it is the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which' that offers significance to the series of ‘in-order-to’ that 
Dasein performs on a daily basis.^' Different from the more mental-oriented concept 
of identity that gives meanings to a variety of behaviors in a unilateral manner, the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which' does not, strictly speaking, impose any significance on the 
everyday activity of Dasein, nor does such a unified representation of oneself ever 
exist on the ontological level. Rather, the 'for-the-sake-of-which' is exhibited by and 
depends on the kind of transparent coping that Dasein performs in one particular 
‘in-order-to，after another. For this point we shall have a better grasp through my later 
analysis of the case of Saida. 
After the brief exposition on Heidegger's vision for how the ontological inquiry into 
the question of background reveals answers different to that offered by the traditional 
subject-object model, we shall now come back to our case with the veiling and 
explore how is the ontological significance of this practice different from the variety 
of meanings that the veil is said to have. This leads us back to the signifier and 
signified story I have laid out in the beginning of the chapter by quoting from Jennifer 
Heath. It is one basic assumption of this signifying interpretation that the veil as a 
symbol bears interminable different meanings depending on the cultural background 
and personal experience. When it comes to our basic question in this chapter, namely, 
how can what termed as the 'cultural background' here be understood in terms of its 
relation with the individual, this assumption says nothing more than the formula of 
form and content usually expresses. That is , the cultural background determines how 
the same behavior of putting on a piece of cloth on one's head can be interpreted 
differently, and the varying individual experience makes more complex the final 
meaning the behavior stands for in each case. If we consider this formula as a 
mathematical equation, then it follows that the meaning of the veil can be calculated 
out rightly if we have adequate grasp of the determinants represented by the 'cultural 
background' and 'personal experience'. Here both the cultural background and 
personal experience express nothing more than the synthesis of manifold of empirical 
data of an ideal subject, i.e. the mental representation in one kind or another. If 
Heidegger is right in his criticism of the representation model thus defined, then it 
follows that such way of approaching the question of background will always pass 
over the question it claims to answer in the first place, for the background understood 
ontologically can never be reached through mental representation or anything like that. 
51 For the exposition for the term ‘for-the-sake-of-which，and how it is connected with the ‘equipment’ 
through the 'assignment' or 'reference' to ‘in-order-to’’ see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM Press LTD, 1962): 114-122. 
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Therefore the same putting on a piece of cloth on the head can never be said to 
represent different meanings under the Islamic and Chinese background, if to veil 
never means to perform something as definite as such a simple behavior in the first 
place, namely, in the ontological sense. This statement warrants more clarification. 
What do we mean that a definite behavior as putting a piece of cloth on one's head 
can never be found in the ontological sense? Further, how will the practice of veiling 
turn out to look like in the ontological setting as defined by Heidegger? In the 
following paragraphs I will attempt to answer these questions through examining how 
the basic understanding that Dasein has toward a practice such as veiling can be 
shown by the proper body distance that Tunisians keep between oneself and the veiled, 
and further, how the ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' as defined by Heidegger can be 
understood through Said's accounts. 
First of all，as we have mentioned in the earlier account of Heidegger's main 
arguments concerning the question of background, the understanding that Dasein has 
at the ontological level for an entity is not anything like the mental representation as 
assumed by the subject-object model. Further, we have also mentioned that such 
understanding is based on the basic familiarity that Dasein has with his/her everyday 
world, which is for most of the time transparent. In regard to the veiling, this indicates 
� that when the ontological significance is concerned the practice can not be thought as 
any sort of mental representation, namely, it can not be conceived as first having a 
cognitive grasp of what is performed by people around as the cultural custom then 
decide to follow it by doing the same oneself. The kind of acculturation or social 
learning assumed here requires rules and principles that are definite and systematic so 
that the mind can recognize and act upon，yet according to Heidegger nothing as 
definite as such can be found in the familiarity the basis of which entities are already 
understood for Dasein. Yet these expositions still seem too abstract to be grasped. 
After all, how can the familiarity as Heidegger refers to it become transparent to 
Dasein, and how can it reveals the more basic understanding that Dasein 'has' toward 
his/her world? 
For the first point it will, be helpful for me to bring my ice-breaking experience in 
conversations with the Tunisians as a telling illustration. Back to my field trip, it was 
my daily routine to ask every one I came across in the casual setting about the 
meaning of the veil in the Tunisian context, and for most of time people would think 
silently for a while, then gave answers such as 'this is Islam', or 'this is what Muslims 
generally do'. Some of them could be considered as the kind of information that 
people came up with casually, yet not all of them could be passed off as trivial details 
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unworthy of serious attention. In one case, I was visiting the market inside Medina 
(the 'Old City') with the accompany of my Tunisian friend, and we came across two 
old women dressed in the 'Tunisian hijab'(see the third footnote back to the 
introduction) inside a shop selling women's garbs. I went up to them and asked for the 
meaning of what they are wearing. Since they did not speak well in standard Arabic, 
my friend introduced me and my research project to them in the Tunisian dialect. 
Being warm-tempered as many other Tunisians they were apparently willing to help 
me out with my research question, yet neither of them came up with something more 
systematic than scattered words such as 'Islam' and 'God'. Noticing the confused 
look on my face, one of them tried to show me how the prayer is delivered when 
mentioning the word 'Islam', and another repeatedly chanted the praise of God with 
her finger pointing upward to the sky. How should such a reaction be considered 
given our proposed question about the basic familiarity? Judged by .the informative 
aspect of their talk we may naturally consider this encounter as offering little useful 
empirical data. These two women appeared as having little to say about the veiling, or 
being restricted in their capacity of rendering the subject in an intellectual manner, yet 
we will be mistaken if we consider them as actually understanding little about the veil. 
The word understanding needs further exposition. In both cases they surely know 
quite well about how to pray five times per day, how to fast regularly a year, how to 
cover themselves carefully before going out every morning, and how to invoke 
expressions related to God to express their different emotions; all these could be 
accomplished with skillfulness after years of getting their way around in an Islamic 
country. 'Islam' or 'God' is in no case conceptual abstraction for them, since both 
have got so pervasively interwoven into the day to day scenario they are familiar with: 
the calling for prayer from the minarets in the early morning, the listening to the 
chanting of Qu'ran in every crowded market, and the referring to the greatness of God 
ill countless daily chatting. Predominantly diffused in everything around them, 'Islam' 
can no longer be called a way of life; it is the life itself in every tangible aspect. From 
this perspective, the loss of words is not an indication of failing in verbal 
communication or the more intellectual way of thinking, but rather the 
insurmountable difficulty one faces when trying to distance oneself from the basic 
familiarity. Further, the overwhelming influence of this familiarity is arguably the 
reason that people I came across resorted to the most general kind of answers such as 
'this is Islam' when being asked about the meaning of the veil. As we shall see further 
in the case of Saida, for some one having 'being a good Muslim' as the final 
‘for-the-sake-of-which', the practice of veiling is not only no more special than other 
daily 'in-order-to's that one does, but it can be entirely inconspicuous and 
unquestionable for the person concerned if everything goes as usual in a daily setting. 
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If the basic familiarity as we have seen in the preceding example can become 
transparent to a person getting intimately involved in one situation, how should we 
further comprehend the statement that this basic kind of familiarity has its own kind 
of understanding? If it looks like that every one is simply passively conforming to 
prevailing social norms, how should any understanding, which is generally associated 
with the active capacity of mind, to be said as exiting in this seemingly thoughtless 
conformism? To answer this question it will be helpful to look at how a proper body 
distance is kept between the veiled and others under the Tunisian context. In Tunisia 
people generally keep a certain body distance with a veiled woman in different social 
settings. Such kind of distance can be hardly defined in any accurate term, and will 
only be sensed once we socialize more casually with a veiled woman. Once joining a 
seminar organized by one Tunisian Youth Union in the capital, I discovered that 
during the seminar breaks the students gathered in the courtyard and chatted freely 
with each other, but a young man would naturally take a step back if a veiled lady 
jointed the conversation. This small response was hardly noticed by those present and 
the chatting generally went on without being disturbed in any observable way. This 
subtle body response that one has toward the veiled was further noticed in my getting 
along with two of my research assistants, who happened to be one veiled and one not. 
Whereas my unveiled assistant usually held my arms when walking with me and sat 
� . near to me in the restaurant, the veiled assistant seldom touched my body except 
during the hands-shaking, and during our chatting in Cafe she usually kept her chair at 
a certain distance to mine. This small difference in the body distance we kept with 
each was for most of time too trivial to be given any serious notice, yet for a foreigner 
like me it was nevertheless sensitively felt, perhaps out of curiosity. In the above two 
cases the body distance people keep between one and another can't be considered as 
something as rigid as rule or norm, for no one needs to pay any special attention to it 
at all in order to get the distance right. In every particular situation people know 
immediately how to position one's body with that of others without resorting to 
anything like rules. Rather, the proper body distance has already been achieved 
beforehand so that the normal social interaction between people can be carried out. 
This knowledge of appropriate gesture reveals a kind of understanding that is more 
basic than the formal form of mental representation, such as recognizing the meaning 
of the veil, or following the conventional norm regarding the veil. Further, if we have 
got Heidegger's vision regarding the 'primordial understanding' correctly, it will only 
make sense to further talk about any norm as such if people have already got this 
basic understanding of how to get along with one and another in the ontological sense. 
Unlike a norm which can be deprived of the concrete situation it takes place in 
individual cases, the understanding revealed by the proper body distance is an 
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indispensible aspect of every particular situation: it makes no sense to say that 'one 
step' is the norm if we are not referring to the courtyard chatting I happened to join in 
the first example; similarly it would be too inflexible to declaim that 'never holding a 
foreigner's arm’ is the norm that my research assistant follows if I am not referring to 
my personal encounter with her. The primordial understanding that people possess in 
terms of their dealing with the veiled is in this sense, unique to every concrete 
interaction, and the unrepeatable nature of each particular situation makes it difficult 
to be considered as any norm or principle. 
If as we have analyzed above, the basic familiarity that people have at the ontological 
level can turn out to be transparent for those involved, and the familiarity can further 
be considered to have its own unique understanding, as the example of proper body 
distance has revealed, then how can these insights help us with understanding the 
significance of veiling in the individual case? What does it mean to say that the 
1 
practice of veiling signifies anything ontologically, if the significance as such is not to 
be understood any meaning induced from the mental representation, be it personal or 
cultural? To explore this question we shall first take a close look at how Saida talks 
about the meaning of the veil for her, and then we will see where her discourse is 
going to lead us. Saida is a high school teacher in her forties, and she started veiling 
,, since her adolescence out of personal will. Back to the beginning of 1990s she quitted 
the attire due to the pressure imposed by the governmental ban, and only recently she 
resumed the dress under the spread of hijab trend within the country. During our 
conversation, she was constantly anxious that my research focus on the veiling is too 
narrow and potentially misleading, and in her words "hijab is only one part of being 
‘mutatayynah' (pious or religious)", which can not be correctly grasped without a 
comprehensive view of Islam and the kind of life it prescribes. This point is closed 
based on another idea that Saida tried to get across to me, namely, for a devoted 
Muslim there is no real difference between ‘，bada, (worship) and 'hayah'(life), for the 
truly religious should always aspire to lead a life in accordance with what one's 
religious conviction requires. To her, veiling was no more special than observing the 
daily prayer, being sincere with family members, committing to her work diligently, 
and in the case with me, treating a foreign friend with respect and kindness. As she 
puts it, "when it comes to the details of being alive and being observant veiling is felt 
as natural as breathing and walking." How should we consider the interpretations 
Saida developed here around veiling, isn't this a telling illustration for how for some 
the practice constitutes part of their identity as being Muslim? Since the whole debate 
around the veil stems largely from people's holding on to different interpretations of 
identity, is there anything novel to be said about why people like Saida would feel the 
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veiling as an indispensible part of their life? My answer to these questions is, for sure 
the accounts given by Saida here can be read as the expression of how a cultural 
specific practice like veiling matters to those concerned, and how the identity of these 
people has been in turn determined by adhering to the relevant cultural practices. Yet 
like the traditional way of taking cultural context as an entity assigned to different 
individuals, to consider the preceding accounts as expressions of identity not only 
answers nothing about what the cultural context and identity thus referred actually are. 
But it totally covers the possibility of answering this 'what is，question due to its 
epistemological dependence on the subject-object model. Since cultural context thus 
defined is not any more than the manifold of cultural data assigned to an ideal subject, 
which can be further understood through the subject's cognitive power, the personal 
identity says nothing more than the a bunch of mental representations of oneself that 
can further determine the behavior one takes and the choice makes. However, insofar 
as our proposed task of exploring the ontological significance of veiling is concerned, 
the representational approach does not get us anywhere near to the question we face, 
namely, what does it mean to have a cultural context, and in this case of Saida, what 
does it mean to have a personal identity? In our preceding analysis of the basic 
familiarity and primordial understanding, the 'Islamic context' as the Tunisians live it 
has already turned out to be something new, which is shown as transparent and 
situation-dependent. It is predicable that the significance of the veiling, understood 
ontologically, is going to be something different from the personal meaning that we 
generally associate with the concept of identity. To see this we may start from the last 
point Saida mentioned previously, namely, veiling is felt as natural as breathing and 
walking for her. When placed in its original context, this analogy is not quite talking 
literally on how natural the veiling will make the practitioner feel, but rather pointing 
toward the transparent coping that Dasein does on the basis of his/her basic familiarity 
with the world. We will miss the point if we take this sentence as declaring the 
practical convenience that veiling brings to any Muslim woman, for the kind of 
naturalness that Saida refers to can not be read separately from her very personal 
project of being a good Muslim. We may think that the naturalness that Saida feels 
can probably be explained by her being growing up within an Islamic society and 
immersed for years in an Islamic culture, yet it is surely not the case that everyone 
nourished by the same broad social background will feel the same as Saida did. As our 
earlier analysis with cases like Sausa and Leila in chapter two has suggested, for some 
young people the veiling is not only felt to be unnatural, but highly troublesome for 
daily socializing. The clue for understanding the reason for Saida's feeling of 
naturalness resides in her mention of 'life as worship', and 'the veiling' as one part of 
this whole. For her being a good Muslim is considered as, in Heidegger's sense, the 
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final ‘for-the-sake-of-which，，that 'offers' significance for every little thing she does 
on a daily basis. We may translate her words into the Heideggerian ones to have a 
better grasp of how this works for her. She observes the prayer in order to be punctual, 
treats the family with love in order to be a good mother and wife, works hard at 
school in order to be a good teacher, accepts my interview with open-mindedness and 
veils in order to follow the proper dress code within her community. All these are 
done in her case for the sake of being a good Muslim. The for-the-sake-of-which 
'signifies' in every case beforehand what is meaningful for Dasein to do in this 
situation, and the significance in turn firmly depends on the basic familiarity which is 
always available for Dasein beforehand. Therefore Saida's having 'being a good 
Muslim' as her ‘for-the-sake-of-which' makes ‘to veil or not' significant, and this 
significance in turn depends on a more general Islamic background where the practice 
is already understood. Given our preceding analysis, the understanding here means 
that in the case of veiling people naturally know how to keep a proper body distance 
with the veiled, and countless likewise daily details that can be disclosed under further 
Interpretation; this can not be considered separately from the countless daily 
situations wherein God is constantly mentioned in the oral language, the chanting of 
Qu'ran available in any corner of the city, the reminder of daily prayer from the 
minarets is broadcasted regularly five times a day, and the festival setting in the street 
.. during the Ramadan is set up annually. All this constitutes what is most familiar and 
environmentally available for Saida, so that it makes sense in the first place for her to 
have her ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' as being a good Muslim. Following this line of 
reasoning, ontologically it makes no sense for a Chinese to veil, because no such basic 
familiarity or primordial understanding can be found in a common Chinese society. 
This is so, because the ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' of Dasein relies on the basic familiarity 
that makes the concrete 'in-order-to' followed by Dasein at a daily basis intelligible. 
Before moving to my conclusions, further conceptual distinction has to be made so 
that the ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' can be differentiated from the concept of identity. In 
the case of Saida, we may think it possible to simplify the exposition by saying that 
Saida's sense of identity as being Muslim gives meaning to what she does on a daily 
basis, and the veiling belongs to one of the practices that is constitutive essential for 
her identity. The identity thus understood indicates the mental representation of some 
sort or another, i.e. Saida has some sort of ideas about herself and projects these ideas 
on the things she does. Further, she uses these ideas to organize what she does so that 
the behaviors will become coherent and significant for her. Yet such mental projection 
and organization have no place in the case of ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' ； in the case of 
Saida to say that 'being a good Muslim' is her final ‘for-the-sake-of-which' does not 
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mean that she is using this idea as the guiding light to decide what is the best choice to 
make in every concrete situation. (In this sense we may think Saida is saying to 
herself in order to be a good Muslim I have to observe the prayers, behave honestly 
with my family and friends, dress modestly and etc.) The formal kind of definition for 
a 'good Muslim' is not at all applicable in this case, since the detailed situation that 
Saida encounters is far more complicated than any general moral guidelines can offer 
when it comes to her daily life. On the contrary, such a grand guiding principle will 
close off the actual possibilities that Saida faces in every arguably non-repeatable 
situation, making the flexible coping with it impossible. For instance, the general 
guideline of being a good Muslim may include something like treating the 
non-Muslim with respect, yet it does not at all offer any answer for more nuanced 
situations such as whether or not to accept the interview of a non-Muslim and whether 
or not to tell the interviewer the existing criticism concerning a religiously desirable 
practice. A top-down sense of identity won't help one in getting around in all these 
complicated situations. Contrary to the concept of 'identity', the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which' that one has does not decide the proper thing to do so that one 
can manage to achieve it. Strictly speaking the ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' is never going 
to be fully achieved through any formal procedure thai subject to further breaking 
down into smaller steps. Dasein just has to stick to the particular situation and 
response to it, and keep doing this in an on-going manner constitutes to make the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which' of Dasein visible. In the case of Saida, she does everything 
from delivering the prayer on time to dressing modestly, from being nice to the 
friends to answering my question sincerely. In every case she is what she aspires to be, 
namely, a good Muslim. She will never be able to fully accomplish to be a good 
Muslim for it only goes on so long as she exists, namely, being able to take a stance in 
a new situations. • 
If I was successful in the previous analysis, then at this point we should be able to see 
that the ontological significance of a cultural practice like veiling is determined by the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which' of Dasein, and it is further based on a basic familiarity on the 
basis of which everything is already understood. According to the choice approach we 
have followed in the preceding chapters, the different cultural contexts is to be 
conceived as predisposed in an arbitrary manner so that the task of making a free 
choice through the universal practical reasoning is to rise above the predominating 
influence of one's own culture and think alternatively. Yet this assumption leaves the 
whole question of cultural context and our relation with it as individuals totally 
unsettled. In regard to the veiling this question can be taken as a question about the 
cultural and personal meaning of veiling. Most of the previous researches answer this 
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question by assuming a broad sense of subject-object dichotomy. Accordingly, the 
practice of veiling is seen as a present-at-hand entity the meaning of which is 
determined by the complex combination between cultural and personal factors. To put 
it in more correct terms, the same practice of putting a piece of cloth on the head is 
considered to have different meanings under different cultural contexts, and 
interpreted differently by different individuals. Hence, the question of meaning is 
answered in this way through resorting to the mental representation of an ideal subject, 
which makes it possible to comprehend the existing cultural norms and forming 
personal interpretations around it. Yet the ontological inquiry I proposed in this 
chapter is aimed at challenging this representational approach toward the question of 
meaning. If the representational approach were right, then it would make sense to 
declare that the practice of veiling has different meanings under the Islamic and 
Chinese context, or signifies different things to a Muslim and a non-Muslim. However, 
as we have already pointed out through exposing concepts such as ‘the basic 
familiarity，，‘the primordial understanding', and ‘the for-the-sake-of-which', the 
ontological significance of one practice depends on the Dasein's 
'for-the-sake-of-which', which further hinges on the basic familiarity. Therefore in the 
most primary sense the practice of veiling is unintelligible under the Chinese context 
where the basic familiarity is lacking. Ontologically, it might be intelligible for a 
contemporary Chinese young woman to live up to the standard of modesty by staying 
away from pre-marital sex, yet it is unintelligible that this Chinese lady chooses to 
wear a veil as expression of her modesty. Likewise, it would be lacking of 
significance for a non-Muslim to choose the veil, for in that case the 




The thesis starts with a recent hijab trend spreading among young Tunisians, and this 
case has raised interesting theoretical questions to be examined alongside the existing 
debate on the Islamic veil. In the preceding chapters I have examined two main 
theoretical questions: first, how should we understand the concept of 'free choice' in 
the individual cases of veiling, and second, what is the ontological significance of the 
veiling practice. 
Regarding the first question I first started with the problems posed by some of my 
interviews with the Tunisian students, namely, although all of them choose to wear the 
hijab out of personal will, they were more or less confused conceptually when it 
comes to the reasons for their choice. Some of them were even actually burdened by 
the idea of 'fitna' as it is popularly defined in the Tunisian context. This observation 
leads to my proposed rethinking of the concept of choice, i.e. whether the capacity of 
practical reasoning should be included in our judging of a choice made free, so that 
the person concerned not only has to be provided with external protection regarding 
the liberty of conscience, but is required to have a good argument for the choice made 
through reasoning. The quality of personal reasoning has not been given serious 
attention in the previous discussion of the veiling, and the point of contention has 
been the more general political meaning that the practice stands for, and the proper 
institutional arrangement regarding the practice. Consequently the wearing of veil has 
either been opposed based on its incompatibility with modern life or defended as 
liberating for those concerned in terms of the functions it serves. Yet discussing the 
question of choice at such grand level overlooks the complexity of situation when it 
comes to the individual reasoning over smaller decisions to be made in daily life. As I 
have argued in this paper, it is crucial to take into consideration this reasoning process 
since it determines primarily how conflicting ideas existing in the on-going debate has 
been sorted out in the personal case, and this further determines how well the 
individual will act consistently in reality without being self-serving or burdened by 
his/her unexamined beliefs. The critical examination of one's beliefs about the choice 
includes essentially the use of practical reasoning，which requires one to rise above 
the most familiar influences within the familiar environment and think alternatively 
how the principles one holds should be applied to a broader group of people. This 
alternative thinking is unfortunately in danger among most of my Tunisian informants, 
for whom the on-going warfare between the West and the Islamic world makes easy a 
categorical siding with Islam when thinking about sensitive issues such as the veiling. 
As a result it is difficult for those who are predisposed to defend Islam to spot the 
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fallacious arguments that widely exist in the popular preaching of veiling in the media. 
In the case of Tunisia this leads to the dilemma of hypocrisy that many veiled young 
women are faced with，which is resulted from, on the one hand, the spread of a rigidly 
defined idea of 'fitna' in public discussion, and on the other, the lack of critical 
thinking on the part of the individual. The popular view of ‘fitna, requires the young 
women to observe a stringent behavior code, which not only includes more general 
moral traits such as being honest and moderate, but also specific rules such as not 
wearing make-up, not hanging out with boyfriends, and most importantly, abstention 
from pre-marital sex. Yet for most of the young students I know these rules are too 
draconian to be followed, and consequently many of them had to adopt a double 
standard in most of these matters in order to justify their occasional breaking of 
conventions. This leads to a prevailing criticism of the 'hypocrisy' of the veiled in the 
public discussion of Tunisia, which in turn exacerbates the guilt many of the veiled 
feel about themselves. In proposing for practical reasoning, I contend that to a critical 
reflection of the beliefs one accepts at one time will likely to reduce the predominant 
control that specious popular ideas generally having on us; through clearly sorting out 
of different assumptions behind the beliefs one is more likely to act flexibly in reality, 
and importantly, with well-structured convictions which can stand critique from a 
broader circle, thus promoting a constructive public debate in the long run. After all, 
as one important form of public discussion, the intellectual debate on the practice will 
lose its intrinsic value and fundamental function if it can not inspire the general public 
to use their own reason in joining a rational debate on issues that concern them 
intimately. Insofar as my proposal of practical reasoning as a universal human 
capacity is concerned, one important opposition is held by the cultural relativists. In 
regard of the veiling, they insist on the relative nature of any kind of standards we are 
using in judging a behavior or choice as right, and settle for the Islamic vision of 
'rights' as being fundamentally different from the human rights as they are defined in 
the western context. Concepts such as 'modesty' and 'mutual complementariness' are 
usually mentioned by those arguing in this line, yet as I have pointed out in the critical 
examination of the popular religious preaching regarding the veil, when taken out of 
its original context and juxtaposed with some haphazardly selected 'western ideas', 
these concepts can not at. all support the argument that Islam stands for an exclusively 
defined idea for human freedom and dignity. Further, in citing discussions of 
Barazanqi I have also suggested that the common ground can be achieved between the 
western idea of reasoning and Qu'ran-based interpretation of basic human capacity. 
Moreover, Barazanqi's emphasis of the crucial role of understanding one's role as 
‘mutaqqf in moral judgments has also supported my argument for the importance of 
practical reasoning in defining the choice one made as truly free. 
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The second question I have addressed in this paper concerns with the meaning of the 
veiling, especially, how the assumptions of different ways of interpreting the meaning 
can be laid out philosophically, and compared in terms of their explanatory power. 
In my discussion of choice, the cultural and personal meaning of the practice has been 
completely left out so that common ground can be achieved regarding the possibility 
of our being moral and the position of reason in this process. Yet the question of 
meaning is nevertheless crucial since it determines in the most primary sense, namely, 
in the ontological sense, how a practice like veiling is understood by people 
concerning themselves with it. Regarding the question of meaning many of the 
previous discussion on the veiling have adopted a broad sense of subject-object model 
in their viewing of the practice. According to this vision, the practice of veiling is 
considered as a cultural entity which can be interpreted differently^ given different 
cultural contexts and personal experiences, and epistemologically an ideal knowing 
subject has to be presupposed to make such kind of interpretation possible. One basic 
implication of this approach is that the practice of veiling can be simplified into a 
present-at-hand entity, which is to be acted upon by determinant factors such as 
cultural context and personal experience. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the 
same practice means differently for a Muslim and a non-Muslim, under the Chinese 
and Islamic context. Yet convinced by Heidegger's critique for limitations of the 
representational model, I am arguing that ontologically it is wrong to believe that the 
practice of veiling means anything at all for a non-Muslim or under an Islamic context. 
In order to develop this point, I have first introduced basic terms that Heidegger 
coined for the ontological Interpretation of the background question, suggesting that 
the question of cultural background is primarily a question of being, and in order to 
approach this question rightly we have to shift our view of human beings from the 
ideal subject to Dasein. Further, using examples from my field trip I have shown that 
both the cultural context and personal identity can turn out to be something quite 
different under the ontological inquiry. In the case of cultural context, my analysis of 
my ice-breaking process during the interview shows that ontologically the Islamic 
context reveals itself as the basic familiarity that is generally taken for granted by 
people living with it. This is in sharp contrast to the context understood under the 
representational model, namely, the systematic aggregate of rules and norms that can 
be grasped mentally by our cognitive power. Through the case of proper body 
distance that Tunisians keep with the veiled, I have further pointed out that the basic 
familiarity is to be taken as a blind kind of conformism，for it has its own kind of 
understanding which is more primordial to the mental kind of understanding we are 
familiar with in the representational story. Likewise the personal identity also suggests 
• 85 
something different under the ontological inquiry. In the case of Saida I have shown 
how having 'being a good Muslim' as one's ‘for-the-sake-of-which' is different from a 
clear personal identity as Muslim, and further, how the ontological significance of the 
practice of veiling hinges on the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of Dasein. It follows that 
ontologically it is unintelligible for a non-Muslim to choose the veil, for the 
for-the-sake-of-which that 'determines' the significance of the practice is unavailable 
in that case. Likewise it makes no sense for a Chinese growing up outside the Islamic 
context to choose the veiling, since the basic familiarity that the practice requires in 
order to be intelligible ontologically does not exist in this case. 
Further, I would like to make some remarks on the theoretical implications of the 
Heideggerian phenomenology that I have been talking heavily in the final section so 
that it can be connected with my earlier discussion on the political aspect of the matter. 
In the earlier parts of my paper, the question that I dealt with concern the question of 
choice with the aim to bring about a more sufficient definition for it. Three kinds of 
argument can be identified to answer this question in the existing literature that I have 
mentioned in this paper: first, there is the argument from a cultural-relativist stance, 
which admits the importance of choice in religious obligation, yet only allow those 
who accept certain metaphysical assumption concerning Islam, say, the existence of 
God or women are created to have certain natural functions, the opportunity to draw 
determinate conclusion on the matter of rights. For this argument, the norm of 
defining rights should be considered as relative to Islam, in the sense that only those 
who are currently within a circle drawn by the metaphysical beliefs are legitimate to 
say anything conclusive on individual rights. This makes the communication between 
the Muslim and non-Muslim community on this subject impossible, and leads to a 
sharp distinction between the Islam and western understanding of rights. I am arguing 
against this relativist stance for the reason that there is a shared human nature that all 
of us can find in common in virtue of one's being human, namely, we are needy 
beings who are capable of reasoning jointly with one another. Accordingly, to make 
the determinate appraisal of veiling exclusive to Muslims is theoretically implausible 
for the very process of defining the purity of Islam depends on referring all non-Islam 
elements, which requires a minimum degree of understanding beliefs and customs 
other than the Islamic ones. Not to mention that for the proponents of the 
Islam-relativism, they have to assume the use of reason based on the basic 
intelligibility among all humans, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, in order to make any 
meaningful disagreement with others. Without this basic intelligibility that is 
pre-secured by one's use of reason as human, it would be pointless to say that all of us 
can have a debate in any sense as a community, let alone to have disagreement or 
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consensus as results of such debate. Second, there is a consequentialist argument in 
favor of veiling as illustrated by the works of Muslim feminists that I reviewed in the 
first chapter. According to this argument, veiling should be allowed because it brings 
positive social and personal consequences for women. However, the consequence is 
produced by social conditions that are neither under control of a person nor fully 
justified in their own terms, and the evaluation of the consequence depends on needs 
and interests that vary from one case to another. This makes the observation of such 
consequence unlikely to sustain a normative conclusion that these feminists aspire to 
draw, namely, women should be given the right to choose their attire in accordance 
with their beliefs despite the concrete social circumstances they are subject to. To 
reach this agreement on this point we need a standard of judgment that is not 
circumstance-relative. As I have proposed，such standard can be found with the shared 
human capacity of reason, which requires a person to not adopt assumptions that 
cannot be accepted upon further reflection, and not to act on incoherent maxims (e.g. 
to condemn nightclub and enjoying going to it at the same time). Making these norms 
of reason a necessary condition for our defining of a free choice can effectively rule 
out the unnecessary confusion or incoherence as we have witnessed in the cases of my 
interviewees. Third, there is an argument for the personal choice regarding sensitive 
political practices like veiling developed by some proponents of political liberalism. 
According to this argument, the primary condition for the matter of choice resides in 
the external political arrangement, and the decision to veil should be said free insofar 
as some crucial political rights are made available to the person concerned. The 
individual responsibility for following some norms in reasoning is overlooked in this 
argument. 52 This not only leaves unclear how the initial consensus on the proper 
political arrangement can be achieved among people with different persuasions, but 
sets up no effective norms by which a person can arrive at agreement with oneself. 
So far all my arguments are based on practical reason and its normative application in 
individual case, yet this would not be a satisfying reply for the question posed by the 
above three arguments, if I could not derive some exposition for the matter of 
meaning from my lengthy reference to Heidegger. Here I shall draw a tentative 
answer for this question. . First, in the first chapter I mentioned the line of thinking that 
Said adopts in his Orientalism, and I also argued that to assume a systematic cultural 
prejudice has misleading effect on a person's judgment. In the case of my 
interviewees, this prevents them from seeing the matter from an alternative standpoint. 
For example of this argument, see Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)，4-11; Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 69-81. 
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As a result, cultural relativist thinking makes difficult any substantive communication 
between these young Muslims and people from other cultures. A basic assumption 
underlies the cultural-relativist argument is that a person has to have some sense of 
identity about the cultural self. In our case, this means that a person must first identify 
herself as a Muslim, or have some narrative about being a Muslim so that it shall 
make any sense for this person to choose veiling. On this reading, it is the conception 
that one has about one's identity that confers meaning to the action of veiling. 
However, our analysis on the ‘for-the-sake-of-which，suggests that such an 
understanding of political identity is not what happens most primarily to a person. 
According to the Heidegger story, it is not the political identity that gives rises to 
significance of one's action. Rather, such identity would not be intelligible if the 
practice of veiling is not already 'understood' ontologically through a person's coping 
with the everyday world as Dasein. Further, the cultural background seen by Dasein is 
not equivalent to the cultural context that Said conceives as having determinate 
influence on one's political views. Just like the identity, the ontological background 
Dasein has is a basic familiarity that pervades the everyday world on which a person 
dwells, and it does not cause anything such as ‘opinion’ or 'viewpoint'. This 
conceptual way of summarizing what is going on only arises when there is something 
going unusual for one's everyday coping, so that a person may feel the urge to have a 
saying or expressing an opinion on the practice. (For instance, a person is urged to 
have a saying when being asked by me as a research to reflect on the significance of 
veiling.) Second, there is another response to the consequentialist argument that we 
can draw from the Heideggerian phenomenology. According to the latter, veiling can 
neither be grounded in an explicit intention to bring something about, nor can it be 
primarily justified by examining the empirical consequence such intention yields. The 
phenomenon of veiling goes one layer deeper than this intention story. In the 
ontological sense, to veil is not to have a specific intention to bring anything about, 
but rather to deal with the situation in a way that is most appropriate to one's given 
environment. Further, the process through which a person keeps her 
‘for-the-sake-of-which', say, to be a good Muslim carries on is not the same with 
having a consequence deriving from a specific intention. For the latter, an intention 
can be fulfilled when a desirable consequence is achieved. Yet for the former, since 
strictly speaking there is nothing to be achieved, there is nothing to be striving toward 
in the first place. Like all the activities that Dasein does, to veil does not bring any 
feeling such as fulfilling a religious obligation, following a convention or whatever. 
For the master level Muslim veiling shall be as ordinary and meaningful as all other 
activities brought forth by countless specific situations arising in one's daily life. It is 
through coping with all these situations with skillfully that the ‘for-the-sake-of-which， 
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this person has can be 'preserved'. This raises another difficult problem: how can we 
decide such ‘ for-the-sake-of-which' said as failing in any sense if it is going on in an 
'invisible' manner as I depicted here? Heidegger did not give a clear answer for this in 
his discussions. Given the ultimate persuasiveness that the ‘for-the-sake-of-which' has 
in the everyday world upon which a person dwells; it is hard to say if it can be broken 
by anything inside this world. Does this suggest that it can be broken by 'pressures' 
from outside this everyday world of familiarity? It is possible. My own conjecture of 
the breaking of one's' for-the-sake-of-which' shall be something like to have an 
anxiety for a clear identity, or to seek anxiously an explication for what one does. (On 
this reading the case of Yosr that I mentioned earlier might be said as an illustration 
for the breaking down of having being a Muslim as one's ‘for-the-sake-of-which' 
rather than living with it.) 
Finally, there are several limitations of this research that I would like to mention. First 
of all, like many other empirical based research, this project is originally designed to 
be open-ended in the interviewing process, which makes it only possible to theorize 
questions revealed by the data afterwards in a retrospective manner. One basic 
problem imposed by this research method is that the data collected in the first place 
might turn out to be inadequate in fully supporting the arguments made. In my case it 
only came to me gradually through translating my interviews and sorting out all the 
fragmented view points that practical reasoning is severely lacking in most cases with 
my informants; therefore it is possible that after discussing with them the ideas 
regarding the veil more thoroughly they will be more consistent in the arguments 
made, thus realizing the weakness of some beliefs they adopted in the first place. 
Therefore it is possible that I wouldn't be so harsh in my comment on them if the 
conversations we had were more modeled on the Socratic dialogue from the outset. 
Second, given my admittedly short stay in the country and predisposed focus on the 
interview, it was practically impossible for me to observe more deeply the daily life of 
Tunisians. This sets limits for the kind of examples that I could come up with in 
illustrating my points in the ontological analysis during the final chapter. The details 
would be much more vivid if I had been doing a longer period of live-in research in 
the country, and they will serve better in delineating how an average Tunisian is living 
ontologically with the practice of veiling. Finally, theoretically there is a deep-seated 
chasm between the discussion of choice based on practical reasoning and Heidegger's 
proposal of ontological analysis, which is beyond my ability to address in this short 
thesis. If one followed Heidegger all the way in insisting the essential position of the 
questions of being, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to argue for any kind of 
human nature at all. Yet it is one basic assumption of the choice approach that we 
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human beings are capable of reasoning in moral matters, and the practical reason 
gives better insight for how we should behave as rational animals. This assumption 
could be contrary to Heidegger's negation of any kind of human nature thus defined. 
The full implications of this theoretical division between the rational approach toward 
the moral question and the ontological insight into our capacity of being moral would 
be a subject for further inquiry in my future research. 
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